The Political Economy of Industrial Tree Plantations in the Era of Global Land Rush: the case of Guangxi, China by Xu, Y. (Yunan)
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 1
  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INDUSTRIAL TREE PLANTATIONS IN THE 
ERA OF GLOBAL LAND RUSH: 
THE CASE OF GUANGXI, CHINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yunan Xu 
  
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 2
This dissertation is part of the research programme of CERES, 
Research School for Resource Studies for Development 
 
 
This research was funded by the China Scholarship Council 
(CSC) and BRICS Initiatives for Critical Studies (BICAS). The 
Ford Foundation Beijing partially sponsored the fieldwork.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
© Yunan Xu 2018 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any 
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, 
recording or otherwise, without the prior permission by the 
author.  
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN  978-90-6490-090-7 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 3
The Political Economy of Industrial 
Tree Plantations in the Era of Global 
Land Rush:  
the case of Guangxi, China 
 
De politieke economie van industriële boom-
plantages in het tijdperk van een wereldwijde 
run op grond:  
de casus Guangxi, China 
 
Thesis 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the Rector Magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. R.C.M.E. Engels 
 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board 
 
The public defence shall be held on 
Thursday 20 December 2018 at 16.00 hrs  
 
by 
 
Yunan Xu 
born in Jiangsu, China 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
Doctoral dissertation supervisors 
Professor dr. M.N. Spoor 
Professor dr. S.M. Borras 
Other members 
Professor dr. E.B. Zoomers, Utrecht University 
Professor dr. ir. J.D. van der Ploeg, Wageningen University and Research 
Dr. G.M. Gómez 
 
 
Co-supervisor 
Dr. M.L. Schneider 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 5
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my dear parents and Fengfeng 
此书献给我亲爱的父母和风风 
 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 6
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 7
  
i 
 
 
 
 Contents 
 
List of Tables, Figures, Maps and Appendices v 
Acronyms viii 
Acknowledgements ix 
Abstract xii 
Samenvatting xiv 
CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF THE INDUSTRIAL TREE 
PLANTATION SECTOR IN SOUTHERN CHINA: PROBLEM, QUESTION, 
METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL EXPLORATION 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Accumulation and dispossession in agrarian transformations - 
Glances at the ITP sector in Southern China 3 
1.2.1 Accumulation with and without dispossession 4 
1.2.2 Diverse trajectories in the rise of the ITP sector in Guangxi
 7 
1.3 Research questions 18 
1.4 Objectives and relevance of the study 22 
1.5 The political economy and political ecology of industrial tree 
plantations 23 
1.6 Transitional rural China 29 
1.7 The key actors 38 
1.8 Analytical framework 44 
1.9 Method 50 
1.10 Fieldwork in Guangxi 56 
1.10.1 Fieldwork in 2014 56 
1.10.2 Fieldwork in 2015 57 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 8
ii  DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN INDUSTRIËLE BOOMPLANTAGES  
 
 
1.10.3 Fieldwork in 2016 59 
1.10.4 Fieldwork in 2017 66 
1.11 Organization of this study 66 
Notes  67 
CHAPTER 2: THE RISE OF THE ITP SECTOR IN SOUTHERN CHINA 73 
2.1 Introduction 73 
2.2 The ITP sector, globally and in China 73 
2.3 The domestic demand for the products 76 
2.4 The agronomic conditions in Southern China 79 
2.5 Land control and labour changes in rural Guangxi 81 
2.6 Land concentration and domestic and foreign land investment 86 
2.7 Conclusion 88 
Notes  90 
CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE EXPANSION OF THE ITP 
SECTOR IN CHINA 93 
3.1 Introduction 93 
3.2 The state in rural China 95 
3.3 The role of the state within the rise of the ITP sector 97 
3.3.1 The central level: preparation of conditions 97 
3.3.2 The provincial level 99 
3.3.3 The local level 101 
3.4 State-society interaction 105 
3.4.1 The state and political reactions from below 106 
3.4.2 Changes in the role of the state 106 
3.5 Further discussion 109 
Notes  111 
CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THEIR LAND ACCESS IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL TREE PLANTATION SECTOR 113 
4.1 Introduction 113 
4.2 Background: the rise of the ITP sector and foreign land-based 
investments in China 114 
4.3 Drivers of foreign investments in the ITP sector 117 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 9
 Contents iii 
 
 
4.3.1 A response to public criticism 117 
4.3.2 Control of raw materials 118 
4.3.3 Additional gains from multiple uses of the ITP sector 119 
4.3.4 Attracting Foreign Direct Investments: the role of the state 
from the central to the local level 120 
4.4 Forestland system in Guangxi 121 
4.5 Mechanisms of land acquisition 123 
4.5.1 Leasing from state-owned farms 124 
4.5.2 Leasing from rural collectives 125 
4.5.3 Leasing from middlemen 127 
4.5.4 Cooperating with individuals 128 
4.5.5 Relevant discussions 129 
4.6 Conclusion 130 
Notes  131 
CHAPTER 5: CHANGES IN VILLAGERS’ LIVELIHOODS IN SOUTHERN CHINA 
WITHIN THE RISE OF ITP SECTOR 135 
5.1 Introduction 135 
5.2 Specific institutional settings 137 
5.3 The negative impacts of ITPs on the local community 140 
5.3.1 Loss of livelihood sources 140 
5.3.2 Declining yield 141 
5.4 The change to villagers’ livelihoods 142 
5.4.1 Intimate land grabbing 144 
5.4.2 Changes in land-use 151 
5.4.3 “Stepping out” 155 
5.5 Conclusion 157 
Notes  159 
CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE 
EMERGING INDUSTRIAL TREE PLANTATION SECTOR IN CHINA 161 
6.1 Introduction 161 
6.2 Rethinking the dichotomy of villagers’ inclusion and exclusion 164 
6.3 Villagers’ positions within the expansion of the ITP sector 167 
6.3.1 Active inclusion 168 
6.3.2 Passive inclusion 169 
6.3.3 Passive exclusion 172 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 10
iv  DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN INDUSTRIËLE BOOMPLANTAGES  
 
 
6.3.4 Active exclusion 173 
6.4 Perceptions of the affected villagers 175 
6.5 Differentiated political reactions by the villagers 177 
6.6 Further discussion on villagers’ political actions 181 
6.6.1 The flexibility of villagers’ actions 181 
6.6.2 Beyond the common assumption of “villagers against 
foreign companies” 182 
6.6.3 Beyond land access 183 
6.7 Conclusion 184 
Notes  185 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 187 
7.1 Changes in land-use and land control 188 
7.2 Changes in labour conditions 192 
7.3 Changes in livelihoods 194 
7.4 Villagers’ wins and losses: the typology of inclusion and exclusion 
and accumulation mechanisms 194 
7.5 Insights into global land politics as seen from China 196 
7.6 Epilogue 198 
Notes  199 
APPENDICES 200 
REFERENCES 221 
 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 11
  
v 
 
 
 
 List of Tables, Figures, Maps and  Appendices 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1.1 The area of Chinese “planted forest” in 1990, 2010, ITPs in the 
1980s (thousand ha) ....................................................................................... 16 
Table 1.2 The characteristics of the ITP sector ........................................ 24 
Table 1.3 Required data, split by sub-question.......................................... 52 
Table 1.4 Data collection methods ............................................................. 54 
Table 1.5 General information on visited sites in 2015 ........................... 57 
Table 1.6 General information on informants during fieldwork 2015 .. 58 
Table 1.7 General information on visited villages in 2016 ...................... 62 
Table 1.8 Summary of the interviewees in 2016 ....................................... 63 
Table 2.1 Regional plantation areas and their increase between the years 
1990 and 2010 (million Ha) ........................................................................... 74 
Table 2.2  Property rights of forestland in Guangxi (in 2010)
 ........................................................................................................................... 84 
Table 3.1 The variegated attitudes of the local state towards the ITP sector
 ......................................................................................................................... 110 
Table 4.1 Two main foreign investors in Guangxi ................................. 115 
Table 5.1 Three main alternative livelihood changes by the villagers in 
Guangxi .......................................................................................................... 144 
Table 5.2 Distinct channels of individual villager-dominated land 
grabbing.......................................................................................................... 145 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 12
vi  DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN INDUSTRIËLE BOOMPLANTAGES  
 
 
Table 6.1 Villagers’ attitudes towards the economic value of the ITP 
sector .............................................................................................................. 165 
Table 6.2 Different types of villagers’ perception of the economic value
 ......................................................................................................................... 174 
Table 6.3 Villagers’ different political reactions towards the rise of the 
ITP sector ...................................................................................................... 178 
Table 7.1 Typology of the change in land control around the ITP sector 
in Guangxi ..................................................................................................... 191 
 
Figures 
Figure 1.1 Accumulation schemes within the rise of the ITP sector in 
Southern China .................................................................................................. 9 
Figure 1.2 Contiguous forestland for ITPs................................................ 10 
Figure 1.3 Small plots of eucalyptus trees remained in farmland in 
Guangxi ............................................................................................................ 14 
Figure 1.4 The map of Guangxi .................................................................. 17 
Figure 1.5 Research problem structure ...................................................... 21 
Figure 1.6 The multiple uses of ITPs ......................................................... 27 
Figure 1.7 Author’s rough sketch of different plots of land allocated to 
household under HRS .................................................................................... 31 
Figure 1.8 Key actors in the ITP sector in Southern China .................... 39 
Figure 1.9 Villager protest against illegal land occupation in Hepu County, 
Guangxi ............................................................................................................ 44 
Figure 1.10 Schema on how key concepts link to one another .............. 45 
Figure 1.11 Visited sites in 2015 .................................................................. 58 
Figure 1.12 Fieldwork visited sites in 2016 ................................................ 60 
Figure 2.1 Area of eucalyptus trees in Guangxi (1000 ha) ...................... 75 
Figure 2.2 Domestic consumption and production of forest products in 
China (Million m3) .......................................................................................... 77 
Figure 2.3 The Chinese import volumes of fibreboards (1000 m3), wood-
based panels (1000 m3) and pulp for paper (1000 tonnes) ...................... 78 
Figure 2.4 Land use in Guangxi .................................................................. 80 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 13
 List of Tables, Figures, Maps and Appendices vii 
Figure 2.5 Fragmented paddy land ............................................................. 82 
Figure 2.6 The intertwined factors for the rise of the ITP sector ......... 89 
Figure 3.1 The bureaucracy .......................................................................... 96 
Figure 3.2 Da Huanghou timber processing industrial Park in Wuming 
County ............................................................................................................ 103 
Figure 3.3 The newly planted pine trees and Castanopsis hystrix trees on 
the forestland of a state-owned farm ......................................................... 108 
Figure 5.1 Percentage share of wages in total income of average rural 
household in Guangxi .................................................................................. 139 
Figure 5.2 A plot near ITPs in Binyang County in Guangxi ................ 142 
Figure 5.3 Eucalyptus trees planted by an “intimate land grabber” (top 
photo) and by Stora Enso (bottom photo) ............................................... 150 
Figure 5.4 A land plot tilled to change land-use from eucalyptus trees to 
sugarcane ........................................................................................................ 156 
Figure 6.1 Typology of villagers’ positions .............................................. 167 
Figure 6.2 Villagers’ grievances towards land and environmental issues
 ......................................................................................................................... 175 
Figure 7.1 Typology of land-use change with the rise of the ITP sector
 ......................................................................................................................... 189 
Figure 7.2 Labour flow during the rise of the ITP sector ..................... 192 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 Questions for academic actors ............................................. 200 
Appendix 2 Questions for state actors ..................................................... 201 
Appendix 3 Questions for corporate actors ............................................ 202 
Appendix 4 Questions for villagers .......................................................... 203 
Appendix 5 Questionnaire(English Version) .......................................... 205 
Appendix 6 Questionnaire(Chinese Version) ......................................... 213 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 14
  
viii 
 
 
 
 Acronyms 
 
 
 
ITP - Industrial Tree Plantation 
PA - Primitive Accumulation 
ABD - Accumulation by Dispossession 
AWD - Accumulation without Dispossession 
HRS - Household Responsibility System 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization 
TNC - Transnational Company 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 15
  
ix 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgements 
 
 
First and foremost, my deepest and heartlet thanks to my three supervi-
sors, Professor Max Spoor, Professor Jun Borras and Dr Mindi Schneider, 
for their guidance and support throughout this PhD journey. I would like 
to express my special thanks to Jun. He guided me to the world of critical 
agrarian studies, helped me to deal with various challenges and taught me 
how to be a good scholar (though I am still on the way). His smart and 
critical thinking, hard-working, passion for research and life and deep love 
for peasants really inspire and motivate me. Without his generous support, 
I would not be able to finish this thesis. I can never thank him enough. To 
Max, I am extremely grateful. He has offered me enormous support at 
every stage of my PhD. He was always kind and encouraging. His men-
torship is crucial to the completion of this study. I also owe many thanks 
to Mindi. Her insightful comments and suggestions have profoundly 
sharpened this work. She was always patient, stimulating and constructive 
in her supervision. I tremendously benefited from discussions with her. 
And her dedication to Chinese agrarian studies as a female scholar is an 
inspiration.  
Similarly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all my com-
mittee members in my PhD seminars, namely, Professor Jan Douwe van 
der Ploeg, Professor Murat Arsel, Dr. Alberto Alonso-Fradejas, Professor 
Ye Jingzhong, Dr. Julien-François Gerber and Clara Mi-Yong Park. Their 
critical and constructive comments and suggestions have helped to im-
prove this work. I particularly grateful to Professor Ye, who travelled all 
the way from Beijing to the Hague for my full draft seminar and public 
defence. As well, I was honoured by the presence of Professor Annelies 
Zoomers, Professor Jan Douwe van Ploeg, Professor Ye Jingzhong, Dr. 
Georgina Gomez, and Dr Julien Francois Gerber at my public defence. 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 16
x THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL TREE PLANTATIONS  
Furthermore, I am deeply grateful to those who helped, supported and 
facilitated my fieldwork in Southern China in many ways. Special thanks 
to Professor Ye for his advice and support throughout the process. Many 
thanks to my friends and colleagues: Wang Chunyu, Hu Zhen, Li Hua, Liu 
Juan, - for their support, dedication and company during part of my field-
work. I am also greatly indebted to communities that I visited in Guangxi 
and Yunnan, particularly those villagers who shared their stories and 
thoughts with me. All their support made my research possible.  
I am also sincerely thankful for the support I received from my com-
rades and friends throughout my PhD journey. Special thanks to my fellow 
PhD candidates: Natalia, Daniela, Elyse, Christina, Ratha, Alberto, 
Tsegaye, Ben, Salena, Zoe, Laura, Cecile, Sergio, Arnim, Yukari, Amod, 
Antonio, Eric, Natacha, Nguyet, Martha, Jin, Sara, Clara, Mads, Nadine, 
Donna, Adwoa, Boa, Umut and the other fellow ‘villagers’. Thanks so 
much for their friendship, encouragement and support and also for the 
joy they brought. Discussing, debating and chatting with them immensely 
benefited my academic work and my personal life. Special thanks to Na-
talia, Christina, Laura, Tsegaye, Sue and Salena for their help when revising 
my research papers, which are part of this work.  Special thanks to my 
other good friends inside and outside of ISS: Sat, Eri, Brandon, Karla, 
Emile, Xu Ye, Beatriz, Fangping, Angelica, Eunjung, Binyam, Sathya, 
Zemzem, Salomey, Bia Nca, Giulio, Juan, Li Hua, Hu Zhen, Lynn, Kenji, 
Cape, Ana, Lv Zhen, Sharmini, Chenmei, Brenda, Hannah, Tania, Shen 
Qing, Chen Zhen, Kong Long, Zhuowei, Hailin, Jinchao, Sijun, Shaofeng, 
Guoqing, Yang Qin, Yali, Jingjing, Qinyuan, Shuting, Guanyu et al. Their 
friendship made the PhD journey enjoyable and joyful. Special thanks to 
the friends I met during courses, seminars and conferences from different 
parts of the world for their friendship and support. Thanks Jane Pocock 
for agreeing to copy-edit my dissertation. Many thanks to the academic 
staff and administrative staff members of ISS who helped me during my 
PhD study. 
Thanks to China Scholarship Council (CSC) for the financial support 
for four years’ study and research in the Netherlands. And also, thanks to 
BRICS Initiatives for Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS) with funds from 
Ford Foundation Beijing, which has supported part of my fieldwork in 
southern China. Some research funds are covered from the budget of Po-
litical Economy (PE) research group of International Institute of social 
studies (ISS). I am sincerely grateful to their support. 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 17
 Acknowledgements xi 
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family. To 
my parents, thanks for their unconditional love. They always encouraged 
and supported me to overcome all kinds of difficulties and to pursue the 
path I chose. Lastly and most importantly, I want to thank Fengfeng, my 
beloved partner, soulmate and best friend. He is the first one who encour-
aged me to pursue a PhD in the Netherlands. He believed in me and sup-
ported me both mentally and financially during this arduous journey. 
Without him, I would never have this work completed. 
 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 18
  
xii 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
 
The industrial tree plantation (ITP) sector is expanding rapidly and mas-
sively in Southern China, and recently especially in Guangxi. The rise of 
the ITP sector, involving both foreign and domestic actors, has led to ex-
tensive changes in land-use and land control, as well as in labour condi-
tions and livelihoods in the villagers in question. These changes and the 
resulting encroachment by the ITP sector, has led to diverse political re-
actions by the affected villagers. Exploring the dynamics of the sector’s 
expansion in Southern China offers, on the one hand, a more refined anal-
ysis of the role of China in global land politics and calls for a rethink of 
the nature of land politics. On the other hand, it helps to deepen the un-
derstanding of a complex maze of recent and dramatic agrarian transfor-
mations in Guangxi involving the land-labour nexus and villagers’ liveli-
hood changes. In this context, the central research question is: Why and 
how did the industrial tree plantation sector expand in Southern China, and what 
implications does it have for the livelihoods of rural villagers? 
Using a critical agrarian political economy and political ecology analyt-
ical framework, this study explores the dynamics of the ITP sector’s ex-
pansion in Southern China - contextually, interactively, and dynamically. 
This study demonstrates that the rise of the ITP sector emerged under 
particular economic, political, and social conditions worldwide and in 
China, while the contours and trajectories of the ITP sector (re)shape and 
are (re)shaped by the land, labour, and livelihood conditions in Southern 
China, in a dynamic and relational way. 
This study shows that foreign investors acquire land inside China. This 
implies that the role of China in global land politics is not limited to that 
of the country-of-origin of numerous foreign land investors and as a major 
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site of agro-product consumption, but that the country is also a destina-
tion of foreign land investments in a global crop boom. At the same time, 
this study reveals a reverse labour and capital inflow from urban areas to 
rural areas with the rise of the ITP sector. This trend is in contrast to what 
most studies on agrarian transformation note, namely that rural areas are 
dispossessed for the capital accumulation of urban industrial sectors, with 
a massive labour flow from rural to urban areas. This study also sees that 
villagers do not necessarily get excluded and thus resist the sector because 
of their expulsion and/or because of environmental concerns, as in the 
case in many other places around the world where a crop boom has taken 
place. Villagers exhibit diverse adaptive livelihood responses to a crop 
boom, and are affected differently by it, which then results in distinctly 
different political reactions. In order to more fully capture these dynamics, 
this study goes beyond the dichotomy of “exclusion versus inclusion”, and 
offers a more nuanced typology, which includes passive inclusion, active 
inclusion, passive exclusion, and active exclusion. Finally, this study criti-
cally examines the complicated role played by the state during the pro-
cesses just described. 
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DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN INDUSTRIËLE 
BOOMPLANTAGES IN HET TIJDPERK VAN EEN 
WERELDWIJDE RUN OP GROND: 
DE CASUS GUANGXI, CHINA 
 Samenvatting 
 
De sector industriële boomplantages (ITP) breidt zich snel en massaal uit 
in Zuid-China, en recentelijk vooral in Guangxi. De opkomst van de ITP-
sector, waarbij zowel buitenlandse als binnenlandse actoren betrokken 
zijn, heeft geleid tot uitgebreide veranderingen in grondgebruik en grond-
beheer, en ook in de arbeidsomstandigheden en het levensonderhoud van 
de betrokken plattelandsbewoners. Deze veranderingen en de inmenging 
door de ITP-sector hebben geleid tot uiteenlopende politieke reacties van 
de getroffen dorpsbewoners. Onderzoek naar de dynamiek van de expan-
sie van de sector in Zuid-China biedt enerzijds een verfijndere analyse van 
de rol van China in de mondiale grondpolitiek, en vraagt om een herover-
weging van de aard van de grondpolitiek. Anderzijds draagt het bij aan een 
beter begrip van een complex doolhof van recente en dramatische agrari-
sche transformaties in Guangxi die van invloed zijn op het verband tussen 
grond en arbeid en op het levensonderhoud van de plattelandsbewoners. 
In deze context is de centrale onderzoeksvraag: Waarom en hoe is de sec-
tor industriële boomplantages in Zuid-China uitgebreid, en welke implica-
ties heeft dit voor het levensonderhoud van de plattelandsbevolking? 
Met behulp van een kritisch analytisch kader uit de agrarische politieke 
economie en politieke ecologie wordt in dit onderzoek gekeken naar de 
dynamiek van de expansie van de ITP-sector in Zuid-China - contextueel, 
interactief en dynamisch. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat de ITP-sector is op-
gekomen onder bijzondere economische, politieke en sociale omstandig-
heden die zich wereldwijd en in China voordoen, terwijl de contouren en 
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trajecten van de ITP-sector (opnieuw) vormgeven aan en (opnieuw) wor-
den gevormd door de omstandigheden op het gebied van grond, arbeid 
en levensonderhoud in Zuid-China, op een dynamische en relationele ma-
nier. 
Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat buitenlandse investeerders grond verwer-
ven in China. Dit betekent dat China in de wereldwijde grondpolitiek niet 
uitsluitend een rol speelt als het land van herkomst van talrijke buiten-
landse grondinvesteerders en als een belangrijke afnemer van agropro-
ducten, maar dat het land ook een bestemming is voor buitenlandse inves-
teringen in een wereldwijde hoogconjunctuur op het gebied van gewassen. 
Tegelijkertijd laat deze studie zien dat de opkomst van de ITP-sector ge-
paard gaat met een omgekeerde instroom van arbeid en kapitaal van ste-
delijke gebieden naar plattelandsgebieden. Deze trend gaat in tegen wat in 
de meeste studies over agrarische transformatie wordt gesignaleerd. Die 
wijzen op een onteigening van de plattelandsgebieden ten bate van de ka-
pitaalaccumulatie in stedelijke industriële sectoren, wat een massale uit-
stroom van arbeid van het platteland naar de stedelijke gebieden tot gevolg 
heeft.  
Uit dit onderzoek blijkt ook dat plattelandsbewoners niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs worden uitgesloten en zich dus niet automatisch tegen de sector 
verzetten vanwege de onteigening en/of vanwege zorgen om het milieu, 
zoals het geval is op veel andere plaatsen in de wereld met een hoogcon-
junctuur op het gebied van gewassen. Dorpsbewoners verschillen in de 
manier waarop zij zich aanpassen aan de gevolgen die de hoogconjunctuur 
in gewassen heeft voor hun levensonderhoud. Ze worden er op een ver-
schillende manier door beïnvloed, wat leidt tot duidelijk verschillende po-
litieke reacties. Om deze dynamiek beter in kaart te brengen gaat dit on-
derzoek verder dan de dichotomie van ‘uitsluiting versus inclusie’. Er 
wordt een meer genuanceerde typologie gepresenteerd, die passieve inclu-
sie, actieve inclusie, passieve uitsluiting en actieve uitsluiting omvat. En 
ten slotte wordt in deze studie kritisch onderzocht welke gecompliceerde 
rol de staat speelt in de zojuist beschreven processen. 
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1 
1 Chapter 1: Rethinking the politics of 
the industrial tree plantation sector 
in Southern China: problem, 
question, methodology and 
theoretical exploration 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, crop booms have occurred worldwide under the conver-
gence of food, fuel, financial, and environmental crises (Hall 2011). As 
Hall (2011) points out, when a crop boom takes place, there is a rapid 
increase in the changes in land-use for the cultivation of that particular 
crop in a given area. This is not only a process of extensive land-use 
change, but is often followed by land acquisitions/land grabs in varying 
ways and at various levels. These changes in land control and land-use 
have significantly affected the livelihoods of local villagers and, in some 
cases, even resulted in the dispossession of various social groups, normally 
the marginalized, and have provoked widespread conflicts (Scoones et al. 
2013, White et al. 2012). These crop booms have attracted a pyramid of 
academic studies, especially concerning land politics. In this dissertation, 
land politics includes issues around who controls the land under what 
channel and for what land-use, who gets what from the land, and the im-
plications of these land-based changes.1 
In current literature, most researches focus on the offshore production 
of boom crops on sites of abundant land supply (e.g. Southeast Asia, Af-
rica and Latin America), involving the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) as some of the newly-emerged investors 
(Hall 2011). In most cases, land-use change involved in the crop boom are 
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for the purposes of food production, biofuel production, and, in a few 
emerging critical studies, flexing in response to multiple crises. 2 Thus the 
boom crops commonly discussed are palm oil, soybean, and sugarcane. 
Meanwhile, crop booms always involve large-scale land acquisitions, 
popularly called ‘land grabs’, which are highly visible worldwide in the cur-
rent literature and political debates (Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 2013). 
These land acquisitions include a dynamic change in land control: when 
someone gains access to land, those who were previously using it lose part 
of or full control of it. This aligns with the definition of land grabbing put 
forward by Borras et al. (2012), that land grabbing is essentially a form of 
‘control grabbing’: “grabbing the power to control land and other associated 
resources such as water in order to derive benefit from such control of 
resources” (Borras et al. 2012, 850). 
Among these crop booms, one important emerging sector is the rapidly 
expanding tree plantation, which is linked to the increased demand for 
timber, pulp and other biomass products (Kröger 2014a). This has re-
ceived much less attention compared to other sectors such as food, bio-
fuels, and mining, despite its relative scale in terms of land area covered 
(Kröger 2014c). It deserves systematic research attention, if only because 
it is one of the biggest sectors in the current land rush in terms of land 
area involved. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, this is also 
one sector that involves China in a more complicated way. 
In the emerging literature, China is linked to the current global land 
rush as an investor in overseas production, a key player in the circula-
tion/trade, and a key site of consumption, but rarely as an important des-
tination of cross-border land investments within a crop boom. Where 
studies about land grabbing in China exist, the research is mainly about 
forced/illegal land transfers (tudi liuzhuan)3, or development-induced land 
expropriation (Siciliano 2014, 2013).4 In a subsequent section addressing 
the industrial tree plantation sector, I will show that there is a specific angle 
that can single out China as a distinct area of research in the global land 
politics literature. 
Specifically: there is an expanding industrial tree plantation sector in 
Southern China, currently large-scale (in terms of total land area covered 
and capital involved), which involves foreign corporations (including 
Finnish and Indonesian ones) and a variety of state and corporate domes-
tic partners. Various domestic actors, even individual local villagers, are 
involved in this investment complex. The villagers in question cannot be 
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fully expelled because of the specific rural land system.5 The commodities 
produced are mainly for domestic Chinese consumption. In some places, 
the villagers embrace the land deals, while in others these land deals have 
provoked conflicts. This is a result of villagers’ distinct interests based on 
their different positions in the sector (which include passive inclusion, ac-
tive inclusion, passive exclusion, and active exclusion).6 Thus, the specific 
political economy of the industrial tree plantation (ITP) sector, embedded 
in particular land-labour conditions in Southern China has made the case 
even more complicated. 
Additionally, analysing the dynamics of the ITP sector in China also 
offers insights into the recent political discussion around land accumula-
tion and dispossession. More specifically, there is a general assumption in 
the current land grabbing discussion that the current corporate encroachment into 
rural areas tends to result in the expulsion of people from their land, and their trans-
formation into landless labourers that mostly support the industrial development of ur-
ban areas. 
However, the current Chinese ITP sector deviates from this popular 
assumption. With the rise of the ITP sector in Southern China, villagers 
do not necessarily get dispossessed and become more vulnerable. Instead, 
villagers show diverse adaptive livelihood responses based on their differ-
ent access to resources under specific institutional and social structures. 
As a result, villagers do not always lose, but at times can benefit, from the 
boom process. Moreover, this Chinese ITP case also shows a reverse la-
bour and capital inflow from urban areas to rural areas, with a few villagers 
returning to rural areas and engaging in the ITP sector with the financial 
capital they gained in urban industrial sectors. 
Therefore, the dynamics within the expansion of the ITP sector in 
Southern China demonstrates that capital accumulation is possible not 
only with, but also without, dispossession of villagers. Thus, an in-depth ex-
ploration of this exception can open an agenda for discussion in the global 
scholarship on contemporary land politics and agrarian transformations. 
 
1.2 Accumulation and dispossession in agrarian 
transformations - Glances at the ITP sector in Southern 
China 
Many scholars use Marx’s “primitive accumulation” and David Harvey’s 
“accumulation by dispossession” to understand land grabbing in terms of 
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its drivers (for accumulation), mechanisms (dispossession, and mainly co-
ercion), and implications (reproduction of capitalist relationships) (Hall 
2013). In this dissertation, instead of an attempt to unfold these loaded 
theories, I intend to position land politics, especially the dynamics of the 
land-labour nexus and livelihood change of the villagers, with the rise of 
the ITP sector in Southern China (in particular Guangxi), based on the 
classic discussions around “accumulation and dispossession”. In this part, 
I particularly focus on the “land-labour nexus”, which refers to the inter-
connected and interacted land and labour dynamics within the boom. 
1.2.1 Accumulation with and without dispossession 
Karl Marx was the first to give a critical analysis of the process of separat-
ing peasants from their means of production, and of capitalist develop-
ment. In Capital: Vol. 1, A Critique of Political Economy (Marx 1887 
orig.1992), Marx analysed the sources, characteristics, and mechanisms of 
capital by studying the history of western countries – especially the birth-
place of capitalism, namely, England. When analysing the point of depar-
ture of the capitalist mode of production, he touched on the relationship 
between capitalism and rural development, and coined the concept of 
primitive accumulation (PA) - “the historic process of divorcing the pro-
ducer from the means of production” (Marx 1887 orig.1992, 875). In so 
doing, he used the capitalist development process of European countries 
(such as England) to demonstrate how the expropriation of peasants 
through their forceful expulsion from their land supplied the capitalist la-
bour market with “free and rightless proletarians” (Marx 1887 orig.1992, 
885). 
Marx’s description of the bloody processes of primitive accumulation 
featured three important elements. Firstly, private ownership was con-
verted from either Church property, state domains, common lands, or feu-
dal and clan property. Secondly, these practices went hand in hand with 
fraud, force, violence, and coercion. Thirdly, expropriating and expelling 
peasants from land on the one hand enabled capitalists to increase their 
wealth and power via the control over the means of production, while, on 
the other hand, it created a reserve army of labour serving as cheap wage 
labour in urban industrial sectors. (Marx 1887 orig.1992, 908-913). In both 
ways, separating peasants from land facilitated the process of urban indus-
try. Thus, according to Marx, proletarianization was a key element of the 
process. 
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Marx conceptualized primitive accumulation as a stage towards capitalism, 
or a precondition for capitalist accumulation, which he assumed would 
end when capitalism emerged. Based on Marx, David Harvey argues that 
primitive accumulation is not a stage in a unilinear process towards capital-
ism, but an ongoing feature of capitalism. Extending Marx’s concept, Har-
vey proposes “accumulation by dispossession” (ABD) (Harvey 2003, 1) to 
understand the reproduction of capitalist relationships and continuous ac-
cumulation under the crisis of over-accumulation. 
In his explanation of ABD, Harvey argues that although “all the fea-
tures of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained pow-
erfully present within capitalism’s historical geography up till now,” there 
are several nuances that exist in the current context (Harvey 2003, 145). 
One the one hand, “some of the mechanisms of primitive accumulation 
that Marx emphasized have been fine-tuned to play an even stronger role 
now than [in] the past” (Harvey 2003, 146-147). This was the case for the 
role of the “credit system and financial capital” in fuelling the process of 
speculation and predation in contemporary capitalism, and that of the 
state in guaranteeing “certain structures of law, private property, contract 
and security of money” to facilitate the market system during accumula-
tion through its “police powers and a monopoly over the means of vio-
lence” (Harvey 2003, 89). On the other hand, there are some new mecha-
nisms. The development of technology, the degradation of the 
environment and the depletion of common resources has created new 
fields of accumulation - entailing the privatization and commodification 
of “cultural forms, histories, and intellectual creativity” (Harvey 2003, 
148). Meanwhile, capital assets and labour power are devalued in response 
to global crises by international capital - sometimes backed by the investor 
state or superior state powers (Harvey 2003, 151). 
Expanding the discussion above, and doing so within the context of 
China, Walker (2006) argues that the “alliance between money and power 
(...) has generated a particular form of primitive accumulation,” which she 
terms “gangster capitalism” (Walker 2006, 1). She defined three main 
mechanisms of “gangster capitalism” in rural China. Firstly, the “urban 
bias” strategy of the central state in the 1990s, which prioritized urban 
development while reducing agricultural investment, was actually a case of 
state-organized “exploitation and oppression of peasants” (Walker 2006, 
2). Secondly, the “two tract pricing system” (between agricultural products 
and industrial commodities) enabled the state-owned enterprises to obtain 
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cheap raw materials and extract resources in rural areas (Walker 2006, 3).7 
Thirdly, a few power-holders used the rural land reform (Household Re-
sponsibility Reform) of the 1980s-1990s as opportunities to illegally shift 
“state property and assets into their own hands” (Walker 2006, 3-5). These 
three mechanisms have had an important impact on how land, labour and 
agrarian transformation can proceed, and are key to the main issues that 
will be problematized in this study. 
Although the mechanisms and distinct socio-economic contexts of 
capital accumulation identified by these scholars differ across time and 
space, the processes all lead to dispossession, and in most cases, displace-
ment of rural populations. In this sense, capital accumulation is featured 
cum dispossession, under which villagers lose control over the land they pre-
viously used and do not get employed by the land investors. 
Contrarily, Giovanni Arrighi argues that accumulation can occur with-
out necessarily dispossessing villagers. When studying the success of Chi-
nese economic development, he expands the notion of accumulation without 
dispossession (AWD) (Arrighi 2007). AWD, a term coined by Gillian Hart 
(2002) in her book, Disabling globalization: Places of power in post-apartheid South 
Africa, is a distinctive form of accumulation in China, which differs from 
the accumulation process in South Africa. Hart argues that the redistribu-
tive land reform in China reflects the specific context of Chinese industrial 
accumulation that took place without dispossessing rural populations 
from their land. (Hart 2002, 199).8 
Building on Hart’s reformulation of PA and ABD, Arrighi further ex-
plained the mechanism of AWD by addressing two aspects. On the one 
hand, China’s household registration system (the Hukou regime)9  pre-
vented the spatial mobility of the rural population and “encouraged the 
rural to ‘leave the land without leaving the village’ [离土不离乡]” (Arrighi 
2007, 361). The Hukou regime separates rural populations from the urban 
ones and is the basis for rural land distribution.10 Thus, it in fact ties the 
villagers to the land, averting the full expulsion of these villagers from their 
land. On the other hand, the rise of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs, the market-oriented but collectively-owned economic units) in ru-
ral China from the 1980s to the early 1990s, also supported AWD. TVEs 
provided off-farm working opportunities for villagers to obtain additional 
wages, while maintaining subsistence farming as a way to redistribute and 
reinvest the industrial surplus to the rural community “within local cir-
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cuits” (Arrighi 2007, 361-364).11 This means that companies could accu-
mulate capital, not necessarily by separating the producers from their 
means of production (as in PA and ABD), but by employing low-cost rural 
labourers. 
Partly in in line with Arrighi’s arguments, Huang, Yuan, and Peng 
(2012) also claimed that the process of rural capitalism is not necessarily 
accompanied by “the spread of an agricultural proletariat” (139). Based on 
an empirical analysis of hired labour in the agricultural sector, they char-
acterized agricultural development in China as “capitalization without prole-
tarianization”. They attributed this special form of capitalization to “the 
concatenation of the political-economic institutions (of equal distribution 
of land and a rural-urban divide in household registration) of China with 
its mode of farm organization under population pressure” (Huang, Yuan, 
and Peng 2012, 165). In other words, one the one hand, villagers’ land-
holdings compensate their low wages in urban areas, thus sustaining a sub-
stantial supply of cheap labour for urban industry. On the other hand, 
wages from off-farm work also eliminate villagers’ livelihood pressures 
due to a low return of farming on fragmented and tiny land plots (under 
the Chinese land system which will be elaborated below). 
Similarly, Chuang (2015), in her study of a village in the Sichuan Prov-
ince, pointed out that although land expropriations - following the scheme 
of ABD - also exist in rural China, “[l]abor, however, is cheapest in rural 
regions where residents are not dispossessed, and continue to subsist 
through farming.” (292). She identified and examined one of the key 
mechanisms of AWD in contemporary China as enterprises employing 
rural land holders on very low wages to pass on the “social cost of work-
force maintenance to rural governments” (275). 
Thus, in contrast to PA/ABD, in the process of AWD, capitalists are 
able to accumulate without dispossession. In this context, investors are 
able to use cheap labour and create a reserve labour army without separat-
ing villagers from their means of production. 
 
1.2.2 Diverse trajectories in the rise of the ITP sector in Guangxi 
A key issue in the discussion on PA, ABD, and AWD is what happens to 
the villagers in question. Linking these concepts to a crop boom, in the 
classic Marxist conception of PA, dispossessing villagers of land is a key 
element of the accumulation process. Similarly, Harvey also pointed out a 
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renewed wave of land enclosure in new terrains (e.g. in China after its 
opening up) during ABD. Thus, as summarized in Figure 1.1, when capital 
accumulation emerges with dispossession (Type A), the villagers are dispossessed 
of land and not recruited by investors. As a consequence, these villagers 
are bound to become more vulnerable due to the loss of land (as a key livelihood 
source) and then usually get excluded within a crop boom. 
In Arrighi’s AWD, however, as mentioned above, villagers are not nec-
essarily dispossessed of land during capital accumulation, especially in the 
case of China, because of the role of certain institutions – namely, the 
household registration system (Hukou), the land property regime, and nat-
ural endowment (in terms of high or low land density, which will be elab-
orated on later in this dissertation) – in preventing the complete expulsion 
process and protecting family farms.12 In this sense, there is a possible al-
ternative direction of change in the process of capital accumulation (Type 
B): the villagers do not lose land while being employed by land investors. Thus, they 
are able to get included in a crop boom and at times be better-off, because, rather 
than lose their previous source of livelihood, the villagers might have their 
livelihoods expanded through employment in the booming sector. 
On this basis, a closer look at the dynamics of the rise of the ITP sector 
in Southern China tends to confirm a far more diverse trajectory of land, 
labour, and livelihood change. There are empirical cases (as will be illus-
trated below) which show dynamics of accumulation cum dispossession 
(Type A), and also cases (Case 2) which demonstrate accumulation with-
out dispossession (Type B). 
Moreover, in a few cases (Case 3), land and labour are both needed, 
which is a combination of the above forms of accumulation (Type C). It 
means that villagers, usually those without alternative livelihood sources 
(e.g. migrant workers in urban areas), are not only dispossessed of land, 
but also exploited for their labour power (i.e. becoming cheap wage la-
bourers). Because the jobs available for unskilled labourers in the ITP sec-
tor are always temporary and seasonal,13 these villagers’ livelihoods be-
come more vulnerable compared to the above types. 
Additionally, sometimes neither land nor labour are needed by inves-
tors (Type D). Thus, this group of villagers is not exploited (of their land 
and labour) during the encroachment of the ITP sector. In these cases 
(Cases 4-6), no one else accumulates at the expense of these villagers dur-
ing the rise of the ITP sector, although this might not be the case in other 
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sectors. Within Type D, a few villagers choose not to engage in the boom-
ing sector (see Case 4), while some others become independent eucalyptus 
planters (see Case 5). Furthermore, there are also a few villagers who ac-
cumulate land from their fellow villagers and become owners of ITPs (see 
Case 6). 
However, the schemes of accumulation are not static and sometimes 
change for specific reasons (as shown in Cases 7 and 8). These add com-
plexity to the land politics in the context of the rise of the ITP sector. 
Figure 1.1 Accumulation schemes within the rise of the ITP sector in South-
ern China 
 
 
Case 1: In a remote village in Guangxi, the forestland was collectively-owned with-
out distribution before the rise of the ITP sector.14 A few villagers used the forestland to 
cut firewood as way to support their livelihood. In 2008, facilitated by the local state, 
the land is leased to a foreign company for 25 years. The contiguous forestland (around 
7000 mu) is then converted into a eucalyptus tree plantation to provide the raw materials 
for the company’s paper production.15 The villagers then lose part of their income from 
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cutting firewood. Meanwhile, their food production on the nearby farmland plots is neg-
atively affected by the ITPs due to the environmental impacts of the fast-growing trees. 
Under this condition, most of the villagers are not employed by the investors. 
Figure 1.2 Contiguous forestland for ITPs 
 
Source: photo taken in Guangxi on 18 March 2015 
 
This case showed a typical dispossession process as framed by Marx 
and Harvey. These villagers lost control over the previously commonly-
use land and did not get incorporated. This is an emblematic example of 
Tania Li’s (2011) argument that, when “the land is needed, but their labour 
is not”, exploitation and exclusion are the most logical outcome. This type 
of agrarian process has occurred in many parts of China during the recent 
decades, including in Southern China and in processes linked to the rise 
of the ITP sector. 
 
Case 2: A woman from a village in Guangxi was a migrant worker in urban areas, 
but later returns to the village to take care of her child. She farms the land plots distrib-
uted to her while doing temporary paid on-farm work for fellow villagers at the same 
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time. With the rise of the ITP sector, she has not yet lost control of the land, but get the 
chance to work on ITPs (weeding and fertilizing) in nearby villages for both foreign and 
domestic investors. 
Case 2 is different from Case 1 in the sense that it illustrates an example 
of the expansion of the ITP sector not resulting in the expulsion of villag-
ers from their land. It is an example of when the land is not needed, but the cheap 
labour is. This is more aligned with AWD. This villager does not lose con-
trol over the land she possessed and is employed in the ITP sector. She 
represents the ‘surplus labour’ described by Marx, but she is not a prole-
tarian who is totally separated from the land and related social relations. 
Under this scheme, villagers are incorporated into the crop boom and able 
to gain, albeit very little, income from the sector. 
 
Case 3: The collectively-owned forestland (500 mu) of a remote village is leased to 
several domestic investors (from both the locality and outside) for the purpose of setting 
up an ITP. Under this scheme, the villagers still control several patches of farmland 
distributed in the 1980s. Later, a few family members are employed by a few investors 
as workers on the plantation. 
Case 3 seems, at first glance, to fit in with Arrighi’s AWD. The villagers 
maintain control over their small farmland plots and get incorporated into 
the emerging sector as wage labourers. However, when taking a closer 
look, this case also contains elements of Harvey’s ABD. Due to the leasing 
process, villagers have, in essence, lost and been dispossessed. They have 
lost effective control of large-scale collectively-owned land (while remain-
ing the nominal ‘owners’), on which they might otherwise have con-
structed their own ITPs and then shared the bulk of the profits. They were 
converted into workers but did not migrate to urban areas. This case is an 
example of when land is needed, so is the cheap labour, which includes the dual 
mechanisms of accumulation (ABD and AWD). In a way, this is similar to 
what Watts and Little (1994, 81) describe as the “disguised proletariats”. 
This is a common occurrence around the world in places where contract 
farming schemes and lease agreements are practised between companies 
and villagers.16 Thus, under this scheme, villagers tend to be exposed to a 
more vulnerable situation. Their inclusion is under unfavourable terms 
which usually bring more loss than benefit, which is closer to McCarthy’s 
(2010b) framing of adverse incorporation17. 
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Case 4: Faced with the expansion of the ITP sector, one villager in Guangxi buys 
a truck and engages in the transportation business (at times including eucalyptus trees). 
However, on the nine mu farmland controlled by his household, he plants sugarcane 
instead of eucalyptus trees, because he believes that currently the price of eucalyptus trees 
is lower than that of sugarcane. Moreover, he thinks that planting eucalyptus trees can 
only bring an income every 4 or 5 years, while cultivating sugarcane can contribute an 
income every year, which will be able to cover the household’s annual expenses. 
Case 4 is an example of when the land is not needed, nor is the labour. The 
scenario is different from that which is created by Marx’s PA, Harvey’s 
ABD, or Arrighi’s AWD. The villager is not dispossessed of the land he 
controls - as is usually the case with PA/ABD. Neither is he turned into 
cheap wage worker - as normally occurs under the AWD. Meanwhile, this 
villager represents a group of villagers who are excluded from the crop 
boom, but their exclusion is not the result of being dispossessed by others, 
but an active “stepping out” (as adapted from Scoones 2012, 515) of their 
own will. They control sufficient means of production or/and capital, but 
decide not to engage in the crop boom, although some of them might be 
involved in the related upstream/downstream sectors. This implies non-
accumulation in the process. 
 
Case 5: A young couple from a village in Guangxi are working as migrant workers 
in a big city. Their wages are the main source of their whole family’s income. With the 
rise of the ITP sector, they plant eucalyptus trees on some parcels of the land they control 
that are not good for paddy rice and vegetable production, and in anticipation of a good 
market for eucalyptus trees. Growing eucalyptus trees does not require a significant la-
bour input, since the trees only require care during the first planting phase. After plant-
ing, the young couple goes back to the city to continue their wage work. The eucalyptus 
trees they plant are like an additional saving. After the first logging, this couple receives 
100,000 Yuan.18 As pioneers in the planting of eucalyptus trees in the village, they 
really earned some money. 
Case 5, similar to Case 4, does not fit the scenario of accumulation cum 
dispossession, nor is it aligned with that of accumulation without dispos-
session. It is an example of “neither their land nor labour is needed”. They are 
neither dispossessed of the land nor converted into cheap wage workers 
in the ITP sector, although their labour is needed in urban areas. With the 
rise of the ITP sector, they choose to become independent planters based 
on the resources they possess (in particular land). Thus, under this scheme, 
they do not lose, but are able to gain from a crop boom. 
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Case 6: When a paper-pulp company entered the village and leased the collectively-
owned forestland for ITP sector, one villager who used to do migrant work in Guangdong 
province came back and also engaged in the ITP sector. In 2005, he leases 30 mu 
forestland from his own village with the money he earned in the urban area. At the 
beginning, he only cultivates the trees with his wife. Then, he expans his plantations 
gradually through leasing, to a total scale of more than 100 mu in 2015. Now he 
employs seasonal labour to help plant trees, fertilize, weed, and log the trees. Although 
such intensive investment in the ITP sector is risky (e.g. the typhoon attacks in summer), 
he still has a big chance to make a fortune. 
Case 6 is also an example of when the land and labour are not needed 
during the crop boom. This villager is not exploited of his land or his la-
bour. Instead, he engages into the crop boom and becomes a capitalist 
himself, with an attempt to employ rural surplus labour. He is able to ac-
cumulate land at the expanse of his fellow villagers based on his privileged 
access to information and recourses (particular financial capital gained 
from his migrant work). This shows a typical process of “accumulation 
from below”, similar to the analysis by Yan and Chen (2015). It implies 
that the villagers in question are not homogeneous in the context of mas-
sive internal migration in China (as will be elaborated in Chapter 5 and 6). 
Although mass numbers of villagers give up farm work in rural areas and 
migrate to urban areas as cheap wage labour in the industrial sector to 
facilitate capital accumulation (Arrighi 2007, Chan 2010), this case reveals 
that a few villagers give up waged jobs in the urban areas and use the in-
come earned from the industrial sector to invest in the booming eucalyp-
tus sector. This indicates an opposite direction of labour and capital flow: 
from the urban industrial sector to the rural agricultural sector. 
 
Case 7: With the encroachment of the ITP sector, a middle-aged man who has a 
job in the town (as an electrician) starts to plant eucalyptus trees in his hometown on 
around 10 mu of forestland distributed to his household in the year 2008. Two years 
later (in 2010), he decides to give up due to the possible significant investment in trans-
portation in the future. He contracts his forestland together with the trees already planted 
to Stora Enso for a 30 year term. 
Case 8: With the expansion of the ITP sector, one rural household plants eucalyp-
tus trees on their farmland distributed under land reform. Later, the county government 
organizes a movement to clean all the eucalyptus trees planted on the farmland. After 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 36
14 CHAPTER 1 
 
this, only a small plot of eucalyptus trees, as shown in Figure 1.3, very near harvest, is 
maintained. Because of this, a few of villagers contract their land to specialist compa-
nies/entrepreneurs involved in food production (e.g. maize, sugarcane, and fruit trees). 
Figure 1.3 Small plots of eucalyptus trees remained in farmland in Guangxi 
 
Source: Photo taken on 7 April 2015 in a county in Guangxi where the removal of eucalyptus 
trees had taken place. The land plots on which previously eucalyptus trees were planted are 
now used to cultivate maize. 
 
Case 7 and Case 8 denote that land politics with a crop boom are dy-
namic. Although some villagers are not dispossessed and engage in the 
sector for a certain period, they might leave their land and/or be dispos-
sessed later for a variety of reasons. In a certain political-economic con-
text, the process of AWD might later turn out to have a similar effect to 
that of ABD. Thus, the schemes discussed are interchangeable, which re-
minds us to make dynamic analyses. 
The above eight cases can be expanded to illustrate variegated trajecto-
ries of land control, labour regimes, and livelihood change associated with 
the rise of the ITP sector in Southern China that underpin Chinese agrar-
ian transformation. Moreover, these cases relate to the current debates on 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 37
 Rethinking the politics of the industrial tree plantation sector 15 
 
land politics based on classic formulations of PA, ABD, and AWD. The 
illustrative cases cited above show that, while PA, ABD, and AWD are all 
helpful lenses, the messy realities of social actors and social relations on 
the ground are not always fully and neatly captured by these concepts, 
much less by one such single conceptual lens. This messy reality thus war-
rants deeper examination. Building on the broad formulations discussed 
above, this study seeks to explore land politics in a relational and dynamic 
way, focusing on the land and labour nexus and villagers’ livelihood 
changes in the context of the rise of the ITP sector in Southern China. 
The challenge is not to study each ideal-typical case above, but to under-
stand the dynamics within and between these ideal-typical cases, and to 
reflect on their relevance in the current discussion on global land politics. 
The ITP sector in China was chosen as the main study subject for two 
main reasons. The first reason is the agrarian, political, and economic char-
acteristics of industrial tree plantations, which are relevant to the linkage 
between urban industry and rural agriculture, the land-labour nexus (land-
intensive but not labour-intensive), and the environmental-economic 
complex (fast-growing tree crop). The second reason is the geopolitical 
and economic character of the country chosen as a case study, namely, 
China. While China is usually perceived as an active transnational investor 
in contemporary transnational land politics, this case features it as the for-
eign investment host country – somewhat similar to what Borras et al 
(2012) call “land grabbed land grabbers” in the context of Latin America. 
Moreover, China, as a country with a bureaucratic hierarchy and a specific 
rural land property system (referring to the separation of land property, 
land contracting, and land management/user rights, which will be elabo-
rated on later in this chapter), is experiencing a political, economic, and 
social “transitional period.” This transition started with the market reform 
of the 1980s, and involved a series of political and economic changes (as 
will be analysed later in this chapter), both within and beyond the country 
(Day 2013, 1). A series of political, socio-economic and institutional 
changes, including the recentralization of the fiscal regime and massive 
rural-urban migration, make the agrarian transformation in rural China 
into a very complex and uncertain issue. 
As shown in Table 1.1, China is a major worldwide producer of indus-
trial trees. The industrial tree plantation sector in China emerged slowly in 
the 1980s, but gained momentum and expanded dramatically from the 
1990s onwards. It is concentrated in Guangxi, as well as in other southern 
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parts of China, namely in the Hainan, Yunnan, Fujian, and Guangdong 
Provinces. 
Table 1.1 The area of Chinese “planted forest”(/plantation) in 1990, 2010, 
ITPs in the 1980s (thousand ha) 
 
Area of ITPs at 
the end of the 
1980s a 
Area of 
‘planted forest’ 
in 1990b 
Area of 
‘planted forest’ 
in 2010b 
Area of planted 
forests with in-
troduced (exotic) 
species in 2010b 
China 400 41950 77157 21603 
Global 1275 94938 152902 44589 
Chinese ITP 
(%) 31.37% 44.19% 50.46% 48.45% 
Source : the data in this Table was synthesized by the author based on the EJOLT report 
(Overbeek, Kröger, and Gerber 2012), Bazett (1993), as cited in Carrere and Lohmann (1996), 
and FAO (2010). The ITPs here include rubber tree plantations and palm oil plantations. 
 
Among these ITP sites, Guangxi – a key hub of the ITP sector in China 
– will be the regional focus of the research, with a specific focus on the 
eucalyptus subsector. Guangxi is situated in the south-east of China, on 
the border with Vietnam (see Figure 1.4). The geographic location has 
created suitable natural conditions for eucalyptus plantations (a subtropi-
cal, mild and moist climate), as well as geopolitical advantages; it is the first 
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area, and benefits from such national devel-
opment initiatives as “Western Development”, “Costal development”, 
and “Development of minority region”. All these have contributed in 
some ways to the development of ITPs in the region. 
To date, Guangxi has more than one-third of the fast-growing planta-
tions in all of China, and is the top ranked eucalyptus area in China. The 
rise of the ITP sector in Guangxi is the result of both state and non-state 
actors’ efforts, which will be systematically analysed in Chapter 2. 
Among the investors in these eucalyptus tree plantations in Guangxi, 
two transnational companies, namely Stora Enso from Finland, and APP 
from Indonesia, have received much attention. Stora Enso kick-started its 
eucalyptus tree plantations in Guangxi in 2002. By 2015, the ITPs owned 
by Stora Enso had expanded to 82.26 thousand ha, accounting for around 
5% of the total ITPs in Guangxi (2010) and with sites located in Beihai, 
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Nanning, Qinlian and Yunlin (StoraEnso 2016a). APP started to plant eu-
calyptus trees in Guangxi in 1995. Currently, its eucalyptus tree plantations 
have expanded to Qinzhou, Nanning, and Wuzhou, with a total acreage 
of 100 thousand ha, which is 6% of the overall area of ITPs in Guangxi 
(Liu 2010b)19. 
Figure 1.4 The map of Guangxi 
 
 
 
 
While these ITPs have been controlled by these foreign investors, they 
have also affected thousands of village households, and provoked wide-
spread conflict among villagers, state farms, and foreign companies. Some 
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of these conflicts are related to the compensation for land expropriation, 
as in the case of the conflicts between Stora Enso and the villagers of 
Hepu, Guangxi (Ping and Nielsen 2010a). Some of the villagers’ acts of 
resistance flared up because of the negative impacts of ITPs on the local 
environment, including overusing local water and soil resources, and 
threatening biodiversity. In short, based on their scale and political impli-
cations, these foreign-invested eucalyptus tree plantations are playing a 
critical role in the ITP sector in Guangxi. 
Associated with the complexity of these foreign land investments in the 
ITP sector, a few basic questions arise: Why do these foreign companies 
choose to engage in the ITP sector in China? This is a question for the 
foreign investors. Why are foreign land investors able to engage in the ITP 
sector? This is a question for the Chinese state and land owners. These are 
only entry questions, as an initial attempt to answer them leads to a maze 
of recent and dramatic agrarian transformation in Guangxi involving land 
control, land-use, labour conditions and villagers’ livelihood changes, 
within and around the sector of industrial tree plantations. In turn, this 
maze leads to more complicated questions about how such intersecting 
international and domestic capital on the one hand, and land, labour, and 
livelihoods of the rural villagers on the other hand, shape and are reshaped 
by each other’s strategy. The potential relevance of such research is quite 
wide, and goes beyond the ITP sector and beyond China: on the one hand, 
it reflects the dynamics of livelihoods, land, and labour in Chinese agrarian 
transformation; on the other hand, it relates to land politics and rural pol-
itics in the global context (as will be elaborated in the part 1.4). 
 
1.3 Research questions 
Based on the framing of the problematique above, and looking at the in-
tersection of international and domestic dynamics of capital, land, and la-
bour politics, the central research question asked in this study is: 
Why and how did the industrial tree plantation sector expand in Southern China in 
the past two decades, and what implications does it have for the livelihoods of rural 
villagers there? 
This central research question is split into the following working sub-
questions: 
1. What are the conditions that have fostered the massive and rapid ex-
pansion of the Industrial Tree Plantation (ITP) sector in Southern China 
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in the past two decades? The factors I will mainly focus on are the follow-
ing: 
(1) The agronomic conditions for growing eucalyptus (suitable cli-
mate, geographic conditions in Southern China, as well as the de-
velopment of genetic technology that makes the eucalyptus spe-
cies popular in Southern China); 
(2) The surge in demand for consumer products from the eucalyptus 
sector, such as paper and timber; 
(3) The institutional land and labour conditions in rural China that 
facilitated the rise of the ITP sector: 
a) the dual property system of rural land and forestland reform; 
b) massive internal rural-urban migration; 
c) the 2002 and 2008 rural tax reforms; 
(4)  The financial capital, especially the foreign capital, involved. 
2. What is the role played by the state and corporations within the rise 
of the ITP sector in Southern China? 
(1) How did the state (central and local) intervene in the eucalyptus 
tree sector boom? The state’s role (strategies/ influence/ interven-
tion) is never independent and static, but (re)shapes and is 
(re)shaped by the actions of the other key actors (corporate, vil-
lagers). Thus, this question should be answered in a dynamic and 
relational way. 
(2) What is the role played by corporations, particularly foreign com-
panies, in this sector, and to what extent? 
a) Why did foreign companies choose to invest in China? 
Why did they choose to expand their business to get in-
volved in the production of raw materials? And more im-
portantly, why did they choose to acquire land in China, 
considering China’s relatively fragmented landscape and 
complicated land regime? 
b) Why did the Chinese state allow international investors to 
gain significant influence in this sector? Is it an anomaly 
that these foreign companies are able to gain control over 
natural resources when Chinese companies are observed 
going abroad to seek control of similar resources (e.g. land)? 
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c) What are the various land control strategies used by these 
companies in China, and what are the respective institu-
tional arrangements? In what way are the foreign compa-
nies’ land acquisitions similar to, and different from, do-
mestic investors? Are there any (potential) conflicts 
between these land control practices? 
 
3. What is the role played by rural villagers in Southern China with the 
rise of the ITP sector? And what are the implications of the ITP sector on 
these villagers in terms of the political economy of their livelihoods? 
(1) How did the ITP sector impact rural villagers’ autonomy and ca-
pacity to construct, defend, consolidate, or expand their liveli-
hoods? What are the livelihood choices of these villagers in re-
sponse to the boom of the ITP sector? Do they actually lose or 
win during the process? I will answer these questions by taking the 
differentiation of the villagers and their distinct relations with the 
sector into account. 
(2) What are villagers’ perceptions of the encroachment of the ITP 
sector? What are their political reactions? To answer these ques-
tions, I will highlight the distinct interests of the villagers in ques-
tion in the crop boom. 
  
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 43
 Rethinking the politics of the industrial tree plantation sector 21 
 
Figure 1.5 Research problem structure 
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1.4 Objectives and relevance of the study 
The main objective of this study is to understand the political, economic, 
and ecological reasons for, and the implications of, the significant expan-
sion of the ITP sector in China. It is the aim of this study to understand 
more systematically why the sector evolved the way it did in terms of 
scope, pace, character, and trajectory. Equally importantly, the study aims 
to understand the political, economic, and ecological reasons for this sec-
tor to develop in Guangxi. In many places in the world, industrial tree 
plantations are more commonly developed using large-scale industrial 
mono-cropping production methods. But in Guangxi, the ITP sector also 
employed a mode of production involving spatially scattered plots and 
small-scale individual planters. It thus involves numerous transactions and 
contracts with numerous plot-holders and planters, with patches of euca-
lyptus trees scattered all over Southern China.20 At first glance, the institu-
tional and geographic characteristics of such a mode of production would 
have slowed – not expedited – the sector’s growth. The answer to this 
puzzle is thus not obvious, and needs to be investigated more carefully. 
 Finally, it is also the objective of this study to examine more carefully 
the impacts and implications of the rise of the ITP sector on the liveli-
hoods of villagers. Conflicts have erupted in many places in the world 
where this sector is present; many of these conflicts consist of resistance 
struggles against the sector by local communities and groups that are ex-
pelled from their lands, or instead are triggered by environmental con-
cerns. Some of these can also be noted in China. However, the political-
economic impacts of this sector on villagers’ livelihoods seem to be far 
more diverse than in other agricultural sectors, featuring both positive and 
negative consequences. Thus, the villagers’ political reactions to the sector 
cannot be straightforwardly termed politics of resistance. It is therefore 
the objective of this study to better understand such varied political reac-
tions. 
The study has a broader relevance – within China and beyond. By an-
swering the key question in this research, my study hopes to offer useful 
insights into the ongoing conceptual, empirical and methodological dis-
cussion about land politics (see Scoones et al 2013, Edelman 2013, Oya 
2013). “Control grabbing” (Borras et al., 2012) as the essence of land grab-
bing is an important element in restating the relevance of this study. The 
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logic of capital is to generate profit (Marx 1887 orig.1992). Capitalist in-
vestors will thus do wherever they can to make profit, although within a 
few boundaries (e.g. ecological ones) (Van der Ploeg 2009, Friedmann 
2016, Moore 2017). Facilitating capital accumulation is a key task of the 
state, along with maintaining political legitimacy (Harvey 2003, Fox 1993). 
By revisiting these critical concepts described above, this study argues that 
the case of the Guangxi ITP sector will contribute to global debates. This 
contribution will be drawn not only from examining more carefully a case 
of a “land grabbed land grabber”, but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
by showing the diverse mechanisms of land control and multiple implica-
tions for local villagers’ livelihoods – which are less present and/or less 
explored in many non-Chinese cases of land deals in the current scientific 
literature. To better capture the dynamic of land politics, this study devel-
ops a more nuanced typology of villagers’ situations in the crop boom, and 
actively engages with the discussions around accumulation and disposses-
sion. By doing so, instead of debating the applicability of either primitive 
accumulation (PA), accumulation by dispossession (ABD), or accumula-
tion without dispossession (AWD), I argue that the central concern is 
when and how each of these types of accumulation occur – because both 
accumulation with and without dispossession occur simultaneously in the 
industrial tree plantation sector in Guangxi. 
 
1.5 The political economy and political ecology of industrial 
tree plantations 
In this section, I will go into a more elaborate discussion of the problem-
atique, concepts, and questions mentioned above. I do so by tightly linking 
the discussion to concepts that are much closer to the political economy 
and political ecology of ITPs, as well as by addressing some empirical is-
sues related to ITPs in general and Guangxi in particular. As previously 
mentioned, the ITP sector is less often addressed by the emerging litera-
ture on global land politics, despite it being responsible for far broader 
land-use changes than other boom crops. 
It is important to quickly address some fundamental characteristics of 
this sector. First of all, the concept of an ITP should be clarified, as various 
authors have given several different definitions (Overbeek, Kröger, and 
Gerber 2012, Kröger 2012, Sheldon and Styring 2011, Gerber 2011b). In 
this study, ITPs refer to monocultures of non-food tree crops, mainly fast-
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wood forestry. They are not only those large-scale forestry planataions 
owned/controlled by corporations, but also large-scale individually-
owned and small-scale villager-owned tree plantations. As such, oil palm 
tree plantations mainly used for food production (palm oil) are excluded. 
Natural rubber tree plantations are also not included. Instead, I adopt a 
narrow definition of ITPs to include mainly eucalyptus, pine, and acacia 
trees. Eucalyptus trees, with a faster growth rate and a quicker and more 
massive expansion trend in Southern China than the other two species, 
are the main focus of my study. However, this does not mean that I plan 
to isolate the eucalyptus sector from other ITP sectors – or, for that mat-
ter, from other agricultural sectors. Instead, I will examine the eucalyptus 
sector in a relational way, while maintaining focus on it. Thus, throughout 
this study, I refer interchangeably to the eucalyptus sector and the ITP 
sector; in those sections where it becomes important to distinctly refer to 
the broader and more comprehensive ITP sector, I will indicate this to the 
reader. 
As shown in Table 1.2, ITPs have several key characteristics in terms 
of their production mode, the species’ agronomic features, product usage, 
source of capital, labour, and land relationships. Some of these are shared 
features of all boom crops, while some are unique and might lead to par-
ticular dynamics. 
Table 1.2 The characteristics of the ITP sector 
Items Features 
Production mode Cultivated on land (mainly forestland rather than farmland) 
Species’ features Fast-growing, exotic species 
Products’ usage Non-food use (as raw materials for industrial production) 
Source of capital Mainly from industrial sectors (both domestic and international) 
Labour-land relation-
ship 
Land-intensive but labour-saving/expelling 
 
Similar to other boom crops, ITPs are cultivated on land. Thus, with 
the rise of the sector, the main considerations are the land on which to 
grow trees, as well as the agronomic conditions (temperature, rainfall) and 
the particular species needed to maximize tree production. Thus, in a way, 
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it is very much traditional agricultural production. There are other institu-
tional and political issues that bring the sector closer to some other boom 
crop sectors. 
In order to develop ITPs, the investors need sufficient access to a suf-
ficient quantity of land. In general, ITPs are grown using industrial and 
mono-cropping methods, and require relatively contiguous blocks of land 
for more efficient production. They require “often tens or even hundreds 
of thousands of hectares” (Overbeek, Kröger, and Gerber 2012, 21). As 
the current global ITP boom is recent (only since the 2000s), the land 
currently used for ITPs was either “‘marginal’, ‘degraded’ or ‘unused’” for-
estland (as ITP investors claimed), or previously “occupied or used by the 
local communities” (Overbeek, Kröger, and Gerber 2012, 21-22). How-
ever, this is not always the case. In Vietnam, the ITP sector is based on 
smallholder units (Sikor 2011). China features both dynamics; this is 
largely conditioned by the institutional arrangement on land-use policy, as 
I will explain in the next part. 
Looking at the various types of production and land-use is one thing, 
and looking at the dynamics of land-use change is another.21 Is it a land-use 
change to switch from food production to ITPs? Or from a natural forest 
to ITPs? Or is that the case when switching from agronomically marginal 
lands to ITPs? These questions are important because there are different 
possible ways in which social relations can be recast around the ITP sector, 
and the implications this has on the livelihoods, land property, labour re-
gimes, and ecology (see Borras and Franco 2012) in the area. Taking China 
as an example, an attempt to map variegated directions of land-use change 
and their respective mechanisms can be complicated. State-owned farms 
or foreign firms may lease privately-owned land from individuals, or col-
lectively-owned land from the local government. An individual villager 
who owns the land may also be incorporated into the ITP sector through 
an out-grower contract/independent cultivator. Thus, various types of 
land-use change and their mechanisms - how the land is accessed for the 
development of ITPs, from whom to whom and through what ways - 
complicate the accumulation process in ITP cases. 
Borras and Franco (2012, 50) state that “land policies neither emerge 
from, nor are carried out, in a vacuum”. Land cannot be separated from 
the social relations surrounding it. Thus, land-use change tends to be ac-
companied by property relationship changes (from collective or privately-
owned land to company-controlled land), agrarian change (some from 
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peasants to proletarians or semi-proletarians, while a small group of poor 
peasants become richer and accumulate land), and livelihood strategy 
changes by the local villagers (from sugarcane planters to eucalyptus tree 
planters, or from crop producers to wage labourers in the urban area). The 
complicated typology of land-use change corresponds to the complex 
property relationship changes, agrarian changes, and livelihood strategy 
changes, which further complicate the dynamics of the agrarian transfor-
mation processes. 
In short, the development of the ITP sector requires a lot of land, and 
has profound implications on land relations. But the ITP sector also has 
key features that have important economic, agronomic and environmental 
contradictions (Lungo, Ball, and Carle 2006). Fast-wood tree crops are 
very attractive from an economic perspective, bringing high benefits, and 
low labour and production costs. Taking eucalyptus, for example, the av-
erage price of the output is about 600 Yuan/m3 (average yield is about 10 
m3/ mu22 per year), while the average cost is only 200-300 Yuan/mu per 
year. Together with the features of fast returns on investment (eucalyptus 
can be logged in 4-6 year rotations) and regeneration ability (one eucalyp-
tus tree can naturally generate two or three shoots after logging), invest-
ments in ITP tend to yield great monetary profits. This implies that great 
monetary profits can be extracted from the ITP sector. As commented by 
a villager in Guangxi, “planting eucalyptus trees is like (constructing) a 
bank there” (Field notes, 6th March 2015). Whether it is the corporation 
or the villager who ultimately corners the main chunk of the profit is an-
other matter. 
In terms of the environmental aspect, monoculture-oriented tree spe-
cies have significant effects on local ecologies. The ITP’s fast-growing 
characteristic is linked to sharp demands on water and soil nutrition within 
a short growth period (Calder et al. 1997, Calder 2003). Furthermore, the 
genetically modified characteristics of the tree crops may inevitably affect 
the balance of the natural ecosystem. Most foreign companies claim that 
their investments in ITPs are sustainable: environmentally-friendly (restor-
ing rather than damaging the environment) and providing eco-service to 
the local community (reforestation to provide site and habitat protection, 
carbon sequestration etc.) (Storaenso , APP , UNDP 2012). In practice, 
however, the ITPs are always complained about as “water pumps” and 
“nutrition pumps” by the local people, due to their negative effects on 
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local hydrological and soil conditions, and also criticized as threats to bio-
diversity (Gerber 2011b). Moreover, the industrial mode of production, 
especially the chemical fertilizers and herbicides used, aggravates the envi-
ronmental and ecological destruction. 
As to the usage of products, here too the ITP sector shows unique 
features. In contrast to most boom crops (e.g. sugarcane, oil palm, soy-
bean, etc.), ITP products are completely inedible, and are largely used as 
industrial raw materials. According to Overbeek, Kröger, and Gerber 
(2012, 15), eucalyptus plantations are mainly “destined for pulp and fuel-
wood”. Kröger (2014a) identified other ITP uses, such as wood-based en-
ergy (including bio-refineries, electricity, and heating), and “carbon sinks” 
(as shown in Figure 1.6). 
Figure 1.6 The multiple uses of ITPs 
 
 Source: Adapted from (Kröger 2014a, 5) 
 
These multiple uses indicate that the eucalyptus tree crop has the po-
tential to flex with the development of technology and increased demands 
for its products in the context of the convergence of fuel and environ-
mental crises (Kröger 2014a). Meanwhile, these products imply that the 
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sector is not associated with the global food-fuel debates which have com-
monly been discussed in the current literature, but are closely related to 
the fibre-fuel-environment complex and actors from industrial sectors, in-
cluding paper-pulp companies, construction companies, automobile com-
panies, textile producers, and energy producers (Kröger 2014a). The 
sources of capital from these industries are both domestic and interna-
tional. In the Chinese case, the international capital involved in ITP in-
vestments deserves careful examination. In large-scale land deals, Chinese 
companies are usually considered to be either greedy “grabbers” (Gray 
2008) within the neo-colonizer framework (Buckley 2013), or “foreign in-
vestors” (Buckley 2013, Bräutigam and zhang 2013). China is seldom re-
ferred to as a key foreign investment site itself nor, as I mentioned earlier, 
as “land grabbed land grabbers” (Borras et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, ITPs generally need less labour compared with the culti-
vation of other crops (e.g. sugarcane). They are thus land-intensive but 
labour-saving/expelling crops. Such a land-labour relationship adds com-
plexity to the agrarian change underlying the rise of capitalism in rural ar-
eas. On the one hand, the land-intensive character of the sector implies 
that lands have to be acquired from someone and from somewhere. This 
may or may not displace food production, and may or may not dispossess 
peasants. In cases where peasants are separated from their land, the low 
labour demand in the ITP sector almost eliminates the chances of them 
being incorporated into the value chain as wage labourers. Expulsion can 
also be more complete in the ITP sector. As the case analysed by Gerber 
and Veuthey (2010) in Ecuador shows, the expansion of the ITP sector is 
followed by large-scale rural displacement. The dispossessed villagers can-
not be included in the plantations, as the job opportunities in the ITP 
sector are limited and temporary, concentrated during the planting and 
harvesting stages. Kröger (2012) similarly witnessed rural exclusions in 
Brazil underlying the boom in the ITP sector, driven by an alliance be-
tween the industrial sector and the state. On the other hand, the non-in-
tensive labour demand makes it possible for villagers to keep the ITP as a 
supplementary income while working in on- farm or off-farm jobs at the 
same time. In this sense, the land-labour relationship in the ITP sector 
provides villagers with additional livelihood options. Empirical results 
from a household survey in Vietnam (Sikor 2011), for instance, outline the 
various on-farm and off-farm livelihood choices for the smallholders of 
commercial tree plantations. 
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1.6 Transitional rural China 
An ITP sector emerges and develops differently from one society to an-
other. As various studies suggest, the similarities and differences between 
societies are largely conditioned by pre-existing agrarian structures and in-
stitutions – including class formation, the character of the state, land prop-
erty relations, and institutions – as well as the characteristics of village-city 
and agriculture-industry linkages. Thus, when taking a quick look at how 
ITPs emerged over time in Canada, Finland, Uruguay, Brazil, Indonesia, 
and Vietnam – from agrarian political economy and political ecology per-
spectives – one can see important similarities and differences. In under-
standing the political economy and political ecology of ITPs, it is im-
portant to pay attention to the specific structural and institutional contexts 
within which they emerged. It is thus important to look into the agrarian 
and ecological transformations in China that are relevant to our under-
standing of the rise of ITPs in the southern part of this country. 
In this section, I will focus the discussion on the key themes empha-
sized above, namely: (i) the broad context of agrarian transformation in 
China, especially from the 1980s onwards; (ii) land property relations and 
institutions, with an emphasis on the household responsibility system 
(hereafter HRS): this involves addressing the ways in which plots have 
been awarded to HRS recipients where land quality and land-use resulted 
in one household having several plots of land (some for paddy rice irri-
gated cultivation, others rocky and hilly without much cultivation, until 
the eucalyptus sector came in); in addition, it implies addressing the ongo-
ing public debate about possible land property reforms awarding full scale 
private property; (iii) rural-urban migration and its implications on the la-
bour supply in the countryside (and the resulting farming adjustments 
made in the villages), as well as on the household incomes of villagers; (iv) 
ecological trends in China, including issues and debates around environ-
mental awareness that will have some implications on how the ITP sector 
has evolved so far; and (v) rural tax reforms and land-use reforms that 
have implications on how land-use is decided upon, and deployed tax in-
centives that have impacted on the emergence of ITPs over time (in rela-
tion to other agricultural sectors, such as sugarcane). 
Following the communist revolutionary triumph in 1949, class labels 
were soon applied to households – they could be part of the “good class” 
(the proletarians and small peasants), or the “bad class” (landlords and rich 
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peasants). During the original revolutionary land reform, the lands of the 
“bad class” households were confiscated and redistributed to those that 
were part of the “good classes” (Unger 2002). Later, in the mid-1950s, 
“the Chinese government commenced a process of collectivizing [the] ag-
ricultural organization” (Kung 2000, 703). Those labelled as belonging to 
the “bad class” were discriminated against and given a very low social-
political status until the late 1970s (Unger 2002). In 1978 China’s “reform 
and opening-up” (Gaige Kaifang) was launched, and further accelerated af-
ter the 1992 ‘South Talk’ by Deng Xiaoping.23 During this reform period, 
rural areas in China also experienced a process of de-collectivization, 
which introduced changes not only in the land property system, but also 
in the agrarian structure. Most villagers became small peasants with user 
rights on tiny pieces of land under the land property system, meaning that 
they did not have full property rights to their land. But according to Unger 
(2002, 146), a group of villagers could become rich through “their own 
skill and resourcefulness” or through political power by functioning as ca-
dres. He (2011) also witnessed a new “middle peasant” class emerging with 
the free circulation of land based on personal relations. Chen (2013) argues 
that the new “middle peasant” is a transitional status rather than a stable 
class, and that in essence, these middle peasants are still small peasants. 
As a vital part of the agrarian transformation, the social relationships 
around rural land also changed over time. Such changes in the land prop-
erty system in turn influenced the character and pattern of subsequent land 
circulation, and impacted on the evolution of rural capitalism. In order to 
gain a fuller understanding of the land conditions underlying the develop-
ment of ITPs in Southern China, I will step back and address the larger-
scale changes in land property relationships and institutions from a longer 
historical perspective. 
Under the collective system in the 1950s, “state and collective owner-
ship co-exist[ed]” (Zhang, Ma, and Xu 2004, 1052), and farmers were de-
prived of individual rights to private control and faced alienation. Sargeson 
(2013, 1066-1067) explained the collectivization in rural China in the 1950s 
as the “nationalization of the key factors of production – foremost of 
which were land and labour” supported by a centrally planned system es-
tablished by the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, Wen Tiejun, in his 
“cost transferring” theory, thought the rural land reform in the 1950s, 
which was claimed to alleviate the diseconomies of agriculture, actually 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 53
 Rethinking the politics of the industrial tree plantation sector 31 
 
created a huge market for the machines produced in urban industrial sec-
tors; this collectivization, he argues, was essentially meant to serve as prim-
itive accumulation at the cost of the agricultural sector (Wen 2012). 
In the 1980s, the HRS was implemented after the demise of communes 
(Rozelle and Li 1998). The “land-use rights [were] then contracted to peas-
ant households on a largely egalitarian basis as an entitlement” (Zhang and 
Donaldson 2010, 464). According to an empirical study by Unger (2002, 
107), land was mostly distributed based on the “size of each household”. 
Due to the high population density in China, the plots awarded to HRS 
recipients were tiny, with an average of 1.37 mu farmland and 0.83 mu 
forestland (mountain land) per capita in Guangxi.24 The plots distributed 
were often spatially separated, and had a wide array of qualities. Among 
the different plots of land awarded to each household, some could be ir-
rigated with sufficient cultivation, while others could be rocky and hilly 
without much cultivation (see Figure 1.7 for a rough sketch of this issue). 
While risking the over-simplification of a real, complex situation, Figure 
1.6 is still a useful depiction for the sole purpose of trying to emphasize 
the chequered pattern of plots’ spatial distribution. This allocation of mul-
tiple plots per household was done for the sake of fairness (distribute all 
good lands and bad lands equitably among households), and would prove 
to be a key institutional basis for the rise of ITPs, where eucalyptus plan-
tations would be focused on non-irrigated, relatively more rocky plots. 
Figure 1.7 Author’s rough sketch of different plots of land allocated to 
household under HRS 
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Under the HRS, what was contracted was user rights for most farmland 
and some forestland (a large part of forestland was not formally distrib-
uted during this reform, which will be discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
4). The farmland, forestland and waste/unutilized land (different from the 
urban construction land) were still owned, at least formally, by village col-
lectives. There existed, then, a special land tenure system: the land was 
owned collectively, while the user rights (including the right to make pro-
duction decisions independently and to control the products from the 
land) were in the hands of individual households (Zhang, Ma, and Xu 
2004). 
The HRS gave impetus to villagers’ agricultural production at that time 
and significantly alleviated rural poverty (Spoor 2012, 187). But it also led 
to rural land fragmentation, which is believed by most commentators to 
“have a series of negative consequences, including low land productivity, 
constraints on accumulation and capital investment, obstacles to the ap-
plication of new technology and in obtaining economies of scale, hin-
drance for labour migration and so on” (Ye 2015, 324). 
As a response, land transfer (Tudi Liuzhuan) emerged. Zhang, Ma, and 
Xu (2004) observed, in the mid-1990s, the existence and rapid develop-
ment of a rural land rental market, which partly broke a barrier to agrarian 
capitalism, namely, the non-tradability of rural land in China. Only land 
user rights can be circulated, and – with the exception of some pilot coun-
ties – the selling and buying of land remains forbidden (Zhang, Ma, and 
Xu 2004, 464). Since 2008, the Chinese state has released a series of poli-
cies which deepen land reform and promote land transfers (by greatly 
loosening and simplifying the procedures around user rights circulation). 
Currently, the circulation takes various forms based to regional differ-
ences, from land interchanges to land banks and shareholding; however, 
rules surrounding all of the circulations means that the main land-use can-
not be changed (i.e. farm land should not be used as urban construction 
land).25 Usually, the members of the community will have priority in con-
tracting the “user rights” based on the principle of voluntariness. This re-
flects a further split in land property rights - user/management rights can 
be separated from villagers’ contracting rights (Ye 2015). Such a change in 
the Chinese rural land system with the aim of promoting rural develop-
ment has certainly tended to result in rural land concentration/consolida-
tion, which then affects the villagers’ livelihood strategies and agrarian 
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transformation, although the operational implications (i.e. who benefits 
and who loses in these situations) need to be much more clearly explained. 
This rural land property system has sparked considerable debate within 
and outside China. As Sargeson (2004, 460-462) explained, liberal econo-
mists always criticized it as a major obstacle to fostering capitalism, and 
characterized it as an inefficient institution that hindered the transfer of 
land “from less efficient to more efficient producers”. But critical scholars 
in agrarian political economy such as Zhang and Donaldson (2010), 
Huang, Yuan, and Peng (2012) and Ho and Spoor (2006) believed that it 
is the rural land system that prevented a large-scale full displacement of 
peasants in China and secured social stability. As Zhang and Donaldson 
(2010, 464) elaborated: 
Farmland has been the last frontier for the penetration of markets and com-
modity relations in agricultural production. Once this last piece falls into 
place, we have strong reason to expect that new actors will enter the agri-
culture sector and that new forms of production that transcend the bound-
ary of family farms and rely on commodity relations for reproduction will 
emerge. 
In this sense, the complex and uncertain social relationships around 
land in China - whether the land rental market will be further opened up, 
and whether the land property rights will be further privatized - are com-
plicating the contours and trajectory of the ITP sector, as well as those of 
agrarian transformation. 
Along with the conditions of land control, labour conditions also 
changed in rural China in the context of rural-urban migration. Millions 
of villagers – who are referred to as “peasant workers” (nongmingong) – left 
their villages and seek jobs in the cities. These people “generally take the 
heaviest and dirtiest jobs, are the most poorly paid, do not enjoy legal pro-
tections, and work without benefits or with reduced benefits” (Huang, 
Yuan, and Peng 2012, 141). The process of internal migration started in 
the 1980s (the de-collectivization reform period in China): “As noted be-
fore contemporary Chinese history, young men migrated out to work in 
the first wave in 1980s, followed by middle-aged men and then young 
women. Finally, the tide of migration involved almost all capable labourers 
in rural communities” (Ye et al. 2013, 1125). The number of “peasant 
workers” has now increased to considerable figures. According to a survey 
conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2016, there are 281.71 
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million migrant workers in China.26 Among them, 169.34 million villagers 
are working away from home, who are described as “‘leave both the land and 
the village’ 离土又离乡”; and 112.37 million villagers are working near 
home, “dubbed ‘leaving the land but not the village’ 离土不离乡.” (Huang, 
Yuan, and Peng 2012, 141). Common to the two types of migrant workers 
is that, in both cases, the villagers leave the land.27 
This internal migration – whether a forced survival option in the con-
text of the current capitalist system (Bernstein 2010a), or an active liveli-
hood choice by the villagers to “form twin legs and/or crutches” (Huang, 
Yuan, and Peng 2012, 164) – has significantly changed the labour-land 
relationship in rural China. Such changes directly impact on the develop-
ment of capitalism in the countryside. The social process is two-way: the 
penetration of capitalism in rural areas influences the villagers’ livelihood 
choices which then affects the process of internal migration. 
Linking this land-labour situation in China back to the ITP sector, de-
densification in rural China caused by internal migration fits the land-in-
tensive-but-labour-saving/expelling character of ITPs. Following on the 
discussion in the previous paragraph, it can be surmised that the land-
labour relationship and the ITP sector are mutually reinforcing, being dy-
namic and mutually changing, rather than being part of a one-way and 
static relationship. In this context, the land-labour conditions in Southern 
China are not only a cause of the massive expansion of the ITP sector, but 
are themselves also partly reshaped by the development of the ITP sector. 
The emergence of the ITP sector in Southern China is also closely 
linked to the ecological environment in that region. The agronomic con-
ditions in Guangxi are fit for the development of ITPs (this will be ana-
lysed in detail in Chapter 2). But just as nature partly influences the appro-
priate farming activities, the latter, as demonstrated in the case of Xinjiang 
(Spoor, Jiang, and Arsel 2013), in turn transform nature (Bernstein 2010a, 
89). This issue is at the heart of political ecology. As mentioned above, the 
large-scale expansion of the ITP sector may have negative impacts on the 
local environment and ecological system, and thus, ecological trends may 
impact the trajectory of the ITP sector. This is an important process to 
observe, especially because forestry has always played an important role in 
development initiatives in post-1949 China. As elaborated by Liu (2010a): 
The “Great Leap Forward” movement (1958–1961) caused the loss of at 
least 10% of China’s forests to fuel backyard furnaces for steel production. 
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The “Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture” movement (1964–1978) trans-
formed numerous landscapes and filled countless lakes, wetlands, and 
coastal areas for crop production with little regard for topographic, climatic, 
and socioeconomic conditions. Since the economic reform and open-door 
policy started in 1978, the massive production of many export goods has 
caused further resource depletion and environmental pollution. 
Following the country’s economic development, as well as some cor-
responding negative environmental problems, the Chinese state started to 
put increasing importance on ecology and the environment (Mol and 
Carter 2006). In 1994, sustainable development was proposed for the first 
time in the long-term plan for national socio-economic development in 
the 21st Century Agenda for China. Since the 16th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2002, “continuously increasing the 
state’s capability to develop sustainably” has been set as one of the state’s 
tasks in building “a better-off society.” 28 Moreover, during the 18th Na-
tional Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, “‘Ecological 
Civilization’ (restructuring the economy to achieve man-nature, produc-
tion-consumption harmony) was included in the Constitution of the CPC” 
(He et al. 2013). As Zhang et al. (2013, 1034) conclude, although “greening 
China is far from an evolutionary process,” environmental awareness in 
China is growing. 
Following such trends in Chinese environment/ecological politics, one 
would expect more protests against the ITP sector because of the potential 
and actual environmental problems that industrial monocrop tree planta-
tions bring. But while such protests have and are erupting in scattered 
pockets, they have not really grown into something consistent and coher-
ent – as compared to, for example, the explosive conflicts around land 
expropriation across China. One thing to consider in relation to this is that 
the subsidy offered by the Chinese central government for reforestation 
(aimed at environmental protection) incentivizes the development of the 
ITP sector. 29 What is also relevant is the central state’s recent promotion 
of “ecological civilization” (since 2012), which has a role to play in the 
change of the local state’s attitudes and policies towards fast-growing tree 
species (as analysed in Chapter 3). All these issues make the trajectory of 
the ITP sector in Southern China full of contradictions. 
In addition to the land-labour relationship and ecological issues, it is 
also important to consider the role of the Chinese state in a series of agrar-
ian reforms that have, in turn, shaped the trajectory of the ITP sector. In 
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this context, land-use and rural tax policy reforms are important. As a vast 
country, China has a complicated administrative system. Between the cen-
tral government and the township government, there are two or three 
more levels of administration. The politics and interactions between these 
levels are complex and dynamic, and are part of a context that is key to 
understanding the ITP sector’s political economy. 
During the Mao era, there was no significant local deviation from the 
central decisions within the collective system (So 2007). At that time, the 
“agriculture tax was based on the amount of cultivated land, estimated 
output and population,” and the state “relied more on procurement rather 
than direct taxation” (Bernstein and Lü 2003, 39). Under this collective 
system, the state bought grain at procurement prices from production 
communes that had delivery quotas (Kennedy 2013, 1012-1013). The pro-
duction communes then distributed the incomes. According to Unger 
(2002), land-use in rural villages was planned by the central government in 
Beijing, while “production teams” in each village owned the means of pro-
duction and organized the production process. 
Under the HRS reform, the farmers owned the user rights for the con-
tracted land, procured by paying agriculture tax, and promised procure-
ment quotas. Peasants could make decisions about what they produced. 
The HRS has been widely hailed as being partly responsible for the vibrant 
revival of the rural Chinese economy (Spoor 2007, 97). However, not eve-
rything went smoothly, nor was everyone in the villages satisfied. Among 
HRS’ critics, Wen Tiejun thought that the system was a way for the state 
to use land user rights in exchange for releasing a series of governmental 
burdens into the rural area (such as social insurance and education fees, 
local government’s public expenses), which should be the responsibility of 
the state (Wen 2012). Put another way, he was arguing that the state put 
resources into the peasants’ right pocket, and took them from their left 
pocket. 
During the HRS period, the central government “loosened its control 
over local affairs…to promote local incentives” (So 2007, 564). Within the 
context of such decentralization, the local government (especially at the 
county and township level) gained power through reallocating resources, 
(e.g. land, subsidized fertilizers) (Rozelle 1994). The fiscal systems of the 
central and local government were separated, underlying the decentralized 
system – something metaphorically called “serving meals to different din-
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ers from different pots”.30 So (2007, 565) found that “this fiscal decentral-
ization policy converted local states into financially independent entities 
that had the unprecedented right to dispose of the revenue they retained”. 
Within this fiscal system, the local government levied heavy rural taxes and 
charges on villagers in order to supplement the insufficient collective in-
come (Li 2003, Kennedy 2013, Lu 1997).31 
Oi (1992) used the term “local state corporatism” to describe the local 
government’s role as “a diversified business corporation.” According to 
So (2007, 560), this decentralization led to a “split state”: “one ‘benign’ 
centre and a ‘predatory’ local apparatus”. Li (2007, 95) thought that de-
centralization was the strategy used by the central government to separate 
itself from local agents in order to find scapegoats to “blame policy failures 
on implementation details and front-line state workers”. 
In 1994, the central government enacted a financial reform, aimed at 
“recentralising control over revenue” (Oi et al. 2012, 653), and a tax stand-
ardization reform, purportedly aimed at reducing the peasants’ burden. 
However, these reforms not only failed to achieve their goals, but actually 
increased the peasants’ burden. According to Oi et al. (2012, 653) “the 
more revenue the centre attempted to take, the more cadres at the local 
levels sought to evade regulations to squeeze the farmers for more fees 
and surcharges”. 
There have been widespread complaints about the relatively miserable 
conditions of Chinese peasants, highlighted even further in relative terms 
by the dramatic improvement in the living conditions of the urban popu-
lation. The Chinese farmers’ problematic situation was vividly described 
by a Hubei farmer’s spring couplet pasted in the Chinese new year of 2000: 
[You] “work hard for 300 days on the piece of farmland, and then at the 
end of the year still find the budget is deficit even with a harvest of about 
a thousand jin per mu.”32 (the number here is exaggerated to show a big 
harvest). Li Changping, the secretary of the Qipan County Party Commit-
tee in Hubei Province, elaborated on this situation in a letter to Premier 
Zhu Rongji in 2000, by stating that: “the peasants are really miserable, the 
countryside is really poor, and the agriculture is really in danger.” His letter 
later led to the state’s increased focus on the issues captured by the famous 
slogan coined by Wen Tiejun: “Three Rural Problems” (Sannong wenti) 
namely: peasantry, countryside, and agriculture). 33 As a result, the “Tax for 
fee” reform was introduced in 2002, abolishing all the local fees while re-
ducing the agriculture tax. 34 Furthermore, in 2006 the agriculture tax was 
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abolished entirely.35 After limiting the agriculture tax, the user rights truly 
became “free” for the peasants, and most townships became administra-
tive shells with a limited ability to provide social services (Kennedy 2007, 
Oi et al. 2012). However, according to Kennedy (2013, 1021), since the 
2002 tax reform, some local governments (township governments) have 
started to lease land to compensate their losses from taxes and fees. 
From decentralization to recentralization, the relationship between the 
central and the local state in China has changed along with rural politics. 
As mentioned above, the abolition of the rural tax triggered the local gov-
ernment to carry out the large-scale leasing of land. This had far-reaching 
implications for the subsequent boom of the ITP sector in Southern 
China, as can partly be seen from the fact that most transnational compa-
nies rented the land from the government during the time of rural tax 
reform and ITP sector expansion. Nevertheless, since the tax reform, vil-
lagers can also freely make decisions about land-use. They can grow sug-
arcane when they think sugarcane is profitable, or eucalyptus if they think 
that is more profitable instead. 36 
In short, land-use policy reforms and tax reforms are definitely not the 
sole determinants of the rise of the ITP sector in China. Instead, they share 
key factor status with the dynamics of the political economy of land and 
labour regimes, and with the ecological basis for growing industrial trees. 
As such, my research will examine these factors more closely and system-
atically, in order to gain a deep understanding of the causes, conditions, 
and consequences of the rise of ITPs in Southern China. 
 
1.7 The key actors 
Following the introduction of the structural and institutional context for 
the boom of the ITP sector, this section will take a closer look at the spe-
cific range of actors involved in the sector. As shown in Figure 1.8, there 
are three main categories of actors, namely: state, companies, and villagers. 
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Figure 1.8 Key actors in the ITP sector in Southern China 
 
 
The state, as a critical player in the political arena, should never be ig-
nored. Nevertheless, competing frameworks exist for understanding the 
state and its role in public policy, namely: “state-centric,” “society-cen-
tric,” and “interactive state-society” (Das 2007, Fox 1993). In the “state-
centric” framework, the state is viewed as an independent political organ-
ization with autonomy (Weber 1965). This means that the state is beyond 
the social groups and does not necessarily reflect the interests and ideas of 
a certain class (Das 2007). In contrast to Weberians, Marxists (and some 
non-Marxists) generally view the state from a “society-centric” perspec-
tive. Marx thought that “the executive of the modern state is nothing but 
a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” 
(Marx and Engels 1906, 30). Such a definition implies that the state is an 
institution with no (or little) autonomy, but closely linked to the ruling 
class, as later interpreted by Lenin: “The state is an organ of class domi-
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nation, an organ of oppression of one class by another; its aim is the cre-
ation of ‘order’ which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by mod-
erating the collisions between the classes” (Lenin 1978, 9). According to 
Lenin’s elaboration, the state is dominated by the ruling class, and used as 
an instrument for the elites to exploit the subaltern classes. The Marxist 
interpretation of the state was later further refined by Gramsci. Gramsci 
used the term “hegemony” to describe the phenomenon when “a given 
group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its 
economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political 
and social arena” (Gramsci 1999, 20). Grounded in such a framework, 
Poulantzas further expanded the Marxist theory of the state from a social 
relationship to “a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material 
condensation of such a relationship among classes and class frac-
tions”(Jessop 2011). This implies that the state is formulated not as an 
instrument for one certain class to exercise its political power, but as a 
“complex institutional ensemble” (Jessop 2011). 
Both of these broad perspectives (state-centric and society-centric) can 
explain part of the political process, “but neither is complete” (Fox 1993, 
11). Within the “state-centric” perspective, the autonomy and capacity of 
the state are overemphasized without a full consideration of class relations 
and social structure. In contrast, the “society-centric” framework tends to 
overlook the relative autonomy of the state. The “interactive state-society” 
is an alternative framework put forward by several scholars, including Fox 
(1993). This framework combines the strengths of the two dominant per-
spectives. In this interactive perspective, the state is understood as an ap-
paratus that “comprises the ensemble of political, social, economic and 
coercive institutions that exercise ‘public’ authority in a given territory” 
(Fox 1993, 11-12). The “state action is the result of a reciprocal cause and 
effect relationship between changes in the balance of power within the 
state and shifts in the balance of power within society” (Fox 1993, 22). 
This framework reveals the contradictory functions of the modern state, 
namely, capital accumulation and political legitimacy (Fox 1993). In other 
words, the state does not only facilitate economic development (to guar-
antee its revenues and private capital accumulation) in the interest of dom-
inant social classes, but also maintains social and political stability to legit-
imize its rule (Fox 1993). Using this framework, one can understand better 
the contradictions in state policies and politics, and the limits and possi-
bilities of policy reforms. 
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Through this lens, I identify the dual policies of the Chinese central 
state. On the one hand, it provided preferential policies (such as subsidies) 
to support the development of the ITP sector, and thereby helped the 
push for capital accumulation – in the countryside in particular, and in the 
country more generally. On the other hand, the central state also set some 
controls on land market and labour mobility in order to preserve some 
idea of equity and rural-urban balance – partly done in order to help legit-
imize its development paradigm. There are tensions in all of these rela-
tionships, with the state in the middle. 
At the state’s local level (province, county or township level), where 
government policies are actually implemented, the contradictory tasks of 
the state become even more obvious. The local state sometimes mediates 
conflicts related to land, labour, and environment within the ITP sector, 
partly by limiting the development of ITPs, or even by fully removing 
them.37 At other times and in other settings, the local government facili-
tates investments in the ITP sector. This is illustrated, for example, in the 
case of the Guangxi Forestry Group Company Limited, an important bro-
ker (especially in transnational land deals) specializing in leasing land for 
forestry investments in Guangxi, which is owned by the local government. 
The distinct and even contradictory roles played by the state within the 
rise of the ITP sector are discussed in Chapter 3. Considering the compli-
cated administrative system, the interactions among different levels of the 
state and between the state and society are taken into account. 
The role of companies is relatively less complex than that of the state 
(though it is no less important). As an economic entity, the aim of com-
panies is always to maximize profit. In addition to providing capital to 
lease land and buy commodities from farmers, and managing the value 
chain from production to circulation, companies also try to maintain their 
social legitimacy through building and sustaining relationships with the 
government and local communities. Foreign companies specialized in pa-
per-pulp productions are involved in the Chinese ITP sector - why and 
how these overseas investors obtain land for the cultivation of eucalyptus 
is worth noting and will be addressed later in Chapter 4. 
A related issue is the role of state farms, which are “created as state-
owned and bureaucratically (sometimes even militarily) organized entities 
operating in agriculture and in rural areas” (Zhang 2010b, 336), with the 
original aim of addressing national food security.38 The state farms used to 
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be part of the state and were later partly separated to be financially “inde-
pendent” from the state after “the state farms commercialization reform” 
(Bank 1988). But the state farms were originally invested in by the state, 
and much of the land and other means of production still belong to the 
state. Thus, state farms are still closely linked to the state as organizations 
“for leading the way and for gauging the effect of national agricultural/ru-
ral policies” (Bank 1988, 55). In the ITP sector in Guangxi, the role of 
state farms becomes more complex. State farms (in the case of ITPs, the 
state forest farms) in Guangxi engage not only in producing eucalyptus 
trees, but also in processing and trading the products. Moreover, state for-
est farms in Guangxi have leased around 100 thousand hectares of their 
own land to Store Enso.39 At the same time, the state forest farms also 
started to lease land from rural collectives to plant eucalyptus trees in order 
to fill their land shortage. This kind of large-scale, complex, and multi-
layered land leasing may bring new dynamics to the ITP sector in 
Guangxi.40 This also shows how state farms seem to have found a niche 
in the context of the ITP sector, taking on multiple roles: directly engaging 
in their own production-to-trade business, supplying land to foreign ITP 
companies by leasing some of their own lands, and accumulating land 
themselves by leasing lands from smallholders (see Chapters 3 and 4). This 
role has far-reaching implications for the political economy of the ITP 
sector in Southern China. 
In the context of ITP expansion, the role of villagers in Southern China 
is highly differentiated. Some of them get included and some are excluded, 
both passively and actively. Their diverse political-economic situations 
during the land-based changes are closely related to villagers’ control over 
the means of production, production process and outputs, and their access 
to alternative livelihood sources. When villagers have limited/no control 
and limited/no access to alternatives, their livelihood choices are quite re-
stricted. Irrespective of whether they are included in or excluded from the 
ITP sector, they have very little economic gain from it and even become 
more vulnerable. Contrarily, when villagers control abundant means of 
production and have access to alternative opportunities, they are able to 
make different choices, either to actively step out from the ITP sector or 
to incorporate into the sector on good terms. Some villagers have the ca-
pability and autonomy to engage with the ITP sector, but choose to be 
excluded on their own free will based on their own calculations. Those 
who want to get money quickly, for various reasons, tend to lease their 
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land to foreign investors or state-owned forest farms, in order to unlock 
the capital (land) tied up in the long rotation period (usually 5-6 years) and 
transfer the risks of cultivation. Some are willing to plant eucalyptus trees 
themselves, induced by the reforestation subsidy and potential value after 
harvest. As eucalyptus trees are a labour-saving crop that only need some 
care during the early planting/nurturing phase, it has become quite com-
mon in Guangxi for villagers to seek off-farm jobs in the town/urban area 
to earn wages, while planting eucalyptus trees for additional savings from 
the forestland that they were allocated during forestland reform. Perhaps 
even more commonly, ‘peasant workers’ in the cities have some of their 
plots in the village included in the ITP sector, since this requires only min-
imal labour intervention from them. For the latter, I would point out that 
many villagers had already moved to the cities before the rise of the ITP 
sector, abandoning some of their village plots. Some villagers gained con-
trol over the land from local or nearby village collectives via customary 
occupation or leasing and became owners of large-scale ITPs. For these 
villagers, planting eucalyptus trees becomes a relative ‘bonus’ – a windfall, 
even. These villagers’ diverse livelihood changes under the rise of the ITP 
sector are discussed in Chapter 5. 
The situation is not free of conflict. Southern China, especially 
Guangxi, has been the site of many recurring conflicts linked to the ITP 
sector, involving villagers, local governments, state farms, and foreign 
companies. But it is not a simple panorama of villagers resisting ‘foreign 
land grabbers’ or ‘state land expropriation’. These political conflicts are far 
more varied in terms of their causes and character, reflecting what 
Margulis, McKeon, and Borras (2013) have argued more broadly. The is-
sues in these conflicts range from illegal land occupation or land usurpa-
tion, to underpaid/unpaid land rent, underpaid labour in ITPs, and envi-
ronmental issues. Some villagers resist the state and corporate enclosure 
of their lands, as in the large Behai special economic zone (SEZ) in 
Guangxi (see Figure 1.9).41 In this Behai SEZ case, many villagers were 
expelled from their land in a process that is probably captured quite well 
by Harvey’s notion of ABD (as described above). However, many of those 
protesting in the context of rural areas and within the ITP sector are mo-
bilizing not to resist the ITP encroachment into their villages, but over the 
terms of such penetration and their incorporation into the sector. Many 
protests are against ‘brokers’ – such as state farms who get big cuts from 
land leases – and protesters mobilize partly to try to bypass the brokers. 
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Mobilizations and protests on environmental issues have also become an 
increasing basis of collective action.42 There are also issues that are com-
plicated by the involvement of actors external to the ITP sector – such as 
the sugarcane actors, who are also interested in the very lands being ab-
sorbed by the ITP sector. These varied forms of reactions from below and 
the respective reasons behind them are examined in Chapter 6. 
Figure 1.9 Villager protest against illegal land occupation in Hepu County, 
Guangxi 
 
Source: http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2010/09/201009192149.shtml, accessed 
on 11 January 2017 
 
1.8 Analytical framework 
The entry point discussion in this study is about land politics and relevant 
debates about accumulation and dispossession. It sets the location of my 
study in broader contemporary debates. But to answer my central research 
question, I needed to adopt a broader theoretical framework, broader than 
debates around accumulation and dispossession. For this purpose, and 
following the discussion above, this study adopts an agrarian political 
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economy analytical framework, supplemented with political ecology in or-
der to answer the research questions explained earlier. Within this frame-
work, the dynamics of capital accumulation – specifically, the role of cap-
ital (both domestic and international), state-society relations (the role of 
the state, the villagers and the rural institutions, and the societal interac-
tions between them) – will be key concepts upon which a broader frame-
work is constructed. Situated in these dynamics, the ITP sector is associ-
ated with both urban industry and rural agriculture due to the sector’s 
agrarian characteristics (e.g. production mode and the usage of the out-
puts). As shown in Figure 1.10, two aspects of the problematique will be 
particularly emphasized, namely, the labour-land relation and the villagers’ 
livelihood strategies. Within the crop boom, capital and labour flows be-
tween urban and rural areas, leading to changes in land-labour relations 
and to villagers’ livelihoods. These changes are key to understanding the 
dynamics of accumulation and dispossession. 
Figure 1.10 Schema on how key concepts link to one another 
 
 
Agrarian political economy, as defined by Henry Bernstein (2010a, 1), 
is a method of investigating “the social relations and the dynamics of pro-
duction and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations and 
their process of change, both historical and contemporary”. Agrarian po-
litical economy asks four fundamental questions in a dynamic and interre-
lated way: who owns what (social relations of property)? Who does what? 
Who gets what? And what do they do with the created wealth? But the 
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agrarian political economy framework has various competing strands and 
traditions, with different (often competing) perspectives/approaches in 
explaining the dynamics of land-labour relations and villagers’ livelihood 
strategies with the capitalist penetration of the countryside. There are two 
main competing agrarian political economy perspectives that have domi-
nated the field of critical agrarian studies: a Marxist perspective and a Cha-
yanovian one. Each of these two competing perspectives features a wide 
range of varying branches. 
Central to the Marxist perspective is class analysis. The perspective’s 
main concept, social class, is determined by a social group’s relationship 
to the means of production. Thus, the social relations of production play 
a key role in understanding rural politics. For the purposes of this disser-
tation, I will very briefly highlight here the key concepts of Marxist agrar-
ian political economy. In the Marxist perspective, Lenin puts particular 
emphasis on issues related to the process of the social differentiation of 
the peasantry amid the penetration of capitalism into countryside. For 
Lenin, the unequal endowment of the peasants in the commodity econ-
omy – the land and technology they can get access to, the finance and 
labour they possess – led to their different positions in the process of cap-
ital accumulation. As capitalism penetrated the agriculture sector, the 
means of production and labour were commoditized, and the process of 
social differentiation gained momentum. The middle /family peasants 
were squeezed, and in the process became either rural bourgeoisie (minor-
ity) with increasing capital control, or rural proletariat (majority) as the 
“double free labour” (free of property and free to sell labour) (Lenin 1982, 
130-131). Based on a study of Russia, Lenin concluded that such social 
differentiation is a permanent, polarizing, economic process (Lenin 1982). 
In other words, the peasantry would “completely split up into opposite 
groups”— rural bourgeoisies and rural proletariats (Lenin 1982, 130-137). 
For Marxists, this is a central element in the dynamics of social change in 
the countryside. 
By comparison, the Chayanovians’ contemporary perspective empha-
sizes the family farms that “are part of capitalist system”, but which are 
not capitalist enterprises “grounded on a capital-labour relations” (Ploeg 
2013, 15). Chayanov shared Lenin’s conclusion about the social differen-
tiation of the peasantry, but thought it was demographic, non-permanent, 
and cyclical. According to Chayanov, social differentiation can be ex-
plained by looking at the changing dynamics of the worker-consumer ratio 
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within a household – which are mainly caused by cyclical demographic 
changes rather than capital exploitation (Thorner 1998). In this sense, so-
cial differentiation is temporary and cyclical. In contrast to Lenin’s predic-
tion about the demise of middle peasants, Chayanov believed that family 
farms would survive even in agrarian capitalism. Family farms could hold 
greater competitive power than the large-scale capitalist farms because of 
their self-exploitation (Bernstein 2009, Ploeg 2013, 16). Chayanov further 
advocated for the combination of family farmers “within a self-governing 
cooperative structure,” for the purposes of gaining scale in production, 
the trade of their produce, and to enable them to compete in the capitalist 
market (Shanin 2009, 98). 
However, not all the Marxists have completely contrary views to Cha-
yanov’s. Before Chayanov, Karl Kautsky, a non-Leninist Marxist, argued 
that small peasants would be able to sustain and survive because of two 
advantages: working longer and consuming less (Kautsky 1988, 110). But 
like most Marxists, Kautsky still believed that small farms were much less 
efficient than large-scale capitalist farms. To enable small farms to share 
part of the agricultural production benefits that generated the superiority 
of large farms, Kautsky introduced the “cooperative” production form, 
which required small farms to unequally enter into large farms – that is, 
with a supply of household land and labour force in exchange for their 
access to credits, markets, and machines (Kautsky 1988, 120-126). Except 
for benefiting small farms, Kautsky also viewed such “cooperatives” as 
indispensable for capitalist farms, because this production form could sup-
plement the large farms’ shortage in labour power and their high input 
losses (Kautsky 1988, 147-166). In the study of the contemporary Chinese 
agrarian political economy, this Marxist–Chayanov debate has been a cen-
tral reference point, and it will similarly be so in the present study. 
Broadly informed by these two competing agrarian political economy 
tendencies, I can identify some relevant discussions in contemporary 
China that are relevant to this study. For example, Philip Huang claimed 
that the “future of Chinese agriculture lies not with large mechanized 
farms but with small capital and labour dual- intensifying family farms” 
(Huang 2011, 107). Zhang and Donaldson described current Chinese ag-
riculture as an “agricultural involution”, providing a particular scenario for 
most Chinese villages: “too many people farming too little land under 
harsh natural conditions had trapped his family in a life of poverty” 
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(Zhang and Donaldson 2010, 459). In other words, the villagers are as-
sumed to be unable to maintain stable subsistence based on farming alone 
under such highly intensive labour-land conditions. However, Huang be-
lieved that “agriculture de-involution” (i.e. reducing the rural surplus la-
bour) can be realized through a “hidden agriculture revolution” – namely, 
the “reduction of absolute size of the rural labour force” – fast urbaniza-
tion with massive internal migration, and the restructuring of the Chinese 
diet with an increasing demand for “‘capital and labour dual-intensifying’ 
agricultural products” (Huang, Yuan, and Peng 2012, 162). 
Following Chayanov, Van der Ploeg champions the notions of peasant 
farm efficiency and further re-grounded peasantry facing the global agrar-
ian crisis of the 21st century, which is caused by the “industrialization of 
agriculture, the liberalization of food and agriculture markets and the rise 
of food empires” (Ploeg 2010a, Ploeg 2010b). For Van der Ploeg, there 
are five balances the peasant farms need to strike, namely, (i) balances be-
tween people and living nature, (ii) between production and reproduction, 
(iii) between internal and external resources, (iv) between autonomy and 
dependence, and (v) between scale and intensity (Ploeg 2013). For him, 
the idea that new peasantries, who are able to make full use of the “eco-
logical capital” of land and other resources to produce “as much added 
value (or labour income) as possible under the given circumstance” (Ploeg 
2013, 70) and maintain self-provisioning within the corporate food regime, 
are the hope to feed the world and solve the food crisis (Ploeg 2010b). 
The competing theoretical perspectives in agrarian political economy, 
largely dominated by the Marxist and Chayanovian traditions, are both im-
portant theoretical frameworks for my study. I am not picking one over 
the other in a rigid way. Instead, my study is informed by theoretical in-
sights from this long-running debate in agrarian political economy. I will 
revisit these traditions throughout this dissertation. For now, it is sufficient 
to deploy generic agrarian political economy concepts as discussed at the 
start of this section. 
That being said, farming is not only a social-economic activity, but also 
a process of transformation, as it is being transformed by nature (Ploeg 
2013). Such an interaction between nature and farming implies the im-
portance of including ecological considerations in studying the ITP sector. 
Thus, political ecology should be used to supplement agrarian political 
economy. Interacting with the issue of ecology, this study slightly expands 
Bernstein’s four questions: who owns what (including natural resources)? 
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Who does what and what are the (possible) environmental impacts? Who 
gets what (both economic and environmental benefits and costs)? And 
what do they do with it? 
Political ecology originated from Kropotkin’s study on human and en-
vironmental interactions, and gradually took shape with the development 
of hazard research and cultural ecology (Robbins 2012, 17-32). In the 
book Land degradation and society, Blaikie and Brookfield provided an ex-
plicit understanding of the political ecology surrounding land: 
The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines the concerns of ecology and a 
broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the con-
stantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also 
within classes and groups within society itself (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, 
17) 
Following the above definition, political ecology is the approach to 
“link social and physical sciences to address environmental changes, con-
flicts and problems” with the same tools of political economy, namely: 
“analyses of social relations of production and questions of access and 
control over resource[s]” (Susan and Gezon 2005, 17). This means that 
the landscape and environment are viewed as socially constructed and in-
teracting with various social actors within political ecology (Blaikie 1995). 
Bernstein agrees that political ecology is an important framework in 
agrarian studies, with such considerations as the “ecological conditions, 
consequences and costs” of agrarian processes (Bernstein 2010b, 301). In 
agrarian political economy, the capitalist mode of production with econo-
mies of scale and the mechanization of the labour process is thought to 
be more productive (Woodhouse 2010). But this perspective on the effi-
ciency of capitalist farms lacks a deeper analysis of the labour-land relation, 
namely: externalizing the environmental/social costs and neglecting the 
energy consumed in the capital-intensive mechanized agriculture (Weis 
2010, Woodhouse 2010). Thus, agrarian political economists agree that the 
incorporation of political ecology can “help reduce the intellectual deficit 
of agrarian political economy” (Bernstein 2010b, 301). I take this as a key 
signpost in my dissertation. 
In my study of the ITP sector, political ecology shows that the envi-
ronmental impacts on local habitats are actually related to specific produc-
tion systems. Industrial monoculture with intensive capital and energy in-
puts tends to lead to environmental degradation and ecological damage. 
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Meanwhile, such environmental “bads” are not distributed equally, but af-
fect a few villagers more than others due to their more vulnerable status 
within the crop boom. The case of ITPs demonstrates the fact that ecol-
ogy and the social relations of production and reproduction are interre-
lated; they shape each other. In this sense, political ecology and political 
economy are intertwined. Although political economy is the primary ana-
lytical framework, political ecology is an indispensable and critical compo-
nent of the theoretical framework of my study. 
 
1.9 Method 
In this research, to understand the dynamics of the rise of the ITP sector 
in Southern China, the methodological approach that guides the data anal-
ysis and data collection is a contextual, interactive and grounded one. This ap-
proach is closely linked with the research questions and objectives. 
Firstly, the analysis should be contextual, as argued by Sayer (2010, 8). 
In this dissertation, a context is more than a background in which social 
phenomenon take place, but a factor that leads to intended and unin-
tended outcomes. Linking this with the study of land politics, trajectories 
of land-based changes are shaped by institutional and social structures. On 
the one hand, land acquisitions are, at least partly, hindered and/or sup-
ported by conditions - not by actors’ choices but created under different 
land property rights and institutions. Thus, in certain contexts, land inves-
tors supposedly choose particular channels to gain and maintain their ac-
cess to land. On the other hand, actors’ agencies are mediated by contexts. 
Under distinct contexts, villagers are positioned differently with diverse 
access to resources - access which is related to their distinct attitudes, re-
actions, and corresponding outcomes in the course of land-based changes. 
When policies particularly favour large-scale investors, smallholders can 
easily go bankrupt under competition and are more likely to resist these 
changes. Conversely, if the policies aim to facilitate villagers in one way or 
another, some villagers might be able to find their niche and even gain 
profits from it. Thus, without a deep exploration of a certain context, ac-
tors’ (re)actions and dynamics of the land-based changes cannot be fully 
understood. 
Secondly, adding to the context-based approach, this study views social 
change as a dynamic and interactive process. Within the process, actors 
and their practices are not completely independent, but are continuously 
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shaping and are shaped by each other in one way or another. In this re-
search about changes in land-use and land control, two groups of inter-
acted relations are focused on, namely, (i) land, labour and livelihood, and 
(ii) state and society. Within agrarian transformation, land, labour and live-
lihood are three interweaving elements. Land is both a vital means of pro-
duction that the rural population works on, and an important livelihood 
resource that rural households gain income from. Different forms of land 
control are closely linked to the ways in which production is organized and 
profits are distributed. Meanwhile, labour conditions are a key factor that 
affect both land-use and livelihood choices. Furthermore, livelihood 
change within a rural household is always related to a shift in the distribu-
tion of labour, land-use and/or land control. Thus, land-use and land con-
trol, labour, and livelihood are inseparably associated with each other, in a 
relational and dynamic way. Any change in one element is bound to have 
implications for the other two, which might in turn result in further 
changes in the former element. As for the state-society interaction, as al-
ready discussed in earlier sections, state and societal forces mutually shape 
each other and contribute to a further complicated trajectory of land-based 
changes. 
Thirdly, building on the previous two approaches, the analysis in this 
research is simultaneously conducted in a grounded manner. This means 
that the understanding of social dynamics is not theory-laden, but based 
on a deep exploration of the dynamics at play (Sayer 2010, 50). In other 
words, this dissertation employs grounded theory, which is “simply the 
discovery of emerging patterns in data” and “the generation of theories 
from data” (Walsh et al. 2015, 593). Applying this grounded lens to studies 
of land politics can contribute to a more nuanced understanding (typol-
ogy) which reflects reality and moves beyond the over-simplified dichoto-
mies in current literature. To give an example, most studies focus on large-
scale foreign corporate-dominated land grabs and portray villagers as vic-
tims and resisters. This reflects that scale, the identities of investors, and a 
simplified view of villagers tend to take precedence in analyses of land 
grabbing. However, this can be problematic and even misleading because, 
as will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6, in reality, (i) small-scale land grabs 
are not necessarily less significant than large-scale ones; (ii) local actor-
dominated land grabs also exist and sometimes might have more serious 
adverse impacts on local communities; and (iii) within land-based changes, 
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villagers are not homogenously affected, but are situated in different posi-
tions, which results in their diverse attitudes and reactions. In this sense, 
instead of sticking to a previous analytical framework rigidly, this study 
tries to link the existing theories to realties. 
Aligned with the contextual, interactive, and grounded approach, this 
study requires different types of data to answer its central research ques-
tion, as shown in Table 1.3. Overall, this includes: agronomic data about 
Guangxi, information concerning the ITP sector, data on changes in land-
labour relations, information on changes in villagers’ livelihoods, and in-
formation on broader political-economic/ecologic changes in the 
Guangxi villages. 
Table 1.3 Required data, split by sub-question 
Question Sub-question Data/information needed 
Q1: Why 
have ITPs 
expanded 
so quickly 
and mas-
sively in 
Southern 
China? 
Q1(a): agronomic conditions 
for growing eucalyptus trees 
Climate information in Guangxi, soil, water, and 
other basic agronomic data, including the techno-
logical aspects of growing eucalyptus trees. 
Q1(b): the ‘demand’ for eu-
calyptus sector products 
Data on the Chinese consumption, export and im-
port of the products from the ITP sector. 
Q1(c): institutional condi-
tions of land and labour in 
rural China 
Data on relevant laws and regulations, including 
the rural land property system, internal migra-
tion, and rural tax system. 
Q1(d): finance capital 
Data on ITP sector investments and the sources of 
these investments: foreign, state, domestic cor-
porations, state farms, and villagers. 
Q2: What 
are the 
roles played 
by the state 
and corpo-
rations 
within the 
rise of the 
ITP sector 
 
Q2(a): How did the state 
(central and local) inter-
vene in the eucalyptus tree 
sector boom? 
Data on laws and policies: (central, provincial, lo-
cal) for land control and land-use. 
Data and information on the range of state actors 
(central, provincial and local), how they perceive 
the ITP sector, and what they did or did not do to 
promote the sector. 
Data on actual interactions within and between 
state and societal groups around the ITP sector – 
how this was shaped by ITP sector interests, and 
how the ITP sector was shaped by such dynamics. 
Q2(b): What is the role of 
corporations underlying the 
boom in the eucalyptus tree 
sector? 
Data and information on foreign companies’ gen-
eral information (e.g. the scale of their ITPs, the 
capital involved, products, main markets), their 
motivations for land investments in China, the 
mechanisms of their land control under the Chi-
nese land regime, and possible conflicts involving 
the mechanisms. 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 75
 Rethinking the politics of the industrial tree plantation sector 53 
 
Q3: What 
are the im-
plications 
of ITPs on 
rural villag-
ers in 
Southern 
China? 
Q3(a): What are the impli-
cations of ITPs on rural vil-
lagers? 
Data on rural household income changes underly-
ing the development of ITPs, and data about the 
households’ livelihood choices, as well as the 
changes in agrarian structures in villages; hectare 
data on ITPs. 
Q3(b): How did the villagers 
respond to the rise of the 
ITP sector? 
Data and information on villagers: how do they 
perceive the ITP sector, what are the key lines of 
convergence and divergence in their interests. 
(the issues that unite or divide various groups), 
what did or did they not do to help facilitate or 
hinder the rapid growth of the ITP sector. 
Data and information on conflicts around ITPs and 
their mechanisms (including the causes, actors, 
impacts). 
 
To study the impacts of ITP expansion, as summarized in Table 1.4, I 
require data about the hectares of ITPs (mainly eucalyptus) and other ag-
riculture crops (such as sugarcane and others), the labour, land, and capital 
invested by households in the ITP sector, and the household incomes de-
rived from ITPs (and in relation to other sources of income by the house-
holds outside ITPs). Data on villagers’ livelihood change, as well as 
changes in the agrarian structure cannot be neglected in this study. Liveli-
hoods here includes the amount of land controlled by the households, 
their income sources (both from farm and off-farm jobs), and labour con-
ditions. 
The methods and the objectives of the data collection were chosen 
based on the “purpose of the question, the resources available and the 
skills of the researcher” (Kumar 1999, 105), as well as the analysis by the 
key actors above. The information about the natural conditions of the site 
(mainly about climate and soil) and the agronomy of industrial tree crops 
were mainly drawn from secondary materials, including internet news and 
reports, and published scientific papers. In order to increase the validity 
and reliability of the data, I conducted interviews with specialists on euca-
lyptus trees in Guangxi to supplement the secondary data. Data on laws 
and regulations around the ITP sector were gathered from official state 
publications, as well as from interviews with key informants at the various 
levels of state bureaucracy. I interviewed relevant staff in relevant govern-
ment offices at the province and city levels, as well as administrative staff 
at county and township levels. 
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Table 1.4 Data collection methods 
Type of data Data collection methods Data collection targets 
Natural conditions of the site 
and the agronomy of ITPs 
Secondary sources (supplemented 
with interviews in the field) 
Guangxi and 
ITPs 
Laws and regulations Semi-structured interviews com-bined with secondary sources Government 
Investment and total output 
value in the ITP sector 
Semi-structured interviews com-
bined with secondary sources 
Government, 
companies, and 
villagers 
Land-use and land control 
change 
Semi-structured interviews supple-
mented with focus group discussions 
and secondary sources 
Government, 
companies, and 
villagers 
Conflicts around the ITP sec-
tor 
Secondary sources combined with 
semi-structured interviews 
Villagers, com-
panies, and gov-
ernment 
Land-labour input of rural 
households into the ITP sector 
Questionnaires combined with focus 
group discussions Villagers 
Villagers’ livelihood strategies 
Questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews combined with focus 
group discussions 
Villagers 
 
Information about investments, total output value, and land-use 
change for the ITP sector was mainly collected via interviews with key 
actors: government officials, companies, and villagers. Among all the gov-
ernmental departments and offices, the Forestry Department at both pro-
vincial and county levels (which are in charge of business in ITPs) were 
my targets for the interviews. Data about companies (especially the big 
transnational companies and state farms) was not easy to acquire; although 
this data can sometimes be obtained from websites, their reliability and 
validity are relatively low. I thus gathered the information through villag-
ers, via household surveys and focus group discussions, from which I then 
extrapolated possible costs and benefits. 
Conflicts in and around the ITP sector are relatively sensitive in China, 
especially in Guangxi. I searched for relevant news, reports, and academic 
papers in advance. Then I went into the field to interview key actors based 
on the information from these secondary sources. I gathered information 
from villagers and government officials by using largely open-ended ques-
tions, such as: “Did you meet any challenges during work in the ITP sec-
tor? If so, what kind?” 
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For data on land-labour inputs into the ITP sector, the villagers’ liveli-
hood strategies, and their perceptions of the ITP sectors, I conducted a 
household survey in villages in Guangxi. The sample I chose and the ques-
tionnaire I designed for this purpose are described and explained in detail 
below. 
The data described above contains both “soft data” (the texts) and 
“hard data” (the numbers). In this sense, my strategy is to combine quali-
tative and quantitative approaches. According to Neuman (1991), re-
searchers conducting qualitative analyses “reflect on process and develop 
new ideas” as they gather data, and qualitative data is able to provide an 
in-depth understanding of the research problem. However, quantitative 
data can provide stronger and more direct evidence and assist in testing 
the validity of the arguments developed by qualitative methods. (Hesse-
Biber 2010). Thus, qualitative and quantitative approaches can reinforce 
each other’s strengths, bringing me closer to answering this study’s central 
research question. However, this study is primarily a qualitative political 
economy/political ecology study, and the quantitative method will be used as a 
supplementary method. 
In short, this research applies a qualitative approach, supplemented 
with a quantitative approach, to analyse data from both primary and sec-
ondary sources. The secondary sources here include official government 
documents, internet news and reports, books and scientific papers, various 
other documents collected through interviews, papers, books and news-
papers about the agronomy of industrial tree crops, the agronomic condi-
tions of Guangxi, investment data, land and water use changes, conflict 
dynamics in and around the ITP sector, and contracts between villagers, 
state farms and companies. These sources are obtained by conducting in-
ternet and library searches and saving/copying documents received from 
interviewees. Compared to secondary sources, primary sources are rela-
tively hard to obtain. In this research, I conducted 201 semi-structured 
interviews with key informants (including state actors, corporate actors 
and villagers) and three focus group discussions to collect primary data in 
four fieldwork trips in Guangxi.43 In the next section I will introduce these 
four fieldwork trips in Guangxi. 
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1.10 Fieldwork in Guangxi 
For this research, I conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and 
focus group discussions (FGDs). I chose semi-structured interviews to in-
terview staff in government and company offices because this method is 
thought to work well when dealing with “managers, bureaucrats and elite 
members of a community – people who are accustomed to [an] efficient 
use of their time” (Bernard 2000, 191). The questions for the different 
interviewees are listed in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
To collect the data about livelihood strategies and the land-labour rela-
tions of the villagers, I conducted in-depth interviews with the question-
naires as a checklist. I chose this method partly because questionnaires 
have no interviewer bias, are easier to control, and convenient for analysis 
(Bernard 2000, 231-233). Questionnaires still have the danger of deviating 
from the original targets if the questions are not properly designed and 
will bring limited results (no surprise) in a close-end survey. I therefore 
carefully designed the questionnaire to reduce these disadvantages. Fur-
thermore, I combined the questionnaires with interviews to deepen my 
understanding of villagers’ answers and to investigate the information hid-
den behind the numbers (e.g. motivations for land-use change). The ques-
tionnaire focused on five aspects: general household situation, land re-
source management, labour distribution and changes, income 
composition and changes, and livelihood strategy changes. Details of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4. 
The general information about my four fieldwork trips to Guangxi 
during the spring of 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 is elaborated below. 
1.10.1 Fieldwork in 2014 
In March 2014, I conducted the preliminary fieldwork in Guangxi, mainly 
in the city and countryside of Nanning. Before that, I only had only been 
to Guangxi once as a tourist with my mother. During this first fieldwork 
trip I saw real eucalyptus trees, rather than just pictures, for the first time. 
During this fieldwork, I interviewed two professors at the Forestry School 
of Guangxi University, three officials from the Forestry Department of 
Guangxi, one staff member from Gaofeng state-owned Forest Farm, APP 
and Stora Enso, respectively, as well as two villagers from Chengxiang 
County of Nanning. I also conducted a telephone interview with a leader 
of a cooperative which is involved in the ITP sector. 
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1.10.2 Fieldwork in 2015 
During this fieldwork trip, I spent two months in Guangxi and interviewed 
various actors at different sites, as shown in Figure 1.11 and Table 1.5. I 
conducted the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions using 
snowball sampling.44 I conducted 63 interviews and three focus group dis-
cussions (one in Chongzuo County, one in Hepu County and one in 
Wuming County). 
Table 1.5 General information on visited sites in 201545 
City County Township Village Note 
Chongzuo Fusui 
Dongmenzhen  
Dominated by sugarcane 
production Dongluozhen  
Shanxuzhen  
Beihai Hepu 
Zhakouzhen F Cun Stora Enso invested 
Quzhangxiang J Cun 
Stora Enso invested, near 
the reservoir, original 
APP invested 
Changlezhen 
X Cun Stora Enso invested 
D Cun Stora Enso invested 
Liuzhou Liujiang Baipengzhen 
G Cun Independent planters 
T Cun Independent planters 
Yulin Luchuan Wushizhen 
S Cun Independent planters 
A Cun State farm (Gaofeng) in-vested, APP invested 
L Cun Independent planters 
Nanning 
Binyang Litangzhen S Cun Independent planters 
Shanglin 
Mingliangzhen B Cun Ecotourism as a promoted 
sector 
Dafengzhen Y Cun Ecotourism as a promoted 
sector 
Wuming Shuangqiaozhen  The industry park for tim-ber processing 
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Figure 1.11 Visited sites in 2015 
  
 
The fieldwork in Chongzuo (from 2 March to 14 March 2015) was 
conducted with three colleagues from the China Agricultural University 
(Liu Juan, Wang Chunyu and Hu Zhen). From 15 March to 25 April, I 
went to six different counties in the southern part of Guangxi where there 
are distinct dynamics within the development of the ITP sector (see Table 
1.5). The actors interviewed during this trip are summarized in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 General information on informants during fieldwork in 2015 
Type Details 
State 
Forestry depart-
ments 
Provincial level; 
County level (in 4 counties); 
Township level ( in 3 towns) 
State farms 
 
Four at provincial level; 
One at county level  
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Companies 
Foreign companies Stora Enso 
Sugarcane facto-
ries 
NanHua; 
Dongya 
Timber processing 
sites 
One in Shanxu; 
Two in Hepu (preliminary); 
And one industrial park in Wuming (both preliminary 
and further processing) 
Villagers 
Non-eucalyptus 
growers 
Two that leased land to Stora Enso; 
One that leased forestland to private investors; 
12 without forestland; 
Two that are short of labour; 
Five with forestland but for the cultivation of other 
crops 
Employed by Stora 
Enso/large grow-
ers 
Protecting the plantations; 
Log the trees (temporarily); 
Security (those have social relations) 
Independent eu-
calyptus growers 
13 small-scale 
Nine large-scale (leasing land): including three own-
ing timber preliminary processing mills and three 
working as middlemen 
Middlemen  Three middlemen: cut trees and sell them 
Migrant workers 
Four migrant workers: including two who grow trees 
at home; 
Several used to be migrant workers: including one 
who used to go the Ghana to do gold mining); 
Several doing off-farm jobs in the near township/ 
county centres. 
 
1.10.3 Fieldwork in 2016 
Based on the two previous fieldwork trips, during the spring of 2016 I 
conducted the in-depth interviews in the four villages (see Figure 1.12) 
with the questionnaires (see Appendix 4) as a checklist to guide the infor-
mation collection using snowball sampling. However, my questions during 
the interviews were not limited to the questions on the questionnaire, I 
also asked other questions in response to the information provided by the 
interviewees (e.g. if the villager told me that he/she plans to change land-
use from eucalyptus trees to sugarcane, I then asked them why and their 
basis/ considerations for this land-use change). The location and the gen-
eral situation of these villages are shown in Figure 1.12 and Table 1.7. 
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Figure 1.12 Fieldwork visited sites in 2016 
 
 
In M village, I lived with Ms Zhen’s parents who lived in one of my 
targeted village groups (E Village Group). Ms Zhen is my collage mate and 
one of my friends. In the first week, I talked to the local people by myself 
but made little progress at first for two reasons. Firstly, I found it is very 
difficult to build trust in the village, especially as I am not able to speak 
the dialect (later I learnt to partially understand the interviewees, but I still 
cannot speak the local language). The villagers there have very bad expe-
riences of talking to strangers about livelihood issues: some of these 
strangers defrauded the villagers of their money; even worse, some traf-
ficked their children. Secondly, the villagers were quite busy during my 
fieldwork, because February is a busy season for them due to the sugar-
cane harvest - if they did not cut down the sugarcane before the end of 
February, the sugar factory in town would refuse to buy it from them. I 
therefore decided to hire my friend’s father (Mr Zhen) as my assistant to 
introduce me to the people I wanted to interview and translate for me 
when necessary (i.e. when interviewing old people who cannot speak Man-
darin). This strategy worked quite well. Mr Zhen is a farmer and he planted 
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eucalyptus trees and sugarcane on the forestland controlled by his house-
holds. He used to be businessman selling chemical fertilizer in the villages 
around and became familiar with villagers in other village groups. Through 
him, I quickly gained access to independent planters, non-planters, mid-
dlemen, and businessmen from seeding cultivation, transportation and 
processing businesses. 
In J village, I lived in one of the village groups with Ms Wei, a middle-
aged woman whom I got to knew during my previous fieldwork in March 
2015. Ms Wei is women’s director in J village. I employed her as my re-
search assistant in this village. We did interviews in all the six village groups 
there. 
I also went to N town, as I had heard from the family I lived with in M 
village that there are several big individual entrepreneurs (or “big bosses” 
as they called by local villagers) involved in land leasing and the eucalyptus 
tree business. Introduced by my friend Ms Zhen, I stayed with the family 
of one of her distant relatives in a village near town. At first, I hesitated to 
hire Ms Zhen’s relative (a distance aunt, Ms Ma) to be my assistant in this 
village, as she cannot speak fluent Mandarin and sometimes she misun-
derstood my words. On the other hand, I observed that she has good so-
cial skills and some connection with villagers and some entrepreneurs in 
town, because she likes walking around and chatting with people during 
her free time. I therefore decided to hire to her as an “ice-breaker”. During 
my interviews, she helped me to get access to the interviewees I wanted to 
interview (I noticed that although she herself could not fully understand 
my work and its aim, and is a normal farmer rather than a village ca-
dre/elite, she could always get my targeted interviewees to say “yes”). I 
then explained my research aim and asked questions myself. 
In L town, I planned to live in the village with a household introduced 
to me by Ms Zhen. Unfortunately, the host family refused me. Consider-
ing that this was a very interesting field site for me, I decided to live in the 
hotel in town. Luckily, the targeted villages were quite near the town. I 
employed a villager, Mr Liang, who collects electricity bills in the nearby 
villages for the local Electricity Company, to be my assistant. We worked 
on the villages where the Gaofeng state-owned forest farm or APP had 
leased land and planted eucalyptus trees. 
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Table 1.7 General information on visited villages in 2016 
 
 M Village  J Village L Town N Town 
Reason 
to 
choose 
I interviewed my friend, 
Ms Zhen, who is origi-
nally from this village. 
She told me almost 
every household plants 
eucalyptus trees in her 
village for additional in-
come. The villages 
burnt the forestland or 
pulled up the originally 
cultivated sugarcane to 
grow eucalyptus trees. 
Furthermore, this 
county is an important 
production site of sugar-
cane in China, with an 
annual output of 200000 
tonnes (equalling to 
more than 10 tonnes per 
capita)46. Meanwhile the 
county government in-
troduced two big paper-
pulp companies in 2006. 
The dynamic between 
sugarcane and eucalyp-
tus trees is very inter-
esting here. 
According to the 
village head, the 
village has 8000 
mu of collec-
tively-owned for-
estland. Of that, 
7000 mu was 
leased to Stora 
Enso (Field notes, 
18 March 2015).47 
One village cadre 
told me her land 
was originally 
leased to APP in 
1998. But APP 
gave up after a 
big typhoon and 
released the land 
to Stora 
Enso(Field notes, 
18 March 2015). 
The dynamic be-
tween Sotra Enso 
and APP is very in-
teresting here. 
I interviewed a 
staff member of 
the town gov-
ernment’s For-
estry Depart-
ment. He told 
me there is a 
big timber pro-
cessing indus-
trial park in 
Wuming County. 
Both APP and 
Gaofeng state-
owned forest 
farms plant eu-
calyptus trees in 
town with the 
land directly 
leased from vil-
lagers/ village 
collec-
tives.(Field 
notes, 13 April 
2015.) 
State-owned 
farm+ APP  
When I inter-
viewed the 
villagers in M 
village, I 
found out that 
there are sev-
eral individual 
entrepreneurs 
(both natives 
and outsiders) 
who lease 
land from col-
lectives or vil-
lagers in N 
Town (Field 
notes, 1 March 
2016). This is 
very different 
from the situ-
ation in M vil-
lage, where 
the land and 
eucalyptus 
trees are still 
under the con-
trol of the vil-
lagers. 
Individual en-
trepreneurs 
 
Infor-
mation 
Population: around 6000 
nine village groups 
Population:1450; 
number of house-
holds: 29448 
six village groups 
  
Type Individual planter domi-
nated 
Foreign company 
dominated 
State-owned 
farm and for-
eign company 
dominated 
Individual en-
trepreneur 
dominated  
 
During this fieldwork, I completed a total of 106 in-depth interviews 
in these four villages. The general information about the interviewees is 
summarized in Table 1.8. 
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Table 1.8 Summary of the interviewees in 2016 
 
 M Village J Village  L Town N Town Total 
Number of inter-
views 38 25 16 36 115 
The number of 
complete inter-
views49 
31 25 16 34 106 
Gen-
der 
Male 30 12 9 28 79 
% 97% 48% 56% 82% 75% 
Female 1 13 7 6 27 
% 3% 52% 44% 18% 25% 
Planter 
Owning 
the land 
(farm-
land/for-
estland) 
26 3 10 28 67 
Leasing 
the land 
from in-
dividual 
villagers 
0 0 0 2 2 
Leasing 
the land 
from 
collec-
tive 
0 0 5 2 7 
Total 26 3 15 32 76 
% 84% 12% 94% 94% 72% 
non-planter 5 22 1 2 30 
% 16% 88% 6% 6% 28% 
 
Based on the data collected from these interviews, the land-labour 
conditions of these sites are distinct. 
In M village, land (both forestland and farmland) was distributed to 
rural households in the 1980s under the HRS reform based on the unit of 
production team (which later became village group). Because each pro-
duction team has different land conditions, the distribution is not equal 
among the villages. Some households own 30 mu farmland, while some 
only own 3 mu. 
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As land is relatively abundant in this village, the scale of the migrant 
population is the smallest of the four sites I visited. The age of the mi-
grants is concentrated in the 18 to 40 age bracket. These migrants claimed 
that they might choose to return to their villages when their parents get 
old or their children start going to school. 
In J village, most of the farmland was acquired to build a reservoir in 
1960s. The forestland ownership in this village is in chaos. A part of the 
forestland was distributed to individual household under the HRS, with-
out any clear boundaries. When collective forestland was leased to 
APP/Stora Enso in the late 1990s and early 2000s, those land plots which 
had already been distributed were also included without any enquiry into 
their ownership. Later, due to grievances/ resistance from below, part of 
the forestland was returned to the villagers, most of whom later leased to 
individual entrepreneurs or to Stora Enso. 
As land is at a shortage in this village, most men have migrated, either 
permanently or temporarily, to towns or urban areas to make a living. 
Generally speaking, only the old, the women, the young and the sick are 
left at home. 
In the villages I visited in L town, farmland was distributed to rural 
households under the HRS reform. The condition of the forestland varies 
among different village groups: some do not have any, and some own 
hundreds of mu. Except for a very small part of the forestland that was 
distributed to households under the HRS, most of the forestland remains 
in the hands of the collective, which leased it to APP or state-owned farms 
in the early 2000s. 
In this town, the areas where I did my fieldwork were quite near the 
town centre (30 mins at the most). Thus, working/doing business in the 
town centre on working days and returning to the village every night was 
an option for villagers. However, as was the case in the previous village, 
the old, the women, the young and the sick were usually left behind.  
In the villages I visited in N town, farmland was distributed to rural 
households under the HRS reform, 50 while the forestland was not. In the 
villages I visited, the principle of first occupation is commonly the agreed 
term of forestland ownership. However, very few people realized the value 
of forestland before the rise in importance of eucalyptus trees. Thus, the 
households with more labourers and/or better access to information 
about the expansion of eucalyptus trees (the elites in the village) usually 
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own more forestland. As in the previous site, the villages I visited are rel-
atively near town, so quite a large group of villagers earn their income in 
the town. 
In terms of land and labour conditions, the trajectories in the develop-
ment of the ITP sector in these four sites are also divergent. In M village, 
except for a very small group of villagers who started to plant eucalyptus 
trees in the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the villages started their 
cultivation after 2010 due to the decrease in the price of sugarcane and the 
increase in the eucalyptus tree price. These villagers thus changed their 
land-use from sugarcane to eucalyptus trees. However, several interview-
ees expressed their willingness to revert the land-use back to sugarcane or 
fruit trees because of the decrease in the eucalyptus tree price this year 
(almost halved).  
In J village, foreign companies are the main investors in the ITP sector. 
APP leased the land from the collective in 1997 with a 20-year contract. 
However, APP only paid the rent for three years and gave up their ITPs 
there due to the high management costs caused by frequent typhoons and 
numerous tree thieves. The land was then re-leased to Stora Enso or indi-
vidual entrepreneurs. Stora Enso leased land from the collective in 2000. 
Because of the chaos in the land ownership and leasing contracts, some 
land plots were returned to villagers later, as mentioned above in M village. 
Following the introduction of foreign companies, a few villagers also 
started in the eucalyptus tree business by leasing land or cooperating with 
foreign companies in and near this village.  
In 2000, Gaofeng Sate farm came to lease land to plant eucalyptus trees 
in some villages in L town. However, the person who actually controlled 
the land and outputs was an employee of Gaofeng Sate farm. These euca-
lyptus trees were planted, cut, and sold in exactly same way as was done 
by individual entrepreneurs. 
Meanwhile, APP has also leased land and built ITPs in this village since 
2003. In some contrast to Gaofeng state farm, part of the outputs (the 
small branches) were transported to the APP factory in Qinzhou city, 
while the big branches were sold to the timber processing industrial park 
in Wuming County. In addition, a few villagers also followed this trend 
and started in the eucalyptus tree business. 
In the villages of N town, except for a very few investments in euca-
lyptus trees in the early 2000s, the rise of the ITP sector in the villages 
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started mainly in 2010, a year which is associated with the price drop in 
sugarcane. Individual investors who are involved in the ITP business are 
usually those who had already accumulated capital from other off-farm 
sectors (e.g. supermarket, trade). 
1.10.4 Fieldwork in 2017 
In the March of 2017, I conducted fieldwork in Guangxi and Yunnan 
provinces with Hua Li from Taiyuan University of Technology. During 
the fieldwork, I conducted in-depth interviews with villagers in Fusui 
County who either plant or do not plant eucalyptus trees, employees of 
sugar companies in both Guangxi and Yunnan, a manager of a private 
company engaged in sugarcane cultivation, an employee of Stora Enso, 
Vietnamese migrant sugarcane cutters, and state actors. The first-hand 
data collected via interviews and observations and the second-hand docu-
ments provided by respondents complemented the information on rural 
transformation and the expansion of eucalyptus trees in relation to other 
boom crops in the region. 
 
1.11 Organization of this study 
Guided by the methodological and theoretical discussions in this chapter, 
and in line with the research questions of this study, the following chapters 
provide further empirical investigations with a focus on land, labour, live-
lihood strategies, and the state-society interaction around the ITP sector 
in Southern China. 
I begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of the rise of the ITP sector in 
Guangxi. I explore the dynamics of the development of the ITP sector in 
China through a political economy lens, with the focus on four factors, 
namely, the domestic demand for the products, the agronomic conditions 
in Southern China, the institutional conditions of land control and labour 
in rural China, and the financial capital from both domestic and interna-
tional sources. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse the role of the state throughout the expansion 
of the ITP sector in Guangxi, using the “interactive state-society” frame-
work. I find that the actions/reactions of the state at different levels - es-
pecially at the provincial and local levels - towards the ITP sector can vary 
in a relational and dynamic way. In line with Fox (1993), I argue that the 
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state’s role is to facilitate capital accumulation while maintaining political 
legitimacy. 
In Chapter 4, I zoom in on the corporations, especially foreign land 
investments in Southern China. I explore the driving forces and the mech-
anisms of APP’s and Stora Enso’s land control for the cultivation of eu-
calyptus in Guangxi. I argue that foreign investors acquired land inside 
China, which implies that the role of China in global land politics is not 
limited to the country-of-origin of numerous foreign land investors and a 
major site of agro-product consumption, but is also a destination for for-
eign land investments in a crop boom. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the impacts of the rise of the ITP sector on 
villagers’ livelihoods in Guangxi. I focus on their adaptive strategies in re-
sponse to the massive changes in land-use and land control due to the 
development of the ITP sector in Guangxi. I demonstrate that villagers 
are not necessarily victims, but at times can benefit and (a few villagers) 
even dispossess others within the boom. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss the political reactions from the affected villagers, 
tracking how and why various social groups affected by the expansion of 
the ITP sector respond differently. I focus on the dynamics of the inclu-
sion and exclusion of villagers to the ITP sector. In this chapter, I chal-
lenge the dichotomy of “inclusion versus exclusion” and develop a more 
nuanced typology, including passive inclusion, active inclusion, passive ex-
clusion, and active exclusion. 
 
 
Notes 
1 In other words, land politics includes a bundle of policies/actions from above 
and a series of initiatives/reactions from below that are associated with land enti-
tlement and the direction of changes in land control and land use. These actions 
from above and from below are neither independent nor do they emerge in se-
quence, but dynamically (re)shape each other. They are around land-based change, 
but not always land-centric (e.g. about labour and ecology). 
2 For details about the politics of flexing crops, see Borras et al (2016); for an anal-
ysis of flexing of soybeans, palm oil and sugarcane see Oliveira and Schneider 
(2016), Alonso-Fradejas et al (2016), and McKay et al. (2016) respectively. 
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3 In China, due to the specific land system which will be introduced in the following 
parts, rural land cannot be sold, but (the user rights) can be contracted. Thus, in 
the context of China, land transfer is what has been commonly discussed by Chi-
nese scholars (Huang and Wang 2008). 
4 These domestic land grabs have not only occurred in rural areas, but also in urba
n areas, as commonly shown in current media and activism, such as: https://www
.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/12/china-must-end-land-grabs-amid-protests
-over-death-custody/, accessed on 16 January 2018. 
5 Under the current land system in China, rural land is owned by the collectives, 
while the contracting rights are entitled to villagers based on their rural identity 
(under the Hukou System), and the management rights belong to the actual users 
of the land. Thus, what can be transferred to investors is the user right of the land 
rather than full ownership. This will be elaborated on in parts 1.6 and 2.5. 
6 In this study, the term of “villagers” is used on purpose to refer to socially differ-
entiated rural residents. Villagers are not the same as the “peasants” who, as defined 
by Chayanov, only conduct subsistence farming. Many villagers do off-farm work. 
Meanwhile, they are not backward and low quality as discussed in contemporary 
narratives about Chinese peasants (see Schneider 2015). They have their specific 
advantages. Furthermore, some villagers are not purely “smallholders”. Although 
villagers in China usually have small, even tiny, plots, some have acquired more 
land as an adaptive livelihood strategy. This will be analysed in the following ses-
sions/chapters. 
7 The two track pricing system is the transitional pricing system implemented when 
China moved from a centrally-planed economic system to a market-dominated 
economic system. Under such a system, part of the raw materials are sold to the 
state at the planned price, while the rest can be sold at market prices. 
(http://baike.baidu.com/view/538126.htm accessed on 11 January 2017) This 
means that government officials and managers in SOEs can buy at a cheap (state) 
price, stockpile, and then sell at a high (market) price to make huge profits. This 
process underlies the creation of the first ‘cadre-capitalist class’, see Hung (2015). 
8 Also cited in Arrighi, Aschoff, and Scully (2010, 416). 
9 A formal registration of the population by government, based on the household 
unit, and with a strict division between the rural and urban populations. The sys-
tem was introduced in the early 1950s as a statistical/ recording system and, from 
the late 1950s, became an institution to control geographical mobilization (Chan 
and Zhang 1999). Under this system, citizens are classified by socio-economic 
eligibility (“agricultural” and “non-agricultural”) and residential location (“local” 
and “non-local”). The classification is related to citizens’ entitlements to the re-
sources and services provided by the state. Thus, without a local non-agricultural 
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Hukou, it would be difficult for a citizen to permanently live in the city. The Hu-
kou system, though it has gone through a variety of reforms, still “directly and 
indirectly, continues to be a major wall in preventing China’s rural population 
from settling in the city and in maintaining the rural- urban ‘apartheid’” (Chan 
and Buckingham 2008, 604). 
10 Rural land rights in China are closely linked to Hukou status. Under the House-
hold Reform System (HRS) reform, the land user rights were allocated to rural 
dwellers with an agricultural Hukou in the village community they belong to. 
These rural dwellers would not lose their land rights unless they give up their 
local agricultural Hukou (Andreas and Zhan 2016). However, Andreas and Zhan 
(2016) have noticed a gradual shift in land rights from being Hukou-based to 
being more market-based under the current Hukou and land reforms. 
11 Note that, after a short-lived period of prosperity in the 1990s, these TVEs have 
already declined. (Buck 2007). 
12 A few scholars have different opinions about the same institutions (e.g. TVEs). 
According to Arrighi (2007, 362-363), collectively-owned TVEs emerged in rural 
China during the period of fiscal decentralization to promote local economic de-
velopment and increase cadres’ bonuses. The role of TVEs in redistributing surplus 
is expressed in two ways, namely: paying taxes and levies to rural communities, and 
employing rural surplus labour to raise villagers’ incomes. However, Walker (2006) 
argues that TVEs are used as tools for extracting rural surplus. In other words, 
where Walker argues that TVEs, rather than being organizations that redistribute 
the surplus from urban to rural areas within the AWD scheme, they simply fuel a 
new round of extraction in rural areas, Arrighi claims that TVEs enable capital to 
reflow from urban to rural areas with capitalist development. Both Arrighi’s and 
Walker’s explanations are supported by empirical evidence from contemporary ru-
ral China, but in different regions and during different time periods: Webber (2008) 
argues that the TVEs, under the protection of local states within the context of a 
non-competitive, centrally-planned economic regime, did indeed improve villagers’ 
welfare by subcontracting work from the urban industrial sector. Buck (2007), 
meanwhile, states that TVEs reformed the rural land-labour relationship, and 
changed the rural farmers into subordinated wage workers. According to Walker 
and Buck (2007, 43-44), when TVEs privatized or closed in the context of the 
market economic regime in the late 1990s, these rural workers were forced to be-
come the industrial reserve army. This is a reminder to pay attention to differences 
across space and time when studying the rise of capitalism and its rural-urban link-
age. 
13 Findings from my fieldwork in 2016, show that 13 of the interviewed villagers 
were doing unskilled wage-labour jobs in the ITP sector (i.e. weeding and fertilizi
ng). Their average annual income from these jobs was 3342 yuan per capita, whic
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h is very little compared to the average annual wage income in China (67569 yuan
 per capital in 2016). Data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China: http:/
/data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01. 
14 In China, forestland is a type of land classified by the state. It is hilly land but not 
necessarily with natural forests on it. 
15 Mu refers to a unit for the measurement of land – 15 mu equals 1 hectare. 
16 Although, according to Zhang (2012), Chinese contract farming might contain 
some distinct features. 
17 His study is based on contemporary land grabs in the context of an Indonesian 
palm oil plantation. The notion of adverse incorporation, “as a fairly broad critique 
of neoliberal accounts of poverty and development,” refers to “the risks and dis-
advantages of inclusion and participation in unregulated capitalist markets” (du 
Toit 2009, 2). 
18 Yuan is the monetary unit of China. 1 euro equals 7.1 Yuan. 
19  Beihai, Nanning, Qianzhou, Qinlian, Yunlin and Wuzhou are all cities in 
Guangxi. 
20 This might be different from maize production in the Northeast of China, 
which tends to encompass large-scale and highly industrialized production (Gale, 
Jewison, and Hansen 2016). 
21 In this study, I mainly focus on the politics of land use change rather than 
broader geographic and ecological measurements in land use changes (including 
land cover, biomass, etc.). 
22 1 hectare equals 15 mu. 
23 See http://www.china.org.cn/china/CPC_90_anniversary/2011-04/19/conte
nt_22392494.htm, accessed on 11 September 2018. 
24 The data comes from the Statistic Year Book of China 2013: http://www.stats.
gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm, accessed on 11 January 2017. 
25 http://baike.baidu.com/view/6054077.htm, accessed on 11 January 2017. 
26 Data source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201704/t20170428_1489334.
html. Accessed on 16 April 2018. 
27 I said “villagers leave land”, because villagers are doing off-farm work and have 
physically left the land and farming activities. But this does not mean that villagers 
have been legally separated from land, either voluntarily or forced. 
28 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/134999/135000/8104098.html, accessed on 11 
January 2017. 
29 There are different types of subsides for different type of forests/plantations. 
Under the Returning Farmland to Forest Program, planters got 210 yuan per mu 
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per year for five years (as commercial forests/plantations) or eight years (as eco-
logical forests/plantations). In 2007, the central state prolonged the subsidies for 
another five or eight years at reduced rates of 125 yuan (Zinda et al. 2017). The 
subsidies and free seedlings increased the economic incentives for villagers in 
Guangxi to plant eucalyptus trees. 
30 http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2008-12/18/content_10522035.htm, acce
ssed on 11 January 2017. 
31 Except for the regular agriculture tax, peasants still had to pay fees and charges 
called “five tongshou three tiliu.”. These were: family planning, social special care, 
militia training, road construction, and education fees at the township level (five 
tongshou), and pubic accumulation funds, public welfare funds, and administration 
fees at the village level (three tiliu). There were also other charges, such as “self-
raised funds” (jizi), and apportions (tanpian). 
32“辛辛苦苦三百天，洒尽汗水责任田; 亩产千斤收成好，年终结算亏本
钱” (http://news.ifeng.com/special/60nianjiaguo/60biaozhirenwu/renwuziliao/
200909/0910_7766_1342837.shtml, accessed on 11 January 2017). A new year co
uplet is a decoration pasted on the door and always expresses wishes for the new 
year. 
33 “农民真苦，农村真穷，农业真危险”（http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-
518437-522104.html accessed on 11 January 2017）. 
34http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%86%9C%E6%9D%91%E7%A8%8E%E
8%B4%B9%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9, accessed on 11 January 2017. 
35  http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-03/06/content_219801.htm, accessed on 11 
January 2017. 
36 However, similarly to soy and maize in Northeast China (Hairong, Yiyuan, and 
Bun 2016, 381), the profitability of a crop is not simply affected by economic fac-
tors. As will be analysed in Chapter 3, it is also related to the state’s strategic control 
of the prices of certain crops (including sugarcane), but not other crops (e. g. eu-
calyptus trees). 
37 During my preliminary fieldwork in 2014, employees of the Guangxi Forestry d
epartment told me of the plan to limit the scale of ITPs in Guangxi. Some counti
es in Guangxi and Guangdong have issued policies to stop the planting of eucalyp
tus trees and plan to completely remove the ITPs already planted, due to their neg
ative environmental impacts and the resistance from below that they generate: htt
p://news.sohu.com/20060411/n242749631.shtml, http://www.eeo.com.cn/201
4/0815/264952.shtml, accessed on 11 January 2017. 
38  The state-owned forest farms (e.g. Dongmen State-owned Forest Farm, 
Gaogeng State-owned Forest Farm) are also “Dragon Head Enterprises”. For a 
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more detailed analysis of “Dragon Head Enterprises” and its role in the rural cap-
italisation in China, see (Schneider 2017). 
39 This information comes from the interview with employees at Store Enso and 
from a state farm during my preliminary fieldwork in spring 2014. 
40 I refer to the total scale of land leased by state forest farms rather than the scale 
of each case. 
41 Although this is a special case, because the enclosure was done in order to create 
a non-agricultural, special economic zone – similar to what Levien studied in India 
(Levien 2012). 
42 This is different from the findings by Deng and Yang (2013, 321), in that, in the 
face of real and serious pollution, villagers may seek to redress environmental griev-
ances by piggybacking on politically favourable issues. 
43 Of these interviews, 105 were conducted with questionnaires as guidelines. 
44 Because my fieldwork is conducted in multiple sites. Although snowball sam-
pling might show bias due to the selection of the first few participants, this is a 
method that could help me quickly access key informants, especially those who 
were involved in the conflicts. During the process, I selected and visited varying 
sites with distinct dynamics of the crop boom and in each site tried to start by 
interviewing normal villagers rather than local elites (e.g. rich farmers and village 
leaders). 
45 In this study, except a few cases (when the information came from newspapers 
and/or was already well-known), most village names are pseudonyms (replaced by 
letters of the alphabet) to protect the informants. 
46 http://baike.baidu.com/subview/327591/7967028.htm, accessed on 11 Janu-
ary 2017. 
47 This number needs further examination as he is employed by Stora Enso to 
guard the plantation. 
48 According to the data provided by officials in the county. 
49 Some of the interviews did not follow the pattern in the questionnaires. Further-
more, a few interviews were interrupted for various reasons. These interviews are 
considered “incomplete” in this Table. 
50 In some natural villages I visited, the farmland had already been leased out to 
entrepreneurs/companies for large-scale sugarcane cultivation. 
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2 2 Chapter 2: The rise of the ITP sector in Southern China 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
For a fuller understanding of the characteristics and trajectory of global 
land politics, especially the new role of China, in this chapter I analyse the 
rise of the ITP sector in Southern China with a more detailed, albeit pre-
liminary, discussion around ITP’s technological, value, material, and finan-
cial bases. To be specific, this chapter identifies and then discusses four 
factors that play a role in the expansion of ITPs in Southern China, 
namely, the domestic demand for the products, the agronomic conditions, 
the institutional conditions of land control and labour in rural China, and 
the financial capital from both domestic and international sources. Prior 
to this, I will introduce certain empirical issues in relation to the ITP sector 
in general and in China (in Guangxi in particular). 
 
2.2 The ITP sector, globally and in China 
As mentioned earlier, the ITP sector is less visible in the emerging litera-
ture on global land politics and crop booms despite its scale, its various 
patterns, and its multiple end uses. First of all, the ITP sector is responsible 
for probably far wider land-use changes than other boom crops (see Table 
2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Regional plantation areas and their increase between the years 
1990 and 2010 (million Ha) 
 1990 2010 Change %, 1990–2010 
Africa 11.663 15.409 32.1 
Asia and the Pacific 74.163 119.884 61.6 
Russian Federation 12.651 16.991 34.3 
Europe 46.395 52.327 12.8 
Caribbean 0.391 0.547 39.9 
Central America 0.445 0.584 31.2 
South America 8.276 13.821 67.0 
Near East (excluding N. Africa) 4.677 6.991 49.5 
Canada 1.357 8.963 560.5 
Mexico 0.35 3.203 815.1 
USA 17.938 25.363 41.4 
World 178.307 264.084 48.1 
Note: Data is cited from Kröger (2014b, 242). The ITP sector here includes rubber and palm 
oil, although fast-growing trees occupy the highest percentage of the sector. 
 
Secondly, the ITP sector involves variegated forms in terms of scale, 
land property rights, investment mechanisms, and implications. The tree 
plantations could be either large or small-scale, and be either publically or 
privately owned. Furthermore, the boom in the ITP sector could be driven 
by an alliance between the industrial sector and the state, as in the case of 
Brazil (Kröger 2012), or based on smallholder units, as in the case of Vi-
etnam (Sikor 2011). Lastly, the rise of the ITP sector may sometimes lead 
to large-scale rural displacement, as in the case of Ecuador (Gerber and 
Veuthey 2010). 
Thirdly, as already mentioned in Chapter 1, the ITP sector is involved 
in the current global flexing complexity partly based on the multiple (both 
actual and potential) uses of the tree crops (Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 
2013). ITP outputs can be raw materials for wood-based boards and pan-
els, paper, and energy (including for bio-refineries, electricity, and heating) 
(Overbeek, Kröger, and Gerber 2012, 15). Furthermore, the trees can be 
used as “carbon sinks”. These emerging uses of the ITP sector are associ-
ated with the development of technology and increased demands for its 
products as fuel and environmental crises converge (Kröger 2014a).Within 
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the current context of contextual changes, these multiple uses of industrial 
tree crops increased the longevity of investments, i.e. by “enabling inves-
tors to better anticipate – and more nimbly react to – changing prices, e.g. 
to better exploit price spikes or withstand price shocks” (Borras et al. 2016, 
94). In other words, when the price of paper is high, investors can choose 
to produce paper or sell the outputs to paper-pulp companies; when the 
price of wood-based products rises, they are able to gain profits from cor-
responding products. 
The ITP sector, with profound implications worldwide and compli-
cated dynamics, deserves to be studied systematically, especially as the sec-
tor has gained ground and expanded so dramatically recently in China. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Guangxi, as a key hub of the ITP sec-
tor in China, is the regional focus of this study, and eucalyptus, as a sub-
sector within the ITP sector, is the principal sector for research. Guangxi 
province is located in the southwest costal area of China. The geographic 
location creates suitable natural conditions, namely, a subtropical, 
mild and moist climate, for eucalyptus. This will be analysed in detail in 
the following part of this chapter. 
Figure 2.1 Area of eucalyptus trees in Guangxi (1000 ha) 
 
Source: 1977-2005 data (Pang (2006), 2010 data (Wei (2011) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, in the 25 years before the year 2000, the acreage 
of eucalyptus increased by about 3.5 times from 43.2 thousand ha in 1975 
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to 148.8 thousand ha in 2000. In the ten years from 2000, the area covered 
by eucalyptus expanded 11 times to the current (2013) total of 1653.3 ha. 
To date, Guangxi has more than one-third of all the fast-growing planta-
tions in the whole of China, and in terms of eucalyptus coverage, Guangxi 
ranks first in China. However, the expansion of ITPs may have slowed 
down since 2013 when the Guangxi Forestry Department issued a policy 
to reduce the area of eucalyptus trees in Guangxi. This is related to the 
competing roles of the state and will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Within the ITP sector in Guangxi, both overseas and domestic compa-
nies are involved. The foreign investors (Stora Enso from Finland and 
APP from Indonesia) mainly specialize in paper products, whereas the do-
mestic investors, including state forest farms, mainly specialize in tim-
ber/board/furniture products. The commodities produced from the ITPs 
are mainly for Chinese domestic consumption. 
This scenario created by such land investments in Southern China thus 
raise the question: why did industrial tree plantations emerge and expand 
so massively in Southern China within such a short period of time? In 
other words, what are the internally-driven and externally imposed factors 
that caused the rise of the ITP sector in Southern China, especially 
Guangxi? In order to fully understand such dynamics, in the following 
sections of the thesis, the value, material, institutional, and financial bases 
for the development of the ITP sector in Southern China will be explored. 
 
2.3 The domestic demand for the products 
As mentioned above, the products of the industrial tree plantations are 
highly diverse, ranging from the tangible (paper, board and wood-based 
energy), to the intangible (“carbon sink”). In Southern China, the carbon 
market has not yet matured due to difficulties around the carbon sequence 
assessment, and wood-based energy, which mainly uses simple combus-
tion for heating rather than bio-refineries, is gradually being substituted by 
electricity generated from other sources. This leaves boards/panels and 
pulp for paper as the main uses of the industrial tree crops. 
In China, the domestic demand for these forest products is huge1, given 
to country’s fast urbanization rate and remarkable population growth. Be-
fore 2000, the domestic demand for these products far outstripped supply. 
According to the Chinese Forestry Development Report 2001, the existing gap 
between domestic demand and supply in 2000 had reached 33.6 million 
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m3,2 and the average prices of timber and paper both increased compared 
to 1999. 3 
Since then, the mismatch between the demand and supply of forest 
products has gently reduced, partly due to the rise of industrial tree plan-
tations from 2000 onwards. As shown in Figure 2.2, the production of 
forest products has increased dramatically in the past decade, from 93.42 
million m3 in 2002 to 285.15 million m3 in 2015. At the same time, the 
domestic consumption of forest products has also more than doubled, and 
the percentage of domestic consumption has remained over 80% of the 
total supply. 
Figure 2.2 Domestic consumption and production of forest products in 
China (Million m3) 
 
Source: Chinese Forestry Development Report 2003-2013 (2003-2013 年中国林业发展报告)4 
 
But this does not the mean that domestic demand is now saturated. In 
2011, the average annual household paper consumption per capital was 
only 3.9 kilos, far below the amount consumed in North America (25 ki-
los), Western Europe and Japan (15 kilos).5 This means that the demand 
for the forest products, especially paper, has a huge capacity to increase in 
the future. 
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Figure 2.3 The Chinese import volumes of fibreboards (1000 m3), wood-
based panels (1000 m3) and pulp for paper (1000 tonnes) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/download/F/FO/E, access on 23 February 2015 
 
The strong domestic demand for forest products has caused the value 
of these products to soar. Correspondingly, the market for these products 
has thrived. Because of this, more fibreboard, wood-based panels, and pa-
per pulps have been imported since the Reform and Opening period (Gaige 
Kaifang) in the 1980s (see Figure 2.3). The import volume of fibreboard in 
2000 was over 140 times the 1980 volume, and the import of wood-based 
panels grew from 329.2 thousand m3 in 1980 to 6626.5 thousand m3 by 
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2000. However, the import volumes of the fibreboards and wood-based 
panels decreased after 2000. This is related to the expansion of ITPs in 
Guangxi and to the technological breakthrough in the processing of 
boards.6 Unlike fibreboards and wood-based panels, the volume of im-
ported pulp has been increasing since 1980, and reached about 16 million 
tonnes in 2013, accounting for a large part of the total supply of the pulp 
in China.7 The increase of the import volume of pulp for paper, even after 
the expansion of ITPs, implies differences within the commodity chains 
of these products, something which needs further research. 
The surging increase in domestic demand since the 1980s actually cre-
ated the value base for the development of ITPs in China. This can be 
seen by the rapid increase in the price of eucalyptus trees from 200 Yuan 
per m3 in 2000 to 850 Yuan per m3 in 2015 (Field notes, 27 March 2015).8 
However, this demand on tree crop products alone did not push the rise 
of ITP sector, the rise also needed a material base (i.e. agronomic condi-
tions). 
 
2.4 The agronomic conditions in Southern China 
The emergence and expansion of the ITP sector in Southern China (espe-
cially in Guangxi), rather than anywhere else, is mainly a result of its spe-
cific climate and land conditions. 
The climate of Southern China, especially Guangxi, is advantageous for 
tropical crops, especially eucalyptus trees: the temperature is mild, with 
annual average temperatures around 20 degrees centigrade and little sea-
sonal difference.9 The annual rainfall is also abundant, at around 1300-
3000 mm per year. This is very suitable for eucalyptus tree crops which 
originate from tropical areas. 
The land conditions in Guangxi are challenging for agricultural produc-
tion. According to the introduction in the official Guangxi Agricultural 
Department website, 68.3% of the territory in Guangxi is hilly (hills over 
200 m high), and a large number of these hills are rocky.10 Most, if not all, 
of the land is rather barren and covered with thin red soil and (more than 
80%) lacking the necessary nutritional elements - nitrogen, phosphorus, 
or potassium - for crop growth. This means that arable land in Guangxi is 
both bad quality and of limited quantity, and thus not suitable for crops 
which have high requirements on soil quality. On the other hand, there is 
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more than enough sloped forestland, implying potential for the develop-
ment of forestry. 
Linking this natural endowment with the present land-use, the im-
portance of the agricultural sector, especially the forestry sector, in 
Guangxi is self-evident. According to a land-use survey conducted in 2005 
(as shown in Figure 2.4), rural land (including land used both directly and 
indirectly for agricultural production) accounted for about 75% of total 
land in Guangxi, equal to 17.89 million ha.11 Within this rural land, 65% 
(around 11.61 million ha) is forestland, which is an area almost three times 
larger than the flat farming land. 
Figure 2.4 Land-use in Guangxi 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from Land-use Plan of Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region (2006- 2020)12 
 
However, these favourable climate and land conditions in Guangxi did 
not immediately induce the increase in eucalyptus tree production after it 
was introduced into China in the 1890s13. This is because the species in-
troduced at that time did not show huge economic potential. The devel-
opment of eucalyptus tree planting did not take off until the 1980s when 
Dongmen Forest Farm, a state-owned farm in Guangxi, started a techno-
logical collaboration with Australia around the forestry sector, particularly 
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around the introduction and cultivation of eucalyptus tree species14. More 
than 100 species were introduced through this collaboration (Field notes, 
17 Mar 2014), among which one fast-growing species, Eucalyptus grandis × 
E.urophylla, which soon became popular across Southern China due to its 
high economic value. 
Specifically, as already mentioned in Chapter 1, this tree species is char-
acterized by a fast growth rate and a strong regeneration ability. Moreover, 
to improve the profitable features of this eucalyptus tree species (an even 
shorter growth period and greater amount of growing stock per unit), the 
hybrids were cultivated using clone technology in various seed base labs 
including the experimental site in Dongmen forest farm). In this way, the 
technological development in seed cultivation, especially cloning tech-
niques, strengthened the economically attractive characteristics of the eu-
calyptus tree crops, which played a critical role in the massive and rapid 
expansion of eucalyptus in Guangxi. 
 
2.5 Land control and labour changes in rural Guangxi 
However, market demand and agronomic conditions still do not offer suf-
ficient explanation for the massive and rapid expansion of ITPs in 
Guangxi: the institutional dynamics around land control and labour can-
not be neglected. Rural land in Guangxi, as in other regions of China, went 
through three stages: collectivization, (re)distribution, and concentration. 
In line with the general agrarian transformation in China, both farmland 
and forestland in Guangxi were collectivized in the 1950s. Subsequently, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, in the 1980s, farmland and a small part of the 
forestland were contracted to villagers under the HRS reform. 
Under the HRS, user rights of rural land were contracted to farmers 
based on a principle of fairness, mostly according to the size of the house-
hold (Unger 2002, 107). Specifically, land was categorized according to its 
geographic, irrigation, and fertilization conditions before being allocated 
in each village. Following this categorization, each type of land (“good 
land” and “bad land”), apart from the collectively reserved land, was di-
vided and distributed on a per capita basis in the village (as shown in Fig-
ure 2.5: one piece of paddy land was divided and allocated to several 
households). Because population density in rural China is high and land 
patches with different qualities are dispersed, one household in a rural area 
may have several tiny and spatially separated plots of farmland: some flat 
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and irrigated which can be used to cultivate paddy and vegetables; some 
intermediate and suitable for sugarcane and fruit trees; and some hilly and 
rocky and can only be planted with crops like eucalyptus trees. 
Figure 2.5 Fragmented paddy land 
 
Source: Photo was taken in Shanglin County of Guangxi on 7 April 2015 
 
Such land fragmentation caused by land reform is thought to be the 
main limitation for the development of rural China (Zhang, Ma, and Xu 
2004). In order to concentrate the spatially separated land, land transfer 
under the HRS has been promoted over the past almost four decades (Ye 
2015). The transfer rate of rural land had been very low in the 1980s, be-
cause rural land could “not be legally leased out for profit” according to 
the Land Management Law issued in 1986 (Hsing 2010, 1). As shown in a 
survey conducted by the Agricultural Department of China in 199015, the 
number of rural households that transferred their contracted land was 
more than 2 million, accounting for 0.9% of total HRS recipient house-
holds, and the area of transferred rural land accounted for 0.44% of total 
farmland, which was 6379 thousand mu (425 thousand ha). However, in 
the 1990s, the number of rural land transfers skyrocketed, as urban sprawl 
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and marketization fuelled rapidly increasing land values (Hsing 2010, 1). 
This trend has continued, and by the end of 2008 the acreage of trans-
ferred (the user rights) rural land reached 109 million mu, or 8.9% of the 
total farmland in China. In July 2016, a new policy issued by the central 
government further freed the rural land market in pilot counties. It legal-
ized and standardized the processes of rural land transfer.16 
Echoing these changes, the China-wide land concentration project 
named “transforming small plots into large plots” (Xiaokuai bian dakuai) was also 
introduced in Guangxi. The “transforming small plots into large plots” project 
is a land exchange programme conducted within communities which 
started is 1996.17 In the beginning, such land consolidation/concentration 
was driven by a few villagers spontaneously exchanging the fragmented 
land awarded under the HRS reform (as mentioned above) based on social 
relations (i.e. villagers’ intimate relations). Later, the state (referring to the 
local state at the provincial level) started to get involved and soon became 
the driving force. According to interviews with officials in Guangxi (Field-
notes, 9 March 2015), since 2002 the provincial state has provided bonuses 
to those villagers, rural cooperatives and companies who invest in land 
levelling and infrastructure construction (including road and irrigation 
construction) to encourage land consolidation/concentration. 18  The 
county governments help the villagers/rural communities to find loans 
and firms specialized in land levelling/ infrastructures construction to fa-
cilitate the project. According to a document issued by the provincial gov-
ernment19, the amount of consolidated/concentrated land in Guangxi is 
targeted to reach as much as 500,000 mu in 2015 (equal to 33,333 ha). 
This land exchange did not change the total area of the land owned by 
each household,20 but the originally non-adjacent land became contiguous. 
On the one hand, this kind of land consolidation simplified the ownership 
of the contiguous patches, which actually facilitates land investments by 
making large-scale land transfers more convenient. On the other hand, it 
transformed production towards more machine-based, value-added crop 
cultivation like eucalyptus trees. This enriched a group of villagers, partic-
ularly the rural elites, village cadres, and their relatives. 
It is a different story for forestland. As shown in Table 2.2, in Guangxi 
more than 90% of the forestland is owned by a collective. Under HRS, a 
central policy related to the redistribution of forestland (‘three determina-
tion’, Sanding policy) was launched in 1984. The policy aimed to contract 
forestland to rural households as farmland in several experimental spots 
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throughout the country. But at the end of 1984, the reform was found to 
have resulted in large-scale deforestation in these regions, particularly in 
Southern China. As a response, the reform was curbed. 21 Thus, except for 
a small number of the hills already allocated in a few villages, most of the 
collectively-owned forestland remained in the hands of collectives. This 
implies that a large amount of land is under ambiguous regime in rural 
China and might be a good area in which to invest/speculate. 
Table 2.2 Property rights of forestland in Guangxi (in 2010) 
 Types Area (10000 ha) Percentage 
 State forest farm-owned 148.88 9.28% 
Collectively-owned 1456.11 90.72% 
Total 1604.99 100.00% 
Source: Author’s elaboration of the data from the present (2011) forestland use table in the 
12th Five-year Plan of the Development of Eucalyptus in Guangxi (2010-2015)22. 
 
In 2008, forestland reform, in the guise of Opinions of CPC Central Com-
mittee State Council on Comprehensively Promoting Collective Forestland Reform23, 
was introduced by the central government to clear the property rights of 
forestland. It planned to contract forestland to households with a contract 
term of 70 years to make sure that rural villagers were the de facto users of 
the forestland, to clear the property rights and forestland boundaries with 
the issuance of official certificates within five years, and to ensure that the 
forestland was managed according to its classified usage, mainly commer-
cial or ecological forests. For the contracted commercial forests specifi-
cally, villagers could make their own decisions about land-use, production 
mode, and product circulation. For the ecological forests, the villagers 
could get ecological compensation and plant other crops (e.g. vegetables) 
and breed animals under the tree crops. Under the forestland reform, the 
user rights of the collective forestland were, thus, formally distributed and 
cleared, although most of the lands had already been used or occupied by 
villagers themselves or by external investors before the reform and espe-
cially since the reforestation subsidy policy in 2002. Such contradictions in 
the control of forestland during the reform will be analysed in Chapter 3. 
In addition to these formal means mentioned above, there are several 
informal ways of (re)distributing land in Guangxi. Even when land plots 
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have already been allocated to rural households under the HRS/forestland 
reform, redistribution still takes place among households via extra-eco-
nomic methods, including (1) social relations, (2) “everyday forms of re-
sistance” and (3) sometimes, occupation by a few individual powerful vil-
lagers. 
To describe this in more detail, firstly, some villagers can gain access to 
the land allocated to their neighbours, friends or relatives when the latter’s 
households are short of labour due to internal migration or/and sickness. 
Such land redistribution is always temporary, based on personal relation-
ships, and with no legal contract and very little (or even no) compensa-
tion24. Sometimes, due to the close social relationships or blood ties, the 
redistribution might be flexible, and the original “owners” (user right own-
ers) can get their land back (usually after failing to find work in urban 
areas) after the harvest. Sometimes, this type of redistribution might lead 
to conflicts, if the present “owners” are not willing to return the land. 
Secondly, some villagers expand their land “ownership” through grad-
ual and covert encroachment of neighbouring land owned by the other 
villagers or state farms. They usually secretly and gradually move their 
boundary marker outwards. Similar to the cases analysed by Scott (1986b) 
in Southeast Asia, these villagers cut corners to ensure subsistence. And 
in most cases, according to my interviews in Guangxi, it is hard for the 
original owners to claim back this land. 
Thirdly, a few powerful villagers, called the “rural land-seeking elites” 
by Zang (2012), use coercion to occupy land. This land acquisition process 
may or may not be carried by local state carders, but will generally be com-
mitted by an individual and is more common in villages with less blood 
ties. 
For the “unused”/ “underused” or “waste” land, mainly undistributed 
forestland in my case of Guangxi, customary land ownership is commonly 
agreed to. In other words, once someone in the village has reclaimed one 
piece of forestland, the land is then believed to belong to his/her house-
hold and no one else in the village will use it. These pioneers are usually 
labour-rich households which have extra money for the venture. They 
sometimes also have special social positions in the village (e.g. village lead-
ers). These land distributions were originally based on the moral and cul-
tural, though not legal, conventions of the whole community. Later, under 
forestland reform, these “owners” got legal “user” certificates. 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 108
86 CHAPTER 2 
Similar to land control change, the labour conditions in Guangxi, as in 
other regions of China, have also changed significantly, mainly due to mas-
sive rural-urban migration. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, some fam-
ily members, usually the young and the physically strong, leave their vil-
lages and seek jobs in the cities. Such internal migration is always 
temporary and seasonal. But it takes away a large number of labourers 
from rural Guangxi. According to the Chinese National Report on Migrant 
Workers 2012,25 Guangxi is the 10th largest supply province of peasant 
workers. The total number of rural-urban migratory workers in Guangxi 
reached 11.65 million by the end of 2015, which equals more than one-
fifth of the total population there.26 
Internal migration has significantly changed labour conditions in rural 
Guangxi and works in favour of the development of a labour-saving crop 
such as eucalyptus trees27. Thus, in Guangxi rural villages, those house-
holds with family members who migrated are most likely to be the ones 
that plant eucalyptus trees if they have access to land and capital. As ex-
plained by a villager during a focus group discussion: “What kind of peo-
ple in the village will plant eucalyptus trees? For example, one household 
has three brothers. When two of the brothers migrate to work outside, the 
rest is too busy (to cultivate the land). Then, this household will plant eu-
calyptus trees.” (Field notes, 6 March 2015) 
In turn, the development of the ITP sector reshapes labour conditions 
in Guangxi. According to my fieldwork, some villagers who used to be 
migrant workers gave up their wage labour in urban areas in order to spe-
cialize in the eucalyptus tree business in rural areas (group discussion, 13 
April 2015). In this sense, under certain conditions, the rise of the ITP 
sector can lead to reverse migration from urban to rural areas. 
As discussed above, the land-labour conditions related to the institu-
tional settings in Guangxi have been the cornerstone for further land 
transfers over the past 10 years. But the rise of the ITP sector requires 
more than institutional arrangements; it also needs financial support. 
 
2.6 Land concentration and domestic and foreign land 
investment 
There were three different patterns of land investment, each driven by 
different financial sources, which directly or indirectly facilitated the rise 
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of the ITP sector in Guangxi, namely, (i) land investments driven by vil-
lagers/rural cooperatives, (ii) land deals driven by corporations, including 
transnational corporations (TNCs), and (iii) land leasing driven by state 
farms. 
Several land investments in the ITP sector in Guangxi were driven by 
individual rural households or cooperatives. Those individual rural inves-
tors are the so-called “large households” (Da hu) - these households pos-
sess natural capital, social capital or economic capital (Scoones 1998). 
They leased land from their village collectives or neighbouring villagers, 
usually with the financial capital accumulated from their migration to ur-
ban areas (sometimes with financial support from relatives and/or banks). 
They carried out large-scale mechanized industrial agricultural production, 
and then sold their products either directly to processing companies or 
indirectly to middlemen who sold them on.28  The rural cooperatives, 
which are mainly organized by these “large households” operate similarly 
to the individual rural households except for two things: the funds are 
raised from cooperative members, and the profits are distributed based on 
members’ shares. 
The second pattern is land investment driven by corporations and has 
two sub-forms. Companies may lease land directly from state farms, vil-
lage collectives, or individual villagers to build their ITP production bases. 
Or, according to the company reports, they have contracts with independ-
ent growers to get raw materials (mainly eucalyptus trees) at a certain price 
with the provision of (sometimes subsidies for) seed, technology, and 
other chemical inputs. Transnational companies (TNCs) are actively in-
volved in this pattern of land investment. Two paper-pulp companies, 
namely, Stora Enso (from Finland) and APP (from Indonesia) control in 
total around 200 thousand ha of ITPs and have invested more than 50 
billion Yuan. In order to gain a better understanding of these TNC-driven 
land investments in Guangxi, Chapter 4 will examine the mechanism of 
land investment by these two foreign investors. 
In addition, the scale of land leasing led by state farms is also consider-
able and may be even greater than foreign investments. At Gaofeng Forest 
Farm, for example, more than 65.7% of the forestland is leased from 
smallholders in order to fill the land shortage caused by land leasing to 
foreign companies (e.g. Stora Enso). According to the interview with an 
employee working in the state farm, most of the land leased by these state 
farms is used to grow eucalyptus trees to provide raw materials for 
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board/panel production aimed at the domestic market (Field notes, 20 
March 2014). With the land they control, these state farms not only build 
ITPs independently, they also cooperate with other domestic and foreign 
companies. Dongmen forest farm, for example, used to cooperate with 
Wangzi Company from Japan. According to employees from the state 
farm, during the cooperation period, this state farm offered land and 
Wangzi Company provided financial and technical support and they both 
shared the profits. (Field notes, 10 March 2015). Meanwhile, with the rise 
of the ITP sector, a few state-owned farms started to expand their business 
from production to processing, which enhanced their power, and put 
them in a more advantageous position within the value chain.29 
Such land investments, driven by different sources of financial capital, 
are closely interlinked with the rise of the ITP sector. On the one hand, 
both domestic and foreign capital involved in land investments created the 
required conditions for ITP expansion. On the other hand, more financial 
capital is and will be stimulated to flow in as a result of booming invest-
ments in the ITP sector. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The emergence and expansion of the ITP sector cannot be simply seen as 
the result of the factors analysed above. Rather, it has more complicated 
dynamics due to the interactions among the factors. As shown in Figure 
2.6, the value, material, institutional, and financial basis for the rise of the 
ITP sector discussed above are all intertwined. Technological develop-
ment in the cultivation of industrial tree crops was stimulated by the high 
economic value of ITPs and driven by the huge domestic demand. In turn, 
this technological development enhanced certain characteristics of indus-
trial crops (e.g. faster growth rate), which made the sector more econom-
ically attractive. Labour and land conditions in Guangxi, transformed by 
massive internal migration and rural land reform, made the emergence of 
ITPs, which are characterized as land-intensive-but-labour saving, possi-
ble. Furthermore, with the development of the ITP sector, land is further 
concentrated and labour continually migrates, thus making the land and 
labour conditions in rural Guangxi more favourable for the expansion of 
the ITP sector. Similarly, financial capital is attracted by economic fea-
tures, and strengthened by technological development and the suitable 
land and labour conditions under the specific institutional environment. 
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The large-scale investments driven by capital from both inside and outside 
China were not only the main driving force for technological develop-
ment, but also transformed the land-labour conditions with changes in 
land control and agrarian structures. 
Figure 2.6 The intertwined factors for the rise of the ITP sector 
 
 
Therefore, the rise of the ITP sector was pushed by the domestic de-
mand for its products, the agronomic conditions in Southern China, the 
institutional conditions of land control and labour in rural China, and the 
financial capital from both domestic and international sources, with all of 
these factors intertwined. 
However, after the rise of the ITP sector, the trajectory of its expansion 
was not linear, but was contiguously shaping and was shaped by the inter-
actions of key actors (villagers, investors, and the state). Thus, how do 
villagers’ land rights and labour conditions as well as state policies (at a 
national and local level) shape and how are they shaped by the contours 
and trajectories of the ITP sector? Who wins and who loses with the ex-
pansion of the ITP sector, and why? What are the implications of the ITP 
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sector for rural villagers in Southern China in terms of the political econ-
omy of their livelihoods, and how do affected villagers respond these 
changes? These questions will be addressed in Chapters 3-6. In the next 
chapter, I explore the role of the state within the rise of the ITP sector. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1 Here forest products include the outputs from both natural forests and planta-
tions. 
2  The estimated domestic demand in 2002 was 109.473 million m3, while the 
planned production was 62.23 million m3 and imports were 13.6117 million m3. 
(http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/62/content-82.html accessed on 16 January 
2017). 
3 The annual average price of timber in 2000 increased by 4.7%, compared to 1999. 
And the price index of chemical pulp was 130.2 in 2000. 
(http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/62/content-82.html accessed on 16 January 
2017. 
4 http://www.forestry.gov.cn/CommonAction.do?dispatch=index&colid=62 ac-
cessed on 16 January 2017. 
5 http://www.paper.com.cn/news/daynews/2011/120809092545947125.htm a
ccessed on 16 January 2017. 
6 Explained by both the professor from the Forestry department of Guangxi Uni-
versity (13 March 2014) and staff from one of the state-owned farms (18 March 
2014). Staff of the state-owned farm mentioned that profits from manmade panels 
and boards have increased greatly recently due technological development. 
7 The percentage is 47%, calculated using data accessed from FAOSATA, but is 
“80%” according one staff member from one of the foreign companies in Guangxi 
during the interview on 21 March 2014. 
8 But this is not one-way: the rise of ITPs, in turn, had some (if not a profound) 
impact on the supply and demand relations around the production of ITPs, which 
is encapsulated in the import volume changes shown in Figure 2.4. 
9 http://www.gx121.com/gx_climate_info.asp accessed on 17 January 2017. 
10According to the introduction on the official website of the Guangxi Agricultu
ral Department (http://www.gxzf.gov.cn/zwgk/zfwj/zzqrmzfwj/201304/t201
30415_420818.htm accessed on 17 January 2017. 
11 http://baike.baidu.com/view/1293581.htm accessed on 17 January 2017. 
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12 Source:  http://www.gxdlr.gov.cn/News/NewsShow.aspx?pd=1828&NewsId
=3277 accessed on 17 January 2017. Here, I would like to highlight the 21% “unu
sed land”. As we are reminded by Borras and Franco (2010), the census data on “
unused/marginal/degraded” land are usually unreliable, and the classification of l
and as “unused” by the state empirically facilitates the land grabs with claims of p
romoting economic productivity. So, this type of land might be involved in large-
scale land investment in the future. 
13Source: http://www.chinaeuc.com/data/shuzhong.aspx?id=46340ecc-fc7b-4
b51-8175-2bd52c42b18e, accessed on 17 January 2017. 
14 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_598139890101e02m.html accessed on 17 Jan-
uary 2017. 
15 http://baike.baidu.com/view/15132539.htm?fromTaglist accessed on 16 Janu-
ary 2017. 
16 http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zcfg/nybgz/201607/t20160704_5195156.htm 
accessed on 16 January 2017 
17 http://www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/mtsy/jjrb/201403/t20140321_1308515.htm ac-
cessed on 16 January 2017. 
18 http://www.gxcz.gov.cn/gxzzzzqczt/yfwlgk/gfxwj/bbmwj/jjjsgl/201411/t20
141125_47036.html accessed on 16 January 2017. 
19  http://www.gxdlr.gov.cn/News/NewsShow.aspx?NewsId=9595 accessed on 
16 January 2017. 
20 According to the interview with staff working in the county government, the 
hectares of roads and irrigations were deducted and then the land was redistributed 
to the villagers based on the share of the total area of their original land plots. 
21 So, the property rights of the forestland in Southern China was rather vague be
fore the forestland reform in the 2008. More details, see http://theory.people.co
m.cn/GB/9848175.html, accessed on 21 June 2018. 
22 《广西桉树速生丰产用材林“十二五”发展规划》(2010-2015) 
23  http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1057276.htm accessed 
on 16 January 2017. 
24 Sometimes the cost is just a meal or the harvest of a very small plot. 
25  Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201305/t20130527_12978.html, 
accessed on 17 January 2017. 
26  Source: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-12/11/content_5022563.htm, ac-
cessed on 16 January 2017. 
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27 According to the information gained during fieldwork in Guangxi, the trees only 
need labour in the first six months and during the harvest season (about 2 days per 
year per mu on average). 
28 It usually happens in the place where the transportation system is less developed 
or where the scale of ITPs is relatively small. 
29 For instance, Gaofeng State Forest Farm has built four timber processing facto-
ries in Guangxi. 
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3 
3 Chapter 3: The role of the state in 
the expansion of the ITP sector in 
China 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Chinese state played a critical role, using both economic and extra-
economic instruments, in the expansion of the ITP sector in Southern 
China. These instruments could either promote or impede the ITP sector. 
They could also influence social relations around the ITP sector, in terms 
of who is excluded, who is included, who benefits, and who loses. 
However, the hierarchical administrative system in rural China means 
that the role of the state is even more complicated than the above suggests: 
the role it plays may vary between different levels of government and 
change across time and space. Specifically, central and local governments 
might hold differing attitudes towards the ITP sector; the local state in one 
place might facilitate investment in the ITP sector, while at the same time 
another may issue a policy to remove ITPs; and one local government may 
at first push for the development of the ITP sector, only to curb its ex-
pansion later. So, why and when and at which level the state plays what 
kind of role within ITP expansion deserves systematic study. 
So to identify and untangle the complementary and/or contradictory 
roles of ‘the state’ at various jurisdictional levels, taking the expansion of 
industrial tree plantations in Southern China as a case study, will provide 
specific insights into the working of the state within the process of capital 
accumulation. It will also open up an agenda for a more complex frame-
work of the state in order to deepen an understanding of state and its role. 
There are basically three frameworks to understand the state and its 
role in public policy, namely, “state-centric,” “society-centric”, and “inter-
active state-society” (Das 2007, Fox 1993). As already discussed in Chap-
ter 1, the state-centric and society-centric perspectives cannot fully capture 
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the dynamics of the political process. This chapter will therefore take a 
look at the “interactive state-society” framework: an alternative frame-
work put forward by several scholars, including Fox in the case of Mexico 
(1993), to understand the dynamic role of the state. This framework re-
veals the contradictory functions of the state, namely, facilitating capital 
accumulation and maintaining political legitimacy, which is not only valid 
in Mexico (Fox 1993), but also in China (Chen, Zinda, and Yeh 2017). 
However, the state-society paradigm per se, which neglects the “nuances 
of intra-societal and intra-state variations” (Perry 1994, 709), cannot fully 
capture the competing jurisdictions following decentralization in China. 
As suggested by Oi (1995, 1147), “one should disaggregate the ‘state’ into 
its component parts to distinguish between levels of government and the 
incentives for different levels to perform”. Similarly, O'Brien and Li (2004, 
94) concluded: “what emerges is a state that is less a monolith than a 
hodgepodge of disparate actors, some of whom have multiple identities 
and conflicting interests. Disaggregating the Chinese state highlights its 
segmented, layered structure”. This reminds us to disaggregate the multi-
level state in order to get a better understanding of politics in rural China. 
Echoing this, some studies noticed the layered bureaucratic system of 
the state. These studies fall mainly into two groups, namely, the competing 
approach and the cooperation approach. Under the competing approach, 
scholars view the local state not as the subordinated agent of the central 
state to implement the policy made at the higher level, but as an entity with 
divergent, even contradictory, interests. Within this trend, Oi (1995, 1139) 
found that local governments also have “entrepreneurial interests” rather 
than being the purely “agents of the central state”. Similarly, Lu (1997, 
130) observed the tensions/ conflicts between “the state” (central state) 
and “the state agents” (local state). More radically, So (2007, 560) used the 
framework of the “split state”- “one ‘benign’ centre and a ‘predatory’ local 
apparatus”- to analyse rural politics. 
Meanwhile, scholars who adhere to the cooperation approach, believe 
that the central and local state share some common interests and mutually 
influence each other. Li (1997) believes that the central and provincial state 
are interdependent, and that conflicts and compromises between different 
layers lead to policy adjustments as part of the reform processes. Later, 
she explained decentralization as the central government’s strategy to dis-
tinguish itself from the local state in order to find scapegoats on which to 
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“blame policy failures on implementation details and front-line state work-
ers”. (Li 2007, 95). Based on such a framework, Göbel (2011) recognized 
in the “uneven policy implementation” in different locations the “policy 
steering instruments” used in rural China; namely, “competition under hi-
erarchy”, and concluded that “both pioneers and resisters contribute to 
shaping the policy outcomes” (76). 
Both of these approaches miss some critical points. The competing ap-
proach can help understand some divergences between the central and 
local state, while viewing the central and local state separately may fail to 
explain some local state actions which align themselves with the policies 
of higher authorities but might affect their revenue generation negatively. 
To give an example, some county governments, following of the lead 
given by the provincial government, issued policies to remove eucalyptus 
trees planted on farmland, despite the fact that the ITP sector contributes 
a large sum to local revenue. In this sense, the cooperation approach pro-
vides better insights with which to understand central-local state relations. 
However, it lacks discussions on the state-society paradigm and is thus not 
able to explain the changing attitude of the state across time. 
To better understand the role of the state within the expansion of ITPs 
in a dynamic and relational way, this chapter applies the interactive state-
society framework and considers the variegated but integrated intra-state 
variations, the so-called coupled interactive approach. This employs an “in-
teractive state-society” framework to understand the role of the state, 
while at the same times utilizing the “cooperative” approach to understand 
central-local state dynamics. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next part offers a preliminary 
introduction to China’s hierarchical state framework. The third part anal-
yses the coupled actions/reactions of the state at different levels - central, 
provincial, and local levels - related to the ITP sector. The fourth part 
explores the dynamic state’s relationship with capital and society, and the 
change in its different developmental stages. 
 
3.2 The state in rural China 
China has a complicated administrative system – as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Between the central government where directives, laws and policies are 
made, and the township governments where the policies are implemented, 
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there are still two or three levels of administration. The politics and inter-
actions between these levels are complex and dynamic, weaving a context 
that is key to understanding the political economy of the rise of the ITP 
sector. 
Figure 3.1 The bureaucracy 
 
 
Source: The figure is drawn based on information from the government’s official website1 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, during the Reform and Open (Gaige 
Kaifang) era, the central government “loosened its control over local af-
fairs…to promote local incentives” (So 2007, 564). With administrative 
and fiscal decentralization, local governments in rural areas (especially at 
the county and township level) were endowed with the power to control 
local revenues and reallocate resources (e.g. land, subsidized fertilizers) 
(Rozelle 1994).2 Thus, decentralization enhanced the power of the local 
state. 
However, this does not mean that local governments have enjoyed 
complete freedom since then. Local government cadres are required to 
sign contracts (which include administrative and economic targets for the 
whole year), and are supervised and assessed by government at the next 
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highest level under the cadre responsibility system (Ganbu Zeren Zhi) intro-
duced in 1980s. Thus the local state became controlled by the central state 
via these assessments, which might bring rewards or punishments to local 
cadres, and, in the long run, affect their bureaucratic careers (EDIN 2003a, 
b). Furthermore, although local governments could keep part of their lo-
cally generated revenues after turning over the committed part to higher 
authorities, the local governments needed to cover their ever-increasing 
administrative expenditure with a steadily decreasing share of the revenue 
(Lu 1997, 125).3 So, as discussed in Chapter 1, the local government levied 
heavy taxes and charges on villagers in order to supplement its insufficient 
revenue (Li 2003, Kennedy 2013, Lu 1997).4 Later the local share of reve-
nues further decreased with the “Tax for fee” reform introduced in 2002, 
which abolished all the local fees while reducing agriculture tax gradually 
until it was abolished entirely in 2006.5 After this significant decline in rev-
enue, the local governments (mainly at the township level) either became 
administrative shells with a limited ability to provide social services 
(Kennedy 2007, Oi et al. 2012), or started to lease land to compensate their 
losses from taxes and fees (Kennedy 2013, 1021, Ye 2015). 
Embedded in such a decentralized state system is more control by the 
local state of resource distribution. This is thus always the focus of aca-
demic studies analysing capital accumulation (e.g. local state corporation 
and land revenue regime). Nevertheless, the central government and pro-
vincial government also play a role, as analysed next. 
 
3.3 The role of the state within the rise of the ITP sector 
The state plays a critical and complicated role within ITP expansion in 
Southern China: the policies introduced by the state directly or indirectly 
promote or impede the rise of the ITP sector; the state facilitates land 
acquisitions by investors in the ITP sector; the state issues the licences for 
forest/plantation logging. However, as already mentioned, the Chinese 
state is multi-layered. This means that the analysis of the state’s role should 
be layered as well. 
3.3.1 The central level: preparation of conditions 
The central state is positioned at the top of the hierarchical structure to 
act as a planner, commander, and coordinator, using both coercion and 
incentives. The policies or directives issued by the central state were always 
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general and vague, but actually paved the way for the development of the 
ITP sector - technologically, legitimately, and economically. 
The emergence of the ITP sector in Southern China was initiated by 
the introduction of fast-growing eucalyptus tree species as part of techno-
logical cooperation projects between the Chinese central government and 
the Austrian government which started in 1981.6 Within this collaboration 
project, Dongmen forest farm, a state-owned farm in Guangxi, was cho-
sen as the experimental spot, making it the largest gene pool of eucalyptus 
tree crops throughout Asia and the biggest research centre for eucalyptus 
trees in China.7 
However, this technological basis is not enough to account for the rise 
of the ITP sector. The national policies around the opening up of the for-
estry market and classified forest (/plantation) management, gave legiti-
macy to the commercial development of forestry in Southern China.8 The 
National NO1 Document in 1985 eliminated the central state’s control of the 
purchase and distribution of most agro-products, including wood-based 
products. This freed up the forestry market and legalized individual invest-
ment in forestry, including the ITP sector. Under the classification pro-
posed by the national state, in 1988 several southern provinces, including 
Guangxi, were chosen as key provinces to promote fast-wood plantations 
in order to build up the timber reserve production base to ensure national 
timber security.9 China’s 2005 regional forestry plan clearly pointed out 
that the forests/plantations in the southern part of the country are mainly 
for commercial use rather than conservation, as is the case in the northern, 
western, and eastern forests/plantations.10 This liberation of the commer-
cial forestry market in Southern China enabled the massive rate ITP ex-
pansion there, especially when incentives were attached. 
The economical drivers came from the forestry tax reforms and refor-
estation regulations issued by the central state. Specifically, the tax on for-
estry products was reduced, especially after the tax reform of 1994. And 
following the Law of the PRC on Enterprise Income Tax in 200711, income 
earned by corporations from forestry either faced reduced, or was com-
pletely exempt from, tax. The government’s reforestation plan, which 
started formally in 2002, is a highly subsidized programme funded by the 
central government aimed at environmental protection. In the pro-
gramme, rural households which transform sloped, sandy, rocky or salty 
farmland (back) to forestland, became eligible for monetary and rice sub-
sidies. It is worth noting that in Guangxi this programme was combined 
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with other promotional projects such as the fast-wood plantation project 
by the provincial and county governments (as will be explained in more 
detail in the next part). These policies, in essence, economically fuelled the 
expansion of ITPs in Southern China. 
However, besides these pushing forces, the central state also placed 
some obstacles in the way of the forestry industry. One of the most sig-
nificant of these is logging control management, which, to avoid excessive 
deforestation, requires individuals/ companies to apply for permits from 
the local state (usually the forestry departments at the county level) before 
logging. 
In addition, the state’s strong intervention in some other boom crops 
in Guangxi (e.g. sugarcane for national sugar security) is also, indirectly, 
associated with the development of the ITP sector. Taking sugarcane as 
an example, the Chinese state on the one hand has strict control over the 
sugar market, through import quotas, tariffs,12 and the national strategical 
reserve.13 On the other hand, the Chinese state tries to boost the domestic 
sugarcane production via a series of directives on the provision of various 
subsidies.14 The state’s direct support for sugarcane production inevitably 
affects villagers’ decision on land-use, which then has a greater or lesser 
impact on the expansion of the ITP sector. 
These policies/directives are to a greater or lesser degree relevant to 
the development of the ITP sector in Guangxi. But the policies / direc-
tives are mostly broad and ambiguous, and sometimes not directly linked 
to the ITP sector. Furthermore, the tax on the ITP sector in Guangxi is 
not directly collected by the central state, thereby providing the central 
state with less incentive to get involved in this accumulation process. Thus, 
the eucalyptus boom is more related to the manipulations of the state at 
lower levels. 
3.3.2 The provincial level 
The province forms the middle level of the state hierarchy. For the 
counties and townships, the provincial government represents the centre 
of policy enforcement; while for the central government, the provincial 
government represents regional differences, and as such is always the unit 
that makes, implements, and assess targeted policies. At the provincial 
level, the intervention of the Guangxi government in and around ITP ex-
pansion was more direct, acting as it did as a project coordinator, a land 
broker and a shareholder. 
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As project coordinator, at the beginning of ITP expansion, the provin-
cial government pushed the development of the ITP sector by mobilizing 
funds from the central state and international organizations (e.g. the World 
Bank). Within the context of the reforestation project that started in 2001 
onwards, the Guangxi government chose the fast-growing eucalyptus tree 
as the main recommended tree crop, providing subsidies and free seeds. 
Alongside the funds from central government, the Guangxi government 
also used loans received from the World Bank since 1999 to establish ITPs 
in cooperative projects, aiming to develop forestry, conserve the environ-
ment (reduce carbon emissions), and/or reduce poverty. Because of this 
cooperation with the World Bank, the Guangxi Forestry Department suc-
cessfully facilitated the ITP sector through loan allocation, technical sup-
port, and infrastructure construction with the close involvement of county 
governments, state farms, and “large households” (Da Hu)15, leading to 
the massive and rapid expansion of ITPs.16 
In addition, the Forestry Department of Guangxi Zhuang Autono-
mous Region also played the role of broker to help investors gain access 
to land. This can be encapsulated in the land acquisition process of foreign 
companies, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. For Stora Enso, more than 
60,000 ha of its forestland was transferred through Guangxi Forestry Group 
- a state-backed company founded by the Guangxi Forestry Department - 
from eight state-owned forest farms with an annual rent much lower than 
the market price. 
Moreover, the provincial government is directly involved in investment 
in the ITP sector as a shareholder. 15% of the shares in Stora Enso 
Guangxi 17  belong to Guangxi Guihai Co. Ltd, a sub-corporation of 
Guangxi Forestry Group. This is because, according to Chinese law, transna-
tional company (TNC)-driven land investment must be carried out as a 
joint venture with domestic capital. This can be understood in two ways: 
on the one hand it is a signal that state capital has allied with foreign capital 
in the accumulation process; on the other hand it is a way for the state to 
control and monitor foreign investments. 
However, while deeply involved in the rise of the ITP sector, the 
Guangxi provincial government also strongly promotes the sugarcane sec-
tor in response to the central state’s policy on national sugar security as 
mentioned above. The Guangxi government not only provides a series of 
subsidies under the “double high” programme,18 but also issues a directive 
on the price of sugarcane every year to encourage sugarcane production. 
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These actions affect villagers’ decisions in relation to land-use, as will be 
analysis in Chapter 5, and further complicate the conditions and trajectory 
of the ITP sector. 
In short, although the promotion by the provincial government of the 
ITP sector is aimed at capital accumulation (or “economic development” 
as claimed by a few state actors), and might include rent-seeking, the role 
of the Guangxi government is more a subordinated administrative agent 
rather than a profit-seeking entrepreneur. Firstly, the prime motivation of 
the Guangxi government to promote the ITP sector is to fulfil the tar-
gets/tasks allocated to it by the central state in relation to the reforestation 
and fast-wood project. Secondly, facilitating foreign companies to get ac-
cess to land involves, on the one hand, attracting foreign investments, 
which was consistent with the central state’s strategic plan at that time. On 
the other hand, acting as a land acquisition broker did not originate from 
the Guangxi government, but was more or less one of the requirements 
made by investors to enable them to gain social legitimacy and reduce con-
flicts. And it is the Guangxi Forestry Group and the state farms rather than 
the government itself that is directly involved in the land access process 
and might gain profit from it. However, the relationship between the state 
and state-owned companies (Guangxi Forestry Group and state forest farms 
in this case) deserves further exploration. 
3.3.3 The local level 
Zooming down to the bottom layer of the bureaucracy, the attitudes of 
the county and township governments towards the ITP sector are varie-
gated, even when faced with similar institutional arrangements at higher 
state levels. As some township governments have recently become mere 
“shells”, as mentioned above, the county-level state will form the focus of 
this analysis. 
When the provincial state started to strongly promote the ITP sector, 
several counties responded actively. Some encouraged cadres to take the 
lead in investing in the ITP sector. They encouraged the cadres with a 
series of preferential policies, including free seeds, rewards, and priority at 
logging times. Because of these policies, a large number of local cadres, as 
well as their relatives, became planters. However, some of the cadres saw 
this as a political task and did not, at first, expect much profit from the 
ITP sector. This is illustrated by an official who works in the county For-
estry Department: “it is mobilized by the government” (Field notes 19 
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March 2015). The cadres leased land, usually at a large scale, from collec-
tives at a very low price due to the under-development of forestland at 
that time. These cadres, thus, identify as entrepreneurs as well as bureau-
crats. 
Later, in the light of the preferential conditions introduced by county 
governments to attract investments from big giants like Stora Enso, APP, 
and state forest farms, some of these cadres were required to transfer the 
land they owned to these lager investors to provide them with a produc-
tion base for raw materials. As explained by an employee of the county 
government who leased 4000 mu ITPs cooperatively run by him and his 
friends to Stora Enso: “it is really a loss. But (it is) mobilized by the gov-
ernment)… every county has tasks (about the quantity of land leased)” 
(Field notes, 17 March 2015). The county-level state also facilitated the 
access to land for these big investors through direct and indirect coordi-
nation with village collectives, sometimes even intervening as middlemen. 
Meanwhile, to attract investment, several local governments cut some 
of the forestry taxes paid by investors, especially foreign investors. In a 
report in 21st Century Business Herald, an official from Qinzhou municipal-
ity told the journalist that in order to support APP, the Qinzhou govern-
ment made a special offer to the company, with big reductions in for-
estry taxes and fees, “if (we) calculate the hectares of raw material bases 
(ITPs) as 500 thousand mu, and the reduced amount of taxes and fees as 
20 Yuan, then (APP) is estimated to be exempt from at least 10 million 
Yuan of taxes and fees”. 19 
In addition, in order to develop the ITP sector, some county govern-
ments invested in infrastructure construction, and a few even built timber 
processing industrial parks or timber logistics and distribution centres to 
attract ITP investors through the agglomeration of its downstream indus-
trial chain. To give an example, the Da Huanghou timber processing in-
dustrial park in Wuming County was constructed by the local Forestry 
Department (see Figure 3.2). As explained by an official there, “There are 
both bosses from local areas and from other provinces, like Jjiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Guangdong...They put all these mills together. This makes it 
easier to manage.” (Field notes, 13 April 2015). The existence of these 
parks/centres not only increased the cultivation of eucalyptus trees in the 
area, but also increased the taxes that could be levelled by the local state. 
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Figure 3.2 Da Huanghou timber processing industrial park in Wuming 
County 
 
 
Source: The photo was taken on 13 April 2015. 
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There are two reasons for such active promotion of the ITP sector by 
county governments. Firstly, county government cadres or their relatives/ 
close friends are incorporated and benefit from the ITP sector. Secondly, 
big paper-pulp companies or processing factories/mills are built locally, 
which can contribute to local revenue generation, as planting eucalyptus 
trees per se is not taxed. 
When neither of these conditions is met, the county governments are 
less vigorous. There are also several county governments with other pri-
orities, for example, sugarcane and ecotourism. These county govern-
ments do not provide any additional benefits to ITP investors/ planters, 
except for those coming from central and provincial governments, while 
they do introduce preferential policies aimed at their targeted sectors. Take 
the county governments which promote the sugarcane sector for example. 
In order to support local sugarcane production, these county governments 
not only utilized a series of regular instruments, including the provision 
subsidies for improved breeds and investment in the infrastructure (flat-
tening sloped land, irrigation systems, and road construction), but also in-
troduced unique planned economic regimes into the sugarcane market to 
ensure a stable production volume and sufficient supply of raw materials 
for each sugar company: they controlled the price of sugarcane by dividing 
sugarcane production zones and regulating that sugarcane producers 
within one zone could only sell their products to one specific sugar com-
pany. Thus these counties guaranteed national sugar security, and, more 
importantly, protected sugar companies which are traditionally big taxpay-
ers and contribute more than half of local revenues. As explained by an 
interviewee who works in a county government where the sugarcane sec-
tor is strongly promoted: “When the yield of sugarcane increases, it is 
good, as the tax increases. The other (crops) do not bring in any tax or 
fees.” (Field notes, 9 March 2015). 
In this sense, the county governments responded differently to the pol-
icies issued at provincial level around the ITP sector. Although all county 
governments are limited by the framework set by higher authorities, some 
county governments strongly promoted the development of the ITP sec-
tor, while others paid it less attention. Their varying attitudes, based on 
the same desire to facilitate local capital accumulation, resulted in the dis-
tinct trajectories in the development of the ITP sector in different coun-
tries. 
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Following the analysis above, it is clear that the role of the state is crit-
ical within the expansion of the ITP sector. The different attitudes of the 
state, especially the local state, resulted in the uneven geographic distribu-
tion of ITPs in China. Meanwhile, using different instruments, the state 
shaped the social relations around the sector. Due to state intervention, 
some investors (including a few villagers) were able to gain access to land 
and even benefit from the ITP sector, while other villagers lost control 
over the land and/or became more vulnerable as the ITP sector grew. In 
other words, the state facilitated the active inclusion and the active exclu-
sion of certain groups, which led to the passive exclusion and adverse in-
corporation of others. 
3.4 State-society interaction 
Within this process, the state also played a critical role in shaping villagers’ 
agency and affecting their further livelihood strategies. When the state fa-
cilitates accumulation by large-scale investors, smallholders can easily be 
dispossessed and lose part or even all of their livelihood, an example being 
Brazil (Kröger 2012). When the state supports smallholders, some villag-
ers might be able to adapt and even expand their livelihoods, an example 
being Vietnam (Sikor 2012). As one of the vital factors that might shape 
villagers’ actions, the role of the state could partly explain why the liveli-
hood responses of Guangxi villagers towards the expansion of eucalyptus 
trees (as will be analysed in Chapter 5) are different from those of villagers 
in some other countries. 
In Guangxi, the role of the state in shaping villagers’ livelihood choices 
was two-sided. On the one hand, it was the state in Guangxi that intro-
duced the ITP sector to the area and helped capitalists get access to land. 
On the other hand, the state also enhanced the competitive power of some 
villagers in their competition with large-scale capitalist counterparts (see 
Chapter 5). So, with the rise of the ITP sector in Guangxi, state interven-
tion lead to the loss of livelihood sources for some villagers, while it en-
hanced the livelihood resilience of some others. 
Furthermore as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the villagers were also 
affected differently by the massive land control and land-use changes. 
Based on their specific interests related to their actual position within the 
ITP sector value chain, the affected villagers had distinct political reac-
tions: some embraced the sector while others conducted various forms of 
resistance, either overt or covert and directed against various actors. 
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3.4.1 The state and political reactions from below 
In terms of political reactions from below, the state has a very critical and 
complicated role. On the one hand, the state, especially the local state, is 
the actor against which villagers resist (So 2007). This resistance is usually 
related to the state’s role in facilitating land grabs, which can lead to the 
expulsion or dispossession of villagers (Borras and Franco 2013, Wolford 
et al. 2013, Borras et al. 2012). In the case of Guangxi, some county gov-
ernments acted as brokers to help big investors (e.g. Stora Enso) get access 
to land to build ITPs. Moreover, state-owned farms and even some cadres 
(or their relatives) were directly involved in large-scale land acquisitions 
for ITPs. This occasionally resulted in state actors (mainly local state ac-
tors) being sued by some affected villagers for illegal land expropriation 
under “rightful resistance”. 
On the other hand, the state sometimes facilitates and even fosters vil-
lagers’ resistance based on its dual functions as suggested by Fox (1993), 
namely, facilitating capital accumulation, and maintaining political legiti-
macy. This is also the case in rural Guangxi. Faced with villagers’ resistance 
to the expansion of ITPs, the local state sometimes connived in these ac-
tions. As described by a staff member from a state-owned farm: 
Recently, villagers’ land encroachment has been very serious. Towards such 
illegal phenomena, the government usually turns a blind eye… We used to 
catch villagers’ (illegal behaviour) at the scene and sue them. The judgment 
was then that the land belonged to the state-owned farm and was illegally 
occupied by villagers. The state (staff) said that this land plot certainly be-
longed to the state. But (he or she) did not support us in getting the land 
back, as using coercion to regain the land would lead to resistance. Finally, 
villagers went to the state petition (shangfang). So (the land) is stuck in the 
“bogged” status. The state just Da Tai Ji (which means to pass the buck). 
(The state) says it supports us, but in the end it has to consider general in-
terests. (Field notes, 10 March 2015) 
In this sense, the role of the state is contradictory. It further compli-
cates the trajectory of the villagers’ political reactions. 
3.4.2 Changes in the role of the state 
A large number of these distinct political reactions were aimed at opposing 
the development of the ITP sector, due to the land control change or/and 
the negative environmental impacts caused by the sector. Faced with such 
ever-increasing resistance against the development of the ITP sector, the 
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provincial state put a brake on the rapid expansion of eucalyptus tree plan-
tations20. According to the Notice issued by the Forestry Department of 
Guangxi in December 201421, the Guangxi government planned to de-
crease the area of eucalyptus tree plantation by 4 million mu by 2020. 75% 
(320 mu) of this decrease should be accounted for by changing the forest 
structure from mono-cropping to mixed forests, and 25% (80 mu) by the 
removal of eucalyptus tree plantations from basic farmland plots near the 
side of the road and in reservation areas. With guidelines set by the pro-
vincial government, the state farms, as state-owned organizations under 
the direct control of the provincial state, were required to substitute euca-
lyptus tree plantations with other tree crops after the following harvest, 
and several counties also introduced corresponding policies to restrict the 
development of eucalyptus trees. 
This shift of the attitude of the provincial state aligns, on the one hand, 
with the central state’s keen promotion of “ecological civilization” which 
started in 2012 (as mentioned in Chapter 1). On the other hand, it reflects 
the dual function of the state, as suggested by Fox (1993) - facilitating 
capital accumulation along with maintaining political legitimacy. The 
Guangxi government supported the development of eucalyptus trees, 
thereby pushing for capital accumulation. Once social stability was threat-
ened, the provincial state issued a policy to restrict the development of the 
eucalyptus tree sector, despite the fact that it was profitable and could 
contribute a lot to regional revenue. 
When the provincial government adjusted its policy direction and 
planned to slow down the expansion of the ITP sector, the state-owned 
farms reacted rapidly. According to my fieldwork in Guangxi in 2014, one 
state-own farm had already begun to burn down the eucalyptus trees that 
did not grow well, and then planted pine trees and Castanopsis hystrix 
trees (as shown in Figure 3.3). As explained by a staff member from one 
of the state-owned farms in Guangxi, “According the Guangxi Forestry 
Department’s plan, the planted plantations should be diversified” (Field 
notes, 18 March 2014). 
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Figure 3.3 The newly planted pine trees and Castanopsis hystrix trees on 
the forestland of a state-owned farm 
 
Source: The photo was taken on 18 March 2014. 
Meanwhile, county governments with other priorities also actively re-
sponded. They issued policies to restrict ITPs, and set targets to remove 
eucalyptus trees step by step: first, with the active involvement of local 
cadres and based on state policies, they enforced the removal of eucalyptus 
trees planted on farmland; then they enforced the gradual removal of eu-
calyptus trees planted in other areas until it was totally removed. During 
my fieldwork in Guangxi in 2014, some county governments had already 
organized actions to remove eucalyptus trees planted on farmland. As ex-
plained by a village cadre in Guangxi: 
The county government required staff from the township government to 
come to villages to act together (with us). Firstly, (we) informed the planters 
and asked them to remove the trees (planted on the farmland) by them-
selves. If they did not do so by themselves, then we would do so. (Field 
notes, 8th April 2015) 
By limiting the development of ITPs, these county governments actu-
ally covertly supported some other sectors (e.g. sugarcane and ecotour-
ism). However, these county governments also had to consider social sta-
bility, if only minimally, when removing eucalyptus trees. To give an 
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empirical example, they left the trees nearing harvest (less than 1 year be-
fore logging) rather than radically pulling up all the trees (see Case 8 men-
tioned in Chapter 1). 
Even those counties which had originally promoted ITPs also sup-
ported this policy of curbing eucalyptus expansion. These county govern-
ments also organized activities to pull up eucalyptus trees planted on farm-
land but, in contrast to those counties which had always resisted ITPs, 
they limited the removal to eucalyptus tree occupying farmland, and they 
stressed that they did not plan to utterly eliminate eucalyptus trees, but 
wanted only to adjust the forest structure gradually in specific areas. Their 
mild response can, on the one hand, be understood as compliance with 
the policy issued at a higher level. On the other hand, their actions did not 
hurt the interests’ of big investors who owned large-scale contiguous for-
estland but did reduce competition from small-scale planters. In this sense, 
these local governments were actually protecting large-scale investments 
in the ITP sector as the main source of local revenue. In addition, in sev-
eral counties, especially those in which there are many eucalyptus pro-
cessing factories/ mills, to date the local state has not given any response 
to the restriction policy. 
These different responses by the local state show that local govern-
ments fall in line with policies from above, though sometimes only super-
ficially. More importantly, the various responses imply that policies at 
higher state levels leave some space for the local state to manipulate them 
in accordance with their own interests. Because, after all, a certain percent-
age of local revenue is paid to higher authorities which have economic 
development as a key concern. 
 
3.5 Further discussion 
As summarized in Table 3.1, the actions/reactions of the state at various 
levels - especially the provincial and local levels - towards the ITP sector 
can vary across time and space. For a better understanding of the role of 
the Chinese state, here are three analytical points that I want to highlight. 
Firstly, the state strongly intervened in the development of the ITP 
sector in Southern China using both economic and extra-economic instru-
ments, including introducing specific laws/polices, issuing logging per-
mits, providing subsidies (in the forms of cash, rice, free seeds, and ferti-
lizers), investing in infrastructure, coordinating land acquisitions, and 
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enforcing the curbing of ITPs. Within the steering process, as observed 
by Wolford et al. (2013, 204), the state gradually moved from “the direct 
developmental role” to becoming an indirect facilitator (e.g. a broker or a 
subsidy provider) in the process of capital accumulation, although some 
state actors might utilize coercion (not necessarily with force). 
Table 3.1 The variegated attitudes of the local state towards the ITP sector 
Provincial state County governments promot-ing ITP 
County governments with other 
priorities 
Strongly pro-
mote the ITP 
sector 
Encourage cadres to take the 
lead to invest in the ITP sector; 
Help big investors get access to 
land; 
Invest in infrastructure con-
struction 
Provide no additional benefits to 
ITP investors/ planters; 
Introduce preferential policies for 
their targeted sectors (e.g. sugar-
cane or ecotourism) 
Curb the expan-
sion of the ITP 
sector 
Organize movements to pull up 
eucalyptus trees planted on 
farmland (limited to eucalyptus 
trees occupying farmland); 
Have not given any response 
Respond rapidly; 
Enforce the remove of eucalyptus 
trees occupying farmland; 
Plan to remove the eucalyptus 
planted in other areas gradually 
until the full remove of this tree 
crop. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Secondly, the central and local states in China are not really split, but 
coupled in a particular way. Specifically, higher government levels (the 
central and provincial level) always issue broad and ambiguous policies, 
which usually leave space for the local state (at the county and township 
levels) to manipulate them as they share some common interests (e.g. rev-
enue generation). So, the local governments across space might introduce 
distinct policies, but all within the range set by higher authorities. 
Thirdly, the shift in state attitudes is mainly because of its struggle in 
balancing its contradictory functions, namely, capital accumulation and 
political legitimacy. As Borras and Franco (2013, 1729-1730) illustrated, 
the state will apply brakes “when the character and extent of accumulation 
and dispossession processes threaten the legitimacy of the state”. Moreo-
ver, based on the analysis of the layered structure of the Chinese state, 
higher level governments tend to be more sensitive to resistance from be-
low, while the actions of the local state are more aligned with economic 
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development targets. This does not mean, however, that local govern-
ments have no interest in social stability. 
Interacting with the complicated roles played by Chinese state, corpo-
rations, in particular foreign ones, play a key role within the rise of the ITP 
sector. In the next chapter, I discuss why and how foreign companies get 
involved in the ITP sector. 
 
 
 
 Notes
1 http://www.china.com.cn/ch-zhengzhi/zhengzhi6.htm accessed on 19 January 
2017. 
2 The fiscal system of the central and local government was separated, underlying 
the decentralized system – something that is metaphorically called “serving meals 
to different diners from different pots”. 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2008-12/18/content_10522035.htm ac-
cessed on 19 January 2017). 
3 The local share became even smaller after the financial reform enacted in 1994 
(https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD1994%E5%B9%
B4%E7%A8%8E%E5%88%B6%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9 accessed on 19 
January 2017). 
4 Except for regular agriculture tax, peasants still had to pay fees and charges 
called “five tongshou three tiliu.”. 
5http://zh.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/%E5%86%9C%E6%9D%91%E7%A8%8E%E8%B4%B9%E6%
94%B9%E9%9D%A9, http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-03/06/con-
tent_219801.htm accessed on 19 January 2017. 
6 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-08/28/content_6614213.htm ac-
cessed on 19 January 2017. 
7 http://dmlcsl.forestry.gov.cn/6186/55552.html accessed on 19 January 2017 
8 In China, forestry (linye) include both natural forest and manmade plantation sec-
tors. 
9 http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/sfb/s/861/content-302942.html accessed 
on 19 January 2017. 
10 http://people.com.cn/GB/paper85/15907/1406021.html accessed on 19 
January 2017. 
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11 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554243.htm accessed on 19 
January 2017. 
12 For more detailed policies on the management of sugar imports, see Borras 
et al (2017, 10) and Zhang and Zhao (2009). 
13 The Chinese national sugar reserve was founded in 1991. It effectively ensures 
state macro-control over sugar for national sugar security. When the sugar price is 
low, the state will purchase and store sugar in the national reserve. When the price 
is high, the reserved sugar will be sold to stabilize the market. In this way, the gap 
between supply and demand is mediated. (For a more detailed explanation of the 
mechanism of the national sugar reserve, see http://www.ynsugar.com/Arti-
cle/TYZL/200609/103.html, accessed on 29 January 2018). 
14 The subsidies are mainly for seeds, machinery and fertilizer and reflect the state’
s promotion of industrialized production. (Development Plan of Sugarcane Prod
uction, 2015-2020, http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201506/W0201506043
23728878521.pdf, accessed on 29 January 2018). 
15 Da Hu refers to rural elite households with wealth, land and/or social status. 
16 The area of the newly established ITPs under this project was as large as 
200,000 ha from 2006 to 2012, according to the document from the World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P087318/guangxi-integrated-forestry-
development-conservation-project?lang=en accessed on 19 January 2017). 
17 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201406/t20140609_614572.html ac-
cessed on 19 January 2017. 
18 The “double high” programme is intended to increase both the yield and the 
sugar content during the production. For more details on this, see Borras et al 
(2017, 5). 
19 http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070915/12133981933.shtml, ac-
cessed on 5 October 2017. 
20 As the central state will require the provincial government to deal with this re-
sistance. 
21 http://www.dgslc.com.cn/uploadfile/2014/1224/20141224113215456.pdf, 
accessed on 18 January 2017. 
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4 Chapter 4: Foreign investments and 
their land access in the Industrial 
Tree Plantation Sector1 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The scenario created by foreign land investments in the ITP sector in 
Southern China raises a series of questions: Why are these foreign inves-
tors interested in investing in China when there are a few other “land host” 
countries that would provide easier and cheaper land access? Why would 
the Chinese state and Chinese investors open up their own land resources 
to foreign capital in the ITP sector while also going abroad to seek control 
of land resources? How did foreign companies get access to land in rural 
Guangxi? To answer these questions, this chapter explores the drivers and 
mechanisms of foreign land investments in Southern China. 
By focusing on the land investments dominated by two foreign land 
investors, this chapter contributes to a more refined picture of global land 
politics. It returns to a critical argument, which has been long overlooked 
in the discussion on global land politics: namely, capital accumulation is 
principally interested in geographic places and settings where it can gener-
ate profit. Furthermore, the exploration of land access by foreign investors 
can be used to show the diverse channels of land control change under 
the institutional and social structures in China, although there might be 
nuances to the land investments dominated by other actors (including 
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state-owned farms, domestic private enterprisers, entrepreneurs and indi-
vidual villagers), in terms of scale, power dynamics, production processes, 
and corresponding results. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section 
discusses certain empirical issues related to foreign capital involvement in 
the ITP sector and narratives about the role of China within the current 
global land rush; the third section presents and examines empirical issues 
in relation to two foreign investors and Chinese policies (why China? Why 
foreign investors?); and based on this, the fourth section explores the 
mechanisms of foreign investor land access (how do they gain access to 
land?). 
 
4.2 Background: the rise of the ITP sector and foreign land-
based investments in China 
As already mentioned in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, compared to the 
food, fuel/biofuel, and mining sectors, the ITP sector has particular char-
acteristics that attract investors. In the first place, the ITP sector involves 
fast-growing trees and thus ensures quick returns on investment. Sec-
ondly, it involves multiple end uses, which can enhance the resilience of 
investors under volatile markets. 
Investors in eucalyptus ITPs in China are mainly interested in the pro-
duction of paper and wood-based board. This economic attractiveness 
makes China one of the dominant producers of industrial trees in the 
world. The industrial tree plantation sector in China has expanded dramat-
ically since 2000. The plantations are concentrated in the southern part of 
China, especially in Guangxi province, where both domestic and interna-
tional investors are involved. 
Stora Enso and APP have received a lot of public attention as major 
land holders, although they are not the only two foreign companies that 
are involved in land-based investments in China.2 Both of these investors 
are worldwide paper giants with large production and sales portfolios. 
Stora Enso specializes in the production and global sale of a series of tree-
based products, including consumer board, packaging solutions, bio-
materials, wood products, and paper (StoraEnso 2016a, 24). Stora Enso 
has mills/factories in South America (Brazil and Uruguay), the United 
States, Europe, Russia and Asia (China and Pakistan), either through joint 
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ventures or as a single owner (StoraEnso 2016a, 5). It owns around 4 mil-
lion ha of tree plantations in Sweden, Finland, Uruguay, Brazil, Estonia, 
Romania, Latvia, Russia, China and Laos, 3 either through purchase or 
lease (StoraEnso 2016b, 49). APP is a subsidiary of Sinar Mas Group4, and 
focuses on pulp and paper production targeted at the global market.5 Its 
production sites are concentrated in Indonesia and China, with nine mills 
and 2,600,000 ha tree plantations in Indonesia and over 20 mills and 
300,000 ha plantations in China (APP 2015, 12-14,47, APP-China 2015, 
7,30). 
APP and Stora Enso were originally motivated to enter the Chinese 
market because of the huge demands for paper-pulp products in China 
due to the country’s fast urbanization rate and remarkable population 
growth (Field notes, 20-21 March 2014). Later, both companies became 
involved in the ‘Plantation-Pulp-Paper integration’ (Linjiangzhi Yitihua) 
project. As shown in Table 4.1, APP started its land investments in 
Guangxi in 1995 and Stora Enso 2002. Both these companies have ob-
tained incredibly large tracts of land. The number of ITPs controlled by 
Stora Enso had reached 82.26 thousand ha by 2015, while APP controlled 
around 100 thousand ha. At the same time, capital involved in their inte-
gration projects (including building pulp mills) is extensive, with 12.8 bil-
lion Yuan in the Stora Enso case and 40 billion Yuan in the APP case. 
Table 4.1 Two main foreign investors in Guangxi 
Name National-
ity of the 
company 
Started 
year 
Investment 
(billion Yuan) 
ITP scale (1000 ha) 
State land 
 
Social land 
 Total area 
Stora Enso Finnish 2002 12.8 53.18 33.08 86.26 
APP Indonesian 1995 40.0 0  106.67 106.67 
Source: StoraEnso (2016a) and Liu (2010b) 
 
Foreign investors have thus acquired land inside China. This challenges 
the narratives about the role of China in current global land rush. China is 
a highly visible player, with land-based investments in distinct regions 
around the world, from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America 
(GRAIN 2008, Cotula 2012). The literature tends to treat such large-scale 
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land acquisitions by Chinese firms as actions dominated, or at least facili-
tated, by the Chinese government as part of its “going out” policy to 
achieve domestic food security - or, to put it more directly, to seek “new 
rice bowls” (Horta 2009, Zoomers 2010). However, various Chinese in-
vestors are commonly and indistinctly labelled as “Chinese” in the public 
media and literature, even though the Chinese state, state-owned compa-
nies, private companies, and individual entrepreneurs have different 
forms, goals, and strategies in their land-based investments. Some scholars 
have also pointed out that China’s role in land grabbing might be over-
stated and misunderstood, particularly in Africa (Hofman and Ho 2012, 
Brautigam and Zhang 2013). In reality, many of these projects do not go 
beyond the stage of official announcements, after which they are sus-
pended or terminated due to social resistance in the host country or vari-
ous other economic, political, or legal issues. 
Meanwhile, China is taking the lead in importing some key agro-prod-
ucts. According to FAO data, China was responsible for 63.6% of global 
soybean exports, and 51% of the world’s oilseed trade in 2013.6 Given the 
flexibility of certain crops, China strategically imports agro-products to 
fulfil the ever-increasing domestic demands of its large population - not 
only for food, but also for feed and fuel (Borras et al. 2016, Alonso-
Fradejas et al. 2016, Oliveira and Schneider 2016). For the main exporting 
countries/regions (e.g. South America), producing a large quantity of 
given crops for export is usually associated with crop booms and changes 
in land-use, land control, and production modes, which have significant 
impacts on the local population (Borras and Franco 2012, Hall 2011). 
In current academic papers and public reports, therefore, China is 
framed either as a key “grabber”, or as a main site for agro-product con-
sumption - but not as a destination for transnational large-scale land deals. 
There are a few studies emerging on Chinese land expropriation or land 
appropriation for urban construction within the massive literature on Chi-
nese land transfer, but these largely focus on domestic actors (Siciliano 
2014, 2013, Ye 2015). This set of the literature misses the fact that there 
are land deals inside China that involve foreign investors. 
Prior to the detailed analysis of these foreign companies’ land access, 
the next part of this thesis discusses why these paper-pulp company 
choose to enter the Chinese market and to get involved in land-based in-
vestments rather simply controlling the processing link, and why the Chi-
nese state allows foreign investment in the ITP sector. 
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4.3 Drivers of foreign investments in the ITP sector 
Why did these two paper-pulp companies choose to invest in the land-
based ITP sector in China? Staff from both companies mentioned the lack 
of profitability of the ITP sector. Huang Dingwen, the vice manager of 
APP-China forestry, stated to a China Business Network journalist that “it is 
very difficult to make a profit from planting trees. To market the ITP sec-
tor, the support of the paper industry towards the ITP sector is needed.”7 
Similarly, one employee of a foreign company explained: 
The raw materials we need are planted by ourselves. So (we can) reduce the 
use of natural forests. It is not related to the issue of cost. Actually, we do 
not make money from planting trees. Because, compared with ordinary vil-
lagers and forest farms, we need to be more socially responsible. Our com-
pany did not officially say that we do not gain profit (from ITPs), but I know 
that it (referring to the foreign company) does not care too much about 
profit here. (Field notes 19 March 2015) 
However, in practice, these foreign companies’ land investments can reap 
benefits in at least three ways. First, constructing human-made plantations 
is championed as reforestation, which is used by the investors as a strategic 
response to public criticism of their negative environmental impact. Sec-
ond, as paper-pulp corporations, direct control over the ITP sector can 
secure a sufficient and stable supply of raw materials. Third, because of 
the multiple end uses of the outputs, control over the outputs can bring 
additional profits. 
4.3.1 A response to public criticism 
Paper-pulp companies have always been criticized by the public 
worldwide, including China, for their extractive activities and for polluting 
the environment. Japan’s Oji Paper Company faced a large-scale protest 
in Qidong City in China in 2012 for its planned water discharge project8. 
APP was criticized and faced a protest by Greenpeace and other NGOs 
for illegal logging and destroying natural forests in Indonesia and in the 
Yunnan and Hainan provinces of China in 2004.9 To respond to such crit-
ics, APP and Stora Enso both coincidentally use the discourse of tree plan-
tations: 
“Use our paper, we plant more trees”--APP logo10 
 “Plant trees and forests to benefit nature, make pulp and paper to 
benefit people”--APP-China11 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 140
118 CHAPTER 4 
“The forest and forestry industry are part of the solution to the 
climate problem.” -- StoraEnso (2016a, 11) 
 
These quotes clearly show that both companies claim that the tree plan-
tation programme is a testament to their social responsibility commit-
ments, and that such activity is eco-friendly rather than extractive. Accord-
ing to this carefully constructed business logic, the promotion of ITPs not 
only reduces the use of nature, but also repairs it. In this sense, foreign 
land investments in Guangxi can be viewed as an adapted version of 
“green grabbing”: on the one hand, the “moral weight of a discursively-
constructed global green agenda legitimizes the appropriation of land and 
resources” (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012, 251); and on the other, 
these so-called ‘green’ land-based investments in turn legitimize accumu-
lation by investors in the host country. However, as I witnessed in the 
field, affected villagers roundly criticize ITPs as having significant negative 
environmental impacts due to the sector’s high demand for water and nu-
trition. 
4.3.2 Control of raw materials 
Furthermore, for these paper-pulp companies, control over ITPs also 
means control over the raw materials for their products. As explained by 
an employee of one foreign company: 
If a pulp mill has been set up, (the supply from our existing ITPs) is not 
enough. (We will) need more (trees). The original plan was to build over 
2 million mu (of ITPs in Guangxi). This was very difficult (to realize). 
Even if we wanted to purchase (the trees at that time), it still depended 
on whether others (who own the trees) wanted to sell. The price then 
became very high. It was too risky (Field notes 19 March 2015). 
This implies that the investments might not be aimed at direct profit 
extracted from the ITP sector, but at the control of raw materials for pa-
per/paperboard production. This was similarly summarized by White et 
al. (2012, 621): “the purpose of the great majority of corporate land grabs 
is to establish agricultural production (or other forms of extraction such 
as mining) on a large-scale, and to guarantee access to its products.” 
As shown in Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2, the imported volume of pulp kept 
increasing, from 0.43 million tonnes in 1980, to 16 million tonnes in 2013. 
This accounts for a large part of the total supply of pulp in China. The 
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increasing dependence on the import of paper pulps illustrates the increas-
ing shortage of supply of raw materials for paper production in China. It 
implies a possible increased value of ITPs. Therefore, for these interna-
tional paper-pulp companies, while investments in the ITP sector might 
not be profitable in the short run, the expansion of the value chain can 
secure a stable supply of raw materials, which, in the long run, will reduce 
costs and unpredictable risks. 
4.3.3 Additional gains from multiple uses of the ITP sector 
Moreover, control of ITPs can bring additional economic gains because 
usually only small tree branches are used for paper production. It was ob-
served that both of the foreign investors sell eucalyptus tree trunks, espe-
cially those with a diameter over 8 cm, to timber processing mills for the 
production of wood-based panels, which have recently become more 
profitable due to a huge domestic demand caused by the rise of the real 
estate sector. According to one villager who was hired by APP to transport 
eucalyptus trees, APP sells part of their timber products this way: “big 
ones are carried to Wuming (the timber processing industrial park in 
Wuming County in Guangxi), and small ones are cut off and transported 
to the factory in Qinzhou.” (Field notes, 20 March 2016). Similarly, Stora 
Enso also sells their wide girthed timber on a Chinese online platform.12 
Although there is no data available to assess whether the benefits of such 
sales have reduced or expanded the costs of these companies’ land-based 
investments, selling surplus outputs indicates that the control of ITPs pro-
vides opportunities for investors to maximize their profits through simul-
taneous and selective benefits from the multiple uses of eucalyptus trees. 
Furthermore, it implies a possible flexing use of the crop, which enables 
investors to reduce the risk and uncertainty of volatile markets. 
In short, the three main reasons for foreign companies to invest in land 
in China are to gain social legitimacy, to access raw materials, and to con-
trol multiple uses.13 The first two points are related to the maintenance of 
their profitable paper-pulp business in China, and the last one to the ex-
traction of as much profit as they can. It is therefore clear that the original 
and essential driver is profit, as is the case with other investments by 
capitalists. However, this motivation alone is not enough to enable foreign 
investors to enter China and access land. Why does the Chinese govern-
ment allow these foreign investors to enter China and gain control over 
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land? To answer this question, it is vital to explore the role of the Chinese 
state in selectively attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). 
4.3.4 Attracting Foreign Direct Investments: the role of the state 
from the central to the local level 
At the central level, as part of “reform and opening-up” (Gaige Kaifang), 
intertwined with the “going out” policy, the “bringing in” (yin jinlai) strat-
egy was introduced in the late 1970s. Under the 1979 Law on Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, FDIs were initially legalized in special 
economic zones. In the 1980s and 1990s, foreign investments in China, 
especially those in specific sectors, were officially promoted when foreign 
enterprises in selected sectors were granted management autonomy, tax 
incentives, and some other benefits by an array of laws and policies.14 Af-
ter China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, a series 
of geographic restrictions were removed, leading to the further opening-
up of the Chinese market to foreign investors (Yueh 2012). 
However, not all foreign investments are allowed and encouraged in 
China. According to the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment 
(revised version 2017) issued by the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Commerce,15 foreign investments in 348 
particular sectors, including wood forests for the industrial raw materials 
(Type 1), are encouraged. Meanwhile, FDIs in 28 sectors are completely 
forbidden (e.g. GMO seeds), and foreign investments in another 35 sec-
tors (e.g. the rice, wheat, and maize trade) can only be made under certain 
conditions.16 This illustrates the Chinese state’s strategic control of a few 
sectors, while liberalizing a few others. This corroborates argument by 
Schneider (2014) about the Chinese state’s vital role in deciding what to 
produce and control domestically and what to “offshore” (or use foreign 
capital). 
Echoing central policy, the provincial government of Guangxi also laid 
down policies to encourage FDIs in a few specific sectors. In accordance 
with these policies, foreign investors were entitled to further tax relief and 
priority in accessing information, loans, and other resources.17 Thus, for-
eign corporations such as Stora Enso and APP were legitimized and en-
couraged to invest in Guangxi. 
However, whether or not foreign corporations can gain access to land 
is more directly linked with the role of local governments. This is due to 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 143
  Foreign investments and land access in the ITP sector 121 
the fact that under the decentralization system, local governments, espe-
cially those at the county and township levels, have been granted the 
power to reallocate resources such as land and subsidized fertilizers 
(Rozelle 1994). On the one hand, county and township governments 
tended to attract FDIs to generate revenue, especially after the local state 
became financially independent during decentralization as mentioned in 
Chapter 1. Such tendencies were further strengthened when the revenues 
obtained by the local governments were significantly reduced after the in-
troduction of ‘Tax for fee’ reform in 2002. On the other hand, local gov-
ernment cadres are motivated to facilitate large-scale investments (includ-
ing FDIs) in order to make economic growth visible and get rewards or 
promotion under the Chinese cadre responsibility system mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Whether such local development is able to actually benefit local 
community is, however, still questionable (Zoomers 2011). 
Meanwhile, local governments always use land as a key instrument to 
attract selected FDIs. According to Wu and Heerink (2016), sizable rural 
land areas have been expropriated to host foreign investors since 1998, 
mainly for the construction of industrial parks. This is in line with the 
demand for land access by foreign companies such as Stora Enso and 
APP. 
To summarize, the state, especially at the local level, is motivated to 
bring in FDIs in a few selected sectors (including the ITP sector) with a 
set of preferential policies, including subsidies, tax reduction, and land ac-
cess. However, to realize foreign land-based investments, certain mecha-
nisms are still required to change control over rural land in China. 
 
4.4 Forestland system in Guangxi 
As Edelman, Oya, and Borras (2013, 1521) remind us, “(t)he spaces in 
which land grabbing occurs have almost always been created and shaped 
by earlier processes of political contention, longstanding patterns of land 
tenure and use, and pre-existing social formations.” It is thus vital to un-
derstand the land-use and land property rights system of the land (mainly 
forestland) acquired by Stora Enso and APP before the transactions. 
As shown in Table 4.1, most of the land controlled by Stora Enso 
(99.94% of it) is forestland, 18 with 51.38 thousand ha (62 per cent) owned 
by the state and 33.08 thousand ha (38 per cent) controlled by collectives 
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(property rights). In the case of APP, all of its ITPs in Guangxi are built 
on collective-owned forestland. 
In Guangxi, state forest farms own 10% of the forestland, while the 
remaining 90% is owned collectively (as mentioned in Chapter 2). State-
owned forestland and collective-owned forestland have different trajecto-
ries of land-use and land control. State-owned forestland was originally 
allotted to communes to build state-owned forest farms in the 1950s and 
1960s. As the forestland in Southern China is mainly for commercial use, 
in line with the national plan, forestland plots were mainly used to plant 
acacia trees and pine before the rise of eucalyptus trees in the 2000s, “to 
fulfil the huge domestic demand for timber” (Field notes, 4 March 2015). 
Collective-owned forestland has a different story. Most of the for-
estland was degraded because, during 1950s-1970s, large areas of for-
estland were destroyed for food production. The less hilly and rocky for-
estland plots (around 700,000 ha) were used for grain and sugarcane 
cultivation, leaving other non-arable forestland plots as ‘waste’ (Li 2008, 
27). Later, even under two state-led reforestation movements,19 these for-
estland plots mostly remained degraded with several pine trees and/or 
acacia trees planted haphazardly. 
The degradation of collective-owned forestland resulted mainly from 
the low economic incentives for forestland investment and villagers’ lack 
of financial capital. At the same time, pine and acacia trees have low and 
slow economic returns because of their long growth cycle (more than 15 
years). Consequently, before the rise of eucalyptus tree planting, there 
were very few economic incentives for villagers to invest in forestland. 
Furthermore, villagers’ poverty impeded their ventures. As mentioned by 
one of the villagers I interviewed in Hepu County in Beihai City, “in the 
past, we were very poor here. What can we do that we do not have money 
to plant (trees)? When bosses came, (could) we not (let them) develop? 
(We) contracted the mountain, all of us contracted to them.” (Field notes, 
20 March 2015) 
However, this does not imply that these ‘waste’ forestland plots were 
not used by villagers. In one village I visited in Hepu County where Stora 
Enso and APP acquired large-scale forestland, a large number of villagers 
told me that they used to “live off cutting firewood” (Field notes, 3 March 
2016). This implies that land-based investments in the ITP sector will have 
a significant impact on these villagers in terms of their livelihoods. This 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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In terms of land property rights, the ownership of collective-owned 
forestland is rather ambiguous in rural Guangxi as mentioned in Chapter 
2. In the 1980s, when farmland was equally distributed to each rural house-
hold under the HRS reform, most of the collectively-owned forestlands in 
Guangxi, especially the degraded land plots, remained in the hands of the 
collectives. In practice, however, these undistributed forestland plots had 
customarily been ‘owned’ by a few villagers. In most villages, it was com-
monly agreed that “those who clear empty land (forestland), own the land” 
(Field notes, 6 March 2015). In other words, once someone in the village 
reclaimed a piece of forestland, this land plot was then believed to be 
“owned” by his/her household. These households usually possessed rich 
labour resources, extra money for the venture, and sometimes even special 
networks for better access to information (e.g. village leaders or their rel-
atives and friends). To formally distribute and clarify the user rights of 
collective forestland, Guangxi started a forestland reform in 2008, 20 alt-
hough most of the land plots were already being used or occupied by sev-
eral villagers and external investors before the reform. 
Clearly then, the social relations around the land that was later trans-
ferred to foreign investors are complex: some land was state-owned; some 
owned collectively but already customarily “owned” by someone; some 
was for commercial use; some was ‘waste’/‘underused’ but actually used 
by someone. This implies that foreign companies required specific 
strategies to gain control over land. 
 
4.5 Mechanisms of land acquisition 
In such a context, as foreign investors, Stora Enso and APP require spe-
cific channels to gain control over the land, which may or may not be the 
same as those for domestic grabbers. Furthermore, their various means of 
acquiring land in the specific Chinese context are linked with certain con-
flicts related to land-use and control changes. 
This part of the thesis provides an initial analysis of the large-scale land 
acquisition practices of the two foreign investors. First, Chinese law stip-
ulates that since APP and Store Enso are foreign investors, they are re-
quired to set up joint ventures involving domestic capital in order to gain 
access to land in China. As a result, 12% of Stora Enso Guangxi's shares 
are held by two state-owned entities (Guangxi Forestry Group Co Ltd, 
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and Beihai Forestry Investment and Development Company) (StoraEnso 
2016b, 17). 
Additionally, according to the Land Administration Law of the PRC, no 
one can buy or sell land. Thus, in order to acquire land, these two interna-
tional companies have to lease from, or cooperate with, landowners. Un-
der the land system in Guangxi, APP and Stora Enso have four main chan-
nels with which to gain control over land, namely, 1) leasing land from 
state-owned farms; 2) leasing land from rural collectives; 3) leasing land 
from middlemen; and 4) cooperating with individuals. 
4.5.1 Leasing from state-owned farms 
As key projects to attract state-promoted FDIs, the two foreign companies 
were offered an opportunity to contract forestland owned by state-owned 
farms through Guangxi Forestry Group, a company set up by the Guangxi 
Forest Department.21 
Through this channel, more than 60% of Stora Enso’s forestland was 
transferred from eight state-owned forest farms. APP was permitted to 
contract 44.67 thousand ha forestland from five state-owned farms22 but 
in the end this land deal was not settled. That is because, according to an 
APP staff member, the forestland plots were located in the east and north 
part of Guangxi, where the climate is not suitable for the cultivation euca-
lyptus trees, and is far from their pulp factory in Qinzhou (Field notes, 20 
March 2014). 
Foreign companies prefer to use this channel because land that is state-
owned is usually large-scale and contiguous, and involves less complicated 
social relations. These features mean that land acquisitions acquired using 
this channel are more convenient and have fewer potential conflicts. How-
ever, this channel is not entirely grievance-free. Some state-owned farms 
expressed complaints: 
The 50-year duration of the land lease is too long. Our land leased from 
outside only has a term of 30 years… When Stora Enso contracted the for-
estland, the price was only several hundred Yuan per mu including the seed-
lings. Now the benefits are seven or eight times (than they were at that time). 
The land could be over 10 thousand Yuan per mu. It (Stora Enso) does not 
to want (to lease) the land with any conflicts (around land ownership). The 
land lease is a requirement from the government. It (the investment by Stora 
Enso) is the investment attracted by the provincial government. … If (we) 
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can (choose) not to lease the land to Stora Enso, (we) are certainly not will-
ing to give (land) to them. (Field notes, 10 March 2015) 
With a change in the control of land and the large-scale leasing of for-
estland from state-owned farms to foreign companies, state-owned farms 
face a land shortage. As a consequence, more land plots change hands as 
state-owned farms try to compensate their loss. 
For most domestic investors, especially small-scale ones, this channel 
is not commonly available. Although a few domestic private compa-
nies/entrepreneurs have been able to cooperate with state-owned farms 
or even lease land directly from state-owned farms,23 the support they get 
from the state in this endeavour is much less, and the scale of their land 
access is much smaller. 
4.5.2 Leasing from rural collectives 
Apart from leasing the forestland originally owned by state-owned farms, 
another vital approach is leasing land from collectives by negotiating with 
village leaders/elites. Such land leases also are not without the intervention 
of the state. A village cadre from a county in Guangxi illustrated this well: 
“In the past, the provincial state helped build the connection (between the 
foreign companies and the village)” (Field notes, 18 March 2015). 
This form of leasing is another favourable option for foreign investors 
because collective-owned forestland is relatively contiguous. However, as 
previously mentioned, before the entrance of Stora Enso and APP, col-
lective-owned forestland was sometimes already used and/or customarily 
occupied by some villagers. Due to this ambiguous ownership of for-
estland, access to this land by foreign companies tends to provoke con-
flicts. In one of the villages I visited in Hepu County in Guangxi (Field 
notes, 4 March 2016), it led to a series of conflicts, both covert and overt, 
between the villagers and the company. In the end, the foreign investor 
had to return part of the land to the villagers. 
In addition to ambiguous land ownership, there are two other key 
triggers for conflicts via this channel - illegally signed agreements and low 
land rent. This was expressed by an employee from one of foreign com-
panies: 
In the past, villagers did not know about the eucalyptus trees, and did not 
know how many economic benefits (can be gained from) this tree 
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crop…they thought the forestland was valueless. So, when it came to sign-
ing the agreements, many of them did not care. A lot of people were not at 
home. Some phoned and said: ‘Anyway, I did not use that thing (the for-
estland), you just forest it.’ Some asked other villagers to sign their names... 
(Some agreements) did not have enough signatures.24 …And at that time, 
the market rent was relatively low, namely, 10 to 20 Yuan, which was still 
worth something…now they feel they have lost out. Together with the 
problems (with the procedures of land leasing), their grievances have deep-
ened and widened. (Field notes, 19 March 2015). 
Although this employee is somewhat biased and neglected the unequal 
information access between the corporations and villagers, what he said 
still reveals some problems within such land leases. Illegal land contracts 
might be due to manipulation by a few local elites, as observed by Ping 
and Nielsen (2010b, 18-19), or the carelessness on the part of the villagers, 
as pointed out by this employee. In some cases, these leases led to the loss 
of collective land without compensation, and even without the villagers 
noticing, which provoked conflicts (Ping and Nielsen 2010b, 18-19). In a 
few cases, however, because of the illegal nature of the land contracts, 
villagers rightfully gained support in getting higher land rent or in getting 
some land back, as was the case in one village I visited in Guangxi. In 
addition, land rent is always low, far below the current value of forestland 
that has increased due to the rise of the ITP sector. According to an offi-
cial from the Guangxi Forestry Department, forestland rent has increased 
more than 10 times in Guangxi from the time that land leasing started so 
“there are huge conflicts” (Zhang 2010a). 
After such land leases, affected villagers lose control on the forestland 
they should have priority to contract.25 Thus, except for those who have 
the financial capital to lease land from other villagers, most villagers lose 
an opportunity to expand their livelihood sources with the rise of ITP 
sector. As regretted by a leader of a production team in Hepu County, “at 
that time, (we) did not know (the price) of the tree would be so high. If 
(we) had known, (we) would have distributed the forestland to each house-
hold to plant trees by ourselves” (Field notes, 2 March 2016). 
For domestic investors, leasing land from collectives is also a com-
monly used channel. To give an example, an employee of Dongmen state-
owned forestry farm told us that the forestland they leased is from collec-
tives, mostly (two-thirds) via the coordination of village committees, 
county governments, and the county Forestry Department (Field notes, 
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10 March 2015). However, in the case of domestic investors, instead of 
strong involvement of the state, especially at the provincial level, it is the 
social connections with the local elites that usually play a more critical role. 
However, as with foreign investors, domestic investors also encounter 
conflicts during land control changes (Field notes, March 2016). 
4.5.3 Leasing from middlemen 
Before foreign companies entered Guangxi, part of the forestland had al-
ready been contracted to several individuals (both local villagers and in-
vestors from outside) based on the social relationships and financial capital 
they possessed.26 So, to get access to those land plots, foreign companies 
needed to subcontract the land from middlemen (known as ‘big bosses’ 
by villagers). 
Such land leasing is not free from the state’s intervention, as a county 
official explained: 
I used to contract some forestland. Because I work in the government, the 
county (government) mobilized (the officials to take the lead to lease for-
estland under reforestation movement). Some friends and I together had 
around 4000 mu of forestland. Now all (of the forestland) has been given 
to them (refers to foreign companies). It is really a loss. But (this was) mo-
bilized (by the government)… every county has tasks (about the quantity of 
land leased to foreign companies). (Field notes, 17 March 2015). 
However, this is a less preferred channel for corporations. Although 
foreign companies can access large-scale land areas with fewer contacts 
through intermediaries, the land rent is usually higher compared to direct 
leasing. As an employee of one foreign company complained: 
We want (to get the land from the collective). But we have our plans, and 
we have some norms. We are surely slower and less flexible than the indi-
viduals. They (the individuals) are very fast. They get a lot of land from col-
lectives. (To negotiate with individuals) is not what we want… we have no 
way....They get contracts from villagers, (with the land rent) at 10, 50, or 100 
Yuan per mu, while, we contracted with them (at a price) of 100 to 150 Yuan 
per mu. (Field notes, 19 March 2015) 
In addition, investors are disconnected from original land holders/us-
ers when acquiring land via this channel. This tends to increase potential 
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conflicts with the affected villagers, especially when the middlemen ob-
tained the land through improper means (e.g. coercion) as illustrated by 
Ping and Nielsen (2010b). 
This is a channel that domestic investors, especially those from outside 
who have weak social connections with local elites, always chose. As is the 
case with their foreign counterparts, these domestic investors also face 
huge (potential) conflicts during their land access attempts using this chan-
nel. 
4.5.4 Cooperating with individuals 
In a few villages, some villagers had already accessed forestland from their 
collectives (via leasing or customary occupation) before the entry of the 
foreign companies. If these landholders, usually big landholders (called 
“Da hu” by local villagers), were not willing to lease their land to interna-
tional companies, the latter (mainly APP), sometimes chose to cooperate 
in other ways with them: landowners plant eucalyptus trees using seed-
lings, chemical inputs and technologies provided by foreign companies, 
and the profits are divided (e.g. 30% for villagers and 70% for the com-
pany).27 
Again, this is not a channel that is independent of state involvement. 
According to a report in Economy & Nation Weekly, the government of 
Qinzhou city required the local Forestry Department to help APP to get 
access to land. Following this state intervention, a staff member from the 
Pubei County (a county of Qinzhou city) Forestry Department repre-
sented APP in signing cooperation agreements with villagers in the name 
of the forest department of Pubei County (Zhang 2010a). 
This is the least favourable channel for the corporations. With such an 
approach, foreign corporations do not gain direct control of the land, and 
take more risks (e.g. crop failures or ‘side selling’ problems28). Moreover, 
such land access has provoked a myriad of conflicts with villagers. In the 
case of Pubei County mentioned above, after two months of logging, 
some villagers had still not received any payment. So they rejected APP’s 
further logging attempts (Zhang 2010a). 
This channel is also used by domestic investors, including state-owned 
farms, private corporations, and individuals. For them, cooperation is usu-
ally conducted based on their social connections and is a way for them to 
have indirect access to land, despite the fact that they may face similar 
conflicts as their foreign counterparts. 
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4.5.5 Relevant discussions 
Besides the four main channels illustrated above, there are a few other 
means that Stora Enso and APP use to acquire land (e.g. taking over the 
plantations from individual planters29 and leasing land from small land-
holders). These are less common, however, and usually occur at a much 
smaller scale. 
There are three points which are associated with land acquisitions by 
foreign companies which I want to highlight. Firstly, access by foreign 
companies to land in Guangxi is more or less facilitated by state actors as 
mentioned above: some of their land plots are directly transferred from 
state-owned forest farms; some of the land plots are leased from officials, 
their relatives or friends under state mobilization; some of their land plots 
are attained from rural collectives/individual landholders based on the re-
lationships built by local governments. However, this is not the case in all 
counties across Guangxi. Some county governments are not so enthusias-
tic, especially when there is no guaranteed revenue.30 This complicated 
role of the state was analysed in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, not all villagers resisted such foreign company dominated 
land acquisitions. While some villagers resisted overtly, commonly 
through social media channels, some villagers resisted covertly, using tac-
tics including anonymously encroaching foreign-owned land, stealing 
trees, destroying young plants, and setting fires to tree plantations.31 These 
tactics are very similar to the “everyday forms of peasant resistance” de-
scribed by Scott (1986a). However, quite a few villagers are indifferent to, 
and even embrace the land deals. These diverse political reactions by the 
affected villagers and the reasons behind them (whether due to the for-
eignization of land control or other reasons) will be discussed in Chapter 
6. 
Faced with resistance from below, both APP and Stora Enso have be-
come cautious in their land access strategies in Guangxi. Since 2008, APP 
has almost entirely halted its land acquisition in Guangxi.32 Stora Enso has 
reduced the amount of land it controls from 90.2 ha in 2014 to 86.3 ha in 
2016, after correcting and revising its land leasing contracts in 2009 
(StoraEnso 2016b, 47). Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in response 
to resistance and the central state’s pursuit of “ecological civilization”, the 
provincial government began putting the brakes on the rapid and massive 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 152
130 CHAPTER 4 
expansion of eucalyptus tree plantations.33 Some county governments in 
Guangxi even issued policies to stop the planting of eucalyptus trees and 
have plans to completely remove the ITPs,34 which will inevitably affect 
further expansion of foreign ITPs. 
Thirdly, such land controls are not static and linear. Some forestland 
plots have been returned to rural collectives or villagers as a response to 
the conflicts, an example being Stora Enso during their correction of con-
tracts as mentioned above. Some forestland plots are subcontracted by 
foreign companies to domestic investors due to frequent typhoons, arson, 
and tree theft. For example, during one of my interviews in March 2016, 
I was informed that the ITPs owned by APP in one village of Guangxi 
were sub-leased to a Chinese entrepreneur. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
With the rise of the ITP sector, foreign companies chose to conduct land-
based investments in China, driven by the profits that could be gained 
from both the sector per se and the downstream paper-pulp sector. These 
companies did gain control over land inside China, partly as a result of the 
state’s strategic choice and by using channels under the particular institu-
tional and social structures at play in China. They acquired the land from 
state-owned farms, rural collectives, and landholders, with the help of do-
mestic actors, especially the state. 
This chapter shows an alternative geographic trajectory of global land 
politics: China, which is usually cast as either a major land grabber in dis-
tant places, or as a key context for crop booms elsewhere, can likewise be 
a host country for large-scale foreign land investments. Land deals can 
take place in any region, even in traditional ‘grabber’ countries like China, 
as long as profits are available for capitalists. This insight is also echoed in 
van der Ploeg, Franco and Borras’s work on land grabbing within the Eu-
rope Union (van der Ploeg, Franco, and Borras Jr 2015) and Borras et al’s 
research on crop booms in China (Borras et al. 2017). Marx made the point 
that: “[t]he restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what 
he (capitalist) aims at.” (Marx (1992, 107). The logic of capitalism is to 
maximize profit, thus investors will go wherever they can for profit, 
whether at home or abroad, and will use whatever channel they can to gain 
control over land. However, as we are reminded by a few scholars (Van 
der Ploeg 2009, Friedmann 2016, Moore 2017), whether they can actually 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 153
  Foreign investments and land access in the ITP sector 131 
gain the land is another issue and is related to the limits (e.g. natural limits) 
they might encounter. This is not a new argument, and has long been pro-
pounded by Marx and a few other scholars. To revisit this argument under 
the contemporary context is critical, as it explains the dynamics of these 
foreign land investments in China and calls for a rethink of the nature of 
global land politics. 
Of course, alongside these foreign investors, there are also domestic 
ones (even grabbers) involved in the ITP sector in Guangxi, ranging from 
state-owned farms, private companies and entrepreneurs, to local villagers. 
Albeit with distinct state and local support, these actors gained control 
over land under the same contexts and via similar means as the foreign 
counterparties. 
With such extensive changes in land-use and land control, villagers are 
inevitably affected. However, according to Zoomers and Otsuki (2017), 
regardless of the primary motivations of the land deals, the impacts on the 
local community tend to be divergent and distinct. Thus, it is critical to 
have a look at the de facto changes in the villagers’ livelihoods. These will 
be explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
Notes
1 Part of this chapter has been published in Xu (2018a). 
2  Sino-Forest from Cananda and OJI PAPER CO., LTD from Japan also ac-
quired some land in Guangxi, but on a much smaller scale and received much less 
public attention. 
3 It includes the plantations where Stora Enso’s shareholding is less than 50%. 
4 An Indonesia conglomerate involved in the pulp and paper, real estate, financial 
services, agribusiness, telecommunications, and mining sectors. 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinar_Mas_Group, accessed on 21 June 2016). 
5 https://www.asiapulppaper.com/about-app accessed on 21 June 2016. 
6 Author’s calculation based on data from FAO, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en
/#data/TP, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
7 http://www.yicai.com/news/4730287.html, accessed on 21 June 2016. 
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8 http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/japans-oji-paper-resumes-output-at-chin
a-plant/article/feed/2017721, accessed on 24 June 2016. 
9 http://www.greenpeace.org/china/zh/campaigns/forests/work/work-achive-
ments/app-records/ accessed on 24 June 2016. 
10 https://www.asiapulppaper.com/, accessed on 20 June 2016. 
11http://www.app.com.cn/en/about/info/id/123, accessed on 20 June 2016. 
12 Beibu Gulf Equity Exchange Group: http://www.bbwcq.com/index.php?m=c
ontent&c=index&a=lists&keywords=%CB%B9%B5%C0%C0%AD%B6%F7%
CB%F7&no=&catid=19&city=%CB%F9%D3%D0%B5%D8%B5%E3&hy=
%CB%F9%D3%D0%D0%D0%D2%B5&submit=%B2%E9%D1%AF, access
ed on 27 June 2016. 
13 Apart from these three main reasons, there may also be a few other specific 
causes. For example, APP’s expansion might be closely related to the pressure on 
it to pay back its outstanding debts (Matthew and van Gelder 2001). 
14 For example, the 1986 Provisions to Encourage Foreign Investment and the 1991 Income 
Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
15 See http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/201706/W020170628553266458339.
pdf, accessed on 30 January 2018. 
16 e.g. cooperating with domestic investors, or with domestic investors as the main 
shareholder. 
17 The 1996 Guangxi policy on further opening up, accessed on 8 January 2018, 
http://www.dxgxcpa.com/e-news/dispArticle.Asp?ID=61; the 2003 Guangxi 
preferential tax policy for foreign investors, accessed on 8 January 2018, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/200403/20040300192586.shtml. 
18 Here forestland does not refer to natural forests, but to one of the eight land-
uses classified by the Chinese government in the Land Management Law. Accord-
ing to Guangxi Tongzhi, most natural forests were destroyed and turned into rocky 
“waste” land in 1935. 
(http://www.gxdqw.com/bin/mse.exe?seachword=&K=a&A=46&rec=86&run
=13, accessed on 30 June 2016). 
19 Namely in the 1990s aiming at recovering waste forestland, and in the 2000s to 
return the occupied forestland to food production. 
20  From the central government website, accessed on 22 April 2016, 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-10/29/content_2252860.htm 
21 But after the reform of public institutions in China, the “Guangxi Forestry Group 
delinked from the Guangxi Forest Department and now belongs to the state-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 155
  Foreign investments and land access in the ITP sector 133 
 
now” (according to the staff at the Guangxi Forestry Department, 4th March 
2015, Field notes). 
22 http://www.gxlyjt.com/news/shownews.php?lang=cn&id=164 accessed on 1 
July 2016. 
23 During my fieldwork in Guangxi on 30 March 2015, a local “boss” told me he 
leased 2400 mu forestland form a bankrupt county-level state-owned farm. State-
owned farms also have multiple levels and are under the control of the corre-
sponding levels of administration. Provincial-level state-owned farms (e.g. 
Gaofeng Forestry Farm) are governed by provincial governments, while county-
level state-owned farms are governed by county governments. Usually, the higher 
level state-owned farms are able to receive more state support and are in a better 
financial situation. 
24 According to the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Contracting of Rural L
and issued in 2002, the contract shall “be agreed to by at least two-thirds of the 
members of the villagers assembly or of the representatives of villagers of the s
aid collective economic organization”. (http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.
aspx?lib=law&id=2433&CGid= accessed on 4 July 2016). 
25 According to the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Contracting of Rural 
Land, the villagers have priority in contracting collectively owned land from their 
collectives. 
26 Most of the large-scale land owners I interviewed are either local elites or the 
relatives/friends of local elites (Field notes, 17, 20, 30 March 2015, 13 April 2015, 
11, 12 and 20 March 2016). 
27 As mentioned by an official from the local forestry department (Field notes, 17
 March 2015), Stora Enso staff (Field notes, 19 March 2015), individual entrepren
eurs (Field notes, 13 April 2015), the villagers (Field notes, 3 March 2016) and AP
P website news (http://www.appjg.com.cn/JGWebSite/Content.aspx?SiteID=1
&ModuleID=0&PageID=2&DataID=10709, assessed on 25 April 2016). 
28 It refers to the phenomenon that individuals do not sell products to contracted 
companies, but to someone else who can give a higher price. It is quite common 
in rural China, as also observed by Zhang (2012). 
29 As described in the case I interviewed on 20 Mar 2015: due to the poor road 
conditions in his village, the villager contracted the 10s mu of forestland to Stora 
Enso for 30 years alongside the eucalyptus trees already cultivated. 
30 The government can only get revenue in the counties where the big paper-pulp 
company or processing factories/mills are built, as planting eucalyptus trees per 
se is not taxed. 
31 According to my observations and interviews with the villagers in one of the 
villages in Heipu County, Guangxi in March, 2016. 
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32 http://www.yicai.com/news/4730287.html, accessed on 21 June 2016. 
33 As the central state will require the provincial government to deal with the con-
flicts. 
34 Web news, accessed on 29 April 2016, http://news.sohu.com/20060411/n242
749631.shtml, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2014/0815/264952.shtml. 
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5 
5 Chapter 5: Changes in villagers’ 
livelihoods in Southern China within 
the rise of ITP sector 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As already analysed in the previous chapters, with the rise of the ITP sec-
tor, a large area of land in Guangxi changed hands and/or use (1653.3 
thousand ha in 2010) in a short period of time. Villagers are inevitably 
affected by these extensive changes in land-use and land control. 
Current literature on land grabbing states that large-scale land acquisi-
tions usually tend to result in the dispossession and even displacement of 
the local villagers (White et al. 2012). In other words, when land deals 
emerge, although the impacts might vary, at least one group of local vil-
lagers will lose control over their critical, if not only, livelihood source (i.e. 
land). If these dispossessed villagers are not employed by land investors, 
their livelihoods are likely to become more vulnerable, resonating with 
what Tania Li (2011) illustrated: “their land is needed, but their labor is 
not” (Li 2011, 286). Meanwhile, some of the consequences are associated 
with land-use change. Large-scale land conversion to the monoculture of 
a certain cash crop is likely to bring additional impacts, for example ‘envi-
ronmental externalities’, as all other land uses are threatened or even pre-
vented due to conflicts over resources (e.g. water), and the lack of sales 
networks for other crops (Hall 2011, 852). These impacts de facto affect 
villagers’ livelihoods. 
 In this sense, within a crop boom, a large part of the villagers’ liveli-
hoods tends to be deprived, particularly when villagers’ ability to maintain 
their land control and land-use is low. As has already been analysed in 
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many cases, large-scale displacement of local villagers is a common out-
come.1   
 I argue, however, that this cannot fully capture the dynamics of the 
eucalyptus boom in China. The rise of the ITP sector took place in 
Guangxi without full, large-scale displacement/dispossession. Within the 
crop boom, the villagers’ livelihood changes were highly diversified: a few 
villagers decided not to engage with the sector, while others were able to 
get incorporated in the crop boom, and even become grabbers themselves. 
Thus some villagers, rather than completely losing their livelihood, were 
able to maintain and even expanded their livelihood.2 Why and how do 
these livelihood changes occur and what are the implications of these 
changes?  
 To understand these dynamics, this chapter analyses villagers’ liveli-
hoods through the lens of political economy, with a particular focus on 
institutions. As De Haan and Zoomers (2005, 44) summarized: “[a]ccess 
to livelihood opportunities is governed by social relations, institutions and 
organizations, and it includes power as an important explanatory variable.” 
Similarly, Ian Scoones (2015, 46) also argued that institutions have a criti-
cal role in governing people’s access to livelihood resources (i.e. what do 
people have?), which then significantly affects people’s livelihood choices 
(i.e. what do people do?),3 and the corresponding outcomes. Thus, during 
an analysis of villagers’ livelihoods, it is key to look into certain institu-
tional settings, particularly those that are closely associated with villagers’ 
access to resources (e.g. land) and livelihoods (e.g. off-farm work). In this 
chapter, such access does not simply mean rights of access (property 
rights), but, in line with the “theory of access” outlined by Jesse Ribot and 
Nancy Peluso (2003), also refers to “the ability to benefit from things” 
(153). In this sense, to understand villagers’ de facto livelihood changes 
within the crop boom, it is key to focus on the institutions that are relevant 
to villagers’ capability and autonomy in maintaining and gaining access to 
resources (particularly land and financial resources) and livelihoods (both 
on-farm and off-farm work). In the context of rural China, the relevant 
institutions include the rural land system, labour conditions, and corre-
sponding social differentiation. 
 Based on an extensive set of primary data from my four fieldwork trips, 
this chapter explores villagers’ livelihoods within the expansion of the ITP 
sector. This chapter argues that villagers’ livelihoods might not necessarily 
be damaged even when some of their livelihood resources (i.e. land) are 
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taken during a crop boom. This is closely related to villagers’ diverse live-
lihood sources under specific institutional settings. For example, a few ru-
ral households gain most of their income not from farming, but from non-
farm work. So, when part of their land is taken (leased out), they are able 
to maintain their subsistence. Moreover, based on the financial recourses 
they gain from the non-farm work, some of these villagers are even able 
to extend their livelihoods within the crop boom. This reminds us that 
when studying the villagers’ livelihood changes, examining what and how 
much is left to villagers in a particular context is equally important as analysing 
what and how much has been taken. This insight is aligned with James 
Soctt’s (1977) analysis of peasants’ moral economy in Southeast Asia. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: in the next part, 
I briefly discuss the role of specific institutional settings in (re)shaping vil-
lagers’ livelihoods during the rise of the ITP sector. In part 5.3, I examine 
the possible negative impact of the expansion of the ITP sector on villag-
ers’ livelihoods. In part 5.4, I discuss what and how much is left to the 
villagers when the crop boom takes place under specific institutions set-
tings. Based on this, I analyse the possible outcomes when villagers choose 
to engage in or step out of the sector (i.e. what do they do?). 
 
5.2 Specific institutional settings 
The livelihood choices made by villagers are not totally free, but embedded 
in existing power structures, as observed by Borras and Franco (2012, 52): 
“while land-based wealth and power transfers do occur, access to and con-
trol over land is further concentrated in the hands of dominant social clas-
ses and groups: landed classes, capitalists, corporate entities, state, or other 
dominant community groups such as village chiefs.” As a starting point, 
this part focuses on (i) the rural land system, which is not only associated 
with villagers’ land access, but also linked to what can be left to villagers 
during the crop boom; (ii) internal migration, another key livelihood re-
source of Chinese rural households and a critical factor that conditions 
both villagers’ land-use change and other villagers’ land control change; 
and (iii) based on the previous changes, the social differentiation among 
villagers that is related to their distinct livelihood choices. 
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, after the HRS reform in the 1980s, 
land plots in Guangxi were allocated to each rural household, leading to 
changes in ownership and landscape. In addition, the HRS reform also 
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brought changes in the mode of production, namely, from being large-
scale commune-based to small-scale household-based. After the HRS re-
form, land-use decision-making and agricultural production units were 
shifted from the commune to individual households. The system was thus 
no longer the egalitarian one under which each individual could get the 
same irrespective of how much he/she did in the commune, but a respon-
sible system under which “the more one did, the more one can get” (Du-
olao Duode).4 In this sense, the HRS reform is widely hailed as a vital reason 
for the vibrant revival of the Chinese rural economy, as it increased villag-
ers’ productive incentives (Spoor 2007, 97, Day 2013, 40). 
Since the HRS reform, the rural land market/land rental market in 
Guangxi, similar to that in other regions in China, has been gradually lib-
eralized. According to the land law, members of the community have pri-
ority in leasing undistributed land owned by their collective based on the 
principle of voluntariness. This land system enhances villagers’ autonomy 
and capacity. In particular, with control of land plots, villagers can make 
their own decisions on production (e.g. which crop to cultivate, and 
whether the cultivation is labour-intensive or capital-intensive) and circu-
lation (e.g. for sale or for self-consumption). Meanwhile, villagers can 
choose to mortgage or lease out the control of their land in exchange for 
the financial support that they need for their livelihood strategy (although 
land fragmentation might hinder their attempts). In addition, despite the 
fact that they have more profitable sources of income than farming, vil-
lagers may choose to keep control of their land as a “safety net” to secure 
at least part of their subsistence if they fail to do so through other sectors. 
The massive urban-rural migration, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, 
has strategic relevance in this chapter. On the one hand, such changes in 
labour conditions have implications on the labour supply in the country-
side. When the young and the physically strong migrate out, labour in rural 
households is fit for the development of labour-saving crops such as eu-
calyptus. On the other hand, the wages obtained from migrants’ work also 
has impacts on households’ incomes. As shown in Figure 5.1, at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, wages accounted for 3% of average rural household 
income in Guangxi, while in the 2010s, 37% of the rural household income 
comes from wages. This falls in line with the argument by van der Ploeg 
and Ye (van der Ploeg and Ye 2016): “for the people involved in both 
farming and non-agrarian activities, ‘multiple job holding’ represents a 
unity of two non-comparable, but supplementary domains” (2016, 29). In this vein, 
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the shift of labour conditions in Guangxi in essence enhances the liveli-
hood resilience of villagers. In other words, when villagers lose part of 
their income from farming (e.g. due to issues related the weather or, worse, 
due to the loss of part of their land access), they might still be able to 
maintain their subsistence. In a few cases, when off-farm work becomes 
their primary source of livelihood, these villagers might be willing, even 
eager, to transfer their land access in exchange for land rent. Meanwhile, 
migrant work also offers financial support to a few villagers when they 
want to expand their livelihoods, e.g. to invest in the ITP sector.5 
Figure 5.1 Percentage share of wages in total income of average rural 
household in Guangxi 
 
Source: Guangxi Statistical Yearbook (1991-2012) 
 
Following the changes in land and labour conditions in rural areas, vil-
lagers started to differentiate, although there are still debates about the 
sources of this differentiation. Some scholars believed the differentiation 
is related to non-farm work. According to Zhang (2012, 469), Chinese vil-
lagers’ unequal access to non-farm incomes is the main factor that resulted 
in their differentiation. Similarly, Jacka (2017) also observed social differ-
entiation led by outmigration. Such differentiation is circular and related 
to demographic change, although later it might contribute to a polarized 
differentiation among villagers. Meanwhile, some scholars argued that 
farming plays a more important role in rural differentiation. As Hairong 
and Yiyuan (2015) found, Chinese rural differentiation is associated with 
land control changes via diverse channels. Thus, transformation is an eco-
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nomic and permanent process. Common to the two types of differentia-
tion is that they both lead to inequality among villagers in access to and 
control over livelihood resources (e.g. natural capital, economic capital 
and social capital), which becomes a key factor that affects their distinct 
livelihood choices and the corresponding outcomes. 
Thus, on the one hand, these institutions are critical factors that 
(re)shape what villagers have, what they do, and the corresponding out-
comes. They could, therefore, (at least partly) explain why the livelihood 
change of Guangxi villagers as a result of the expansion of eucalyptus trees 
were different from those of villagers in Brazil, Ecuador, and some other 
countries. On the other hand, the livelihood changes are continuously 
shaped by a series of changes induced by the expansion of ITPs, which in 
turn further affect villagers’ livelihood responses. So we need to explore 
these changes in a dynamic and relational way. 
 
5.3 The negative impacts of ITPs on the local community 
The rise of the ITP sector had negative impacts to the local communities. 
Although the impacts were not distributed evenly, at least some of the 
villagers saw their livelihoods significantly affected. Specifically, some vil-
lagers lost part of their source of livelihood due to the loss of control of 
collectively-owned land. A few villagers faced declining yields because of 
the negative environmental impacts of ITPs. 
5.3.1 Loss of livelihood sources 
Some of these impacts are associated with land control change. As men-
tioned in Chapter 4, the land leased to domestic and foreign investors is 
mostly collective-owned forestland, due to the fragmentation of already 
distributed farmland plots. These land plots are usually seen as “empty” 
or “marginal” land that is unused or underused. However, as Borras and 
Franco (2012, 45) remind us, this definition can be problematic, especially 
when these land plots “have a particular cultural or ecological signifi-
cance”. 
 In the case of Guangxi, although most villagers would agree that the 
land leased out is “barren hill” (Huangshan), there are still some villagers 
who used to get part of or even most of their income from these land 
plots. For example, in one of village I visited during my fieldwork in 2016, 
a lot of villagers used to generate income by cutting firewood from the 
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forested hills which were later contracted to Stora Enso. This was illus-
trated by a villager during a focus group discussion in a village in Hepu 
County, Guangxi: 
In the past, my household income came from farming and cutting firewood. 
We have no other income. The food we grow was not enough to eat, so we 
depended on cutting firewood to buy food. Now no firewood can be ob-
tained, because the Finnish company plants eucalyptus trees here and there 
is no brushwood (to be picked as firewood) (Field notes, 3 March 2016). 
Similarly, another villager in the same village told me: “All the land 
(forestland) in the village has been contracted. Where (can I find) land (to 
cultivate)?” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). In this sense, some villagers have 
lost at least part of their source of income due to the changes in land con-
trol with the expansion of eucalyptus trees. In addition, they are also de-
prived of possibilities to expand their livelihoods on previously collec-
tively-owned land. In other words, by the time villagers became aware of 
the economic value of eucalyptus trees, they had already lost control of 
the land which they otherwise could have benefited from. 
5.3.2 Declining yield 
Some of the impacts are related to the land-use change, more specifically 
to the negative ecological impacts of the crop. As mentioned in Chapter 
1, the land-use change towards eucalyptus trees inevitably changed the 
ecological environment of the neighbouring land plots (e.g. hydrological, 
nutrition, and sunshine). Such change, in turn, had a significant adverse 
effect on villagers’ farming. According to one villager, “since planting eu-
calyptus trees, the land has almost no water… Now no matter what (corps) 
we plant here, they do not grow” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). In a more 
systematic way, one villager in Binyang County explained: 
No other crop can be grown next to the eucalyptus trees. For one thing, 
(eucalyptus) trees are very tall. They create shade on the neighbouring land 
belonging to others. Also, after the trees have been planted for two to three 
years, there are a lot of weeds. Mice can then easily hide. The mice eat the 
crop seeds (as shown in Figure 5.2) … What’s more, I observed that the 
roots of eucalyptus trees can reach 20 m to absorb water. (Field notes, 30 
March 2015), 
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Figure 5.2 A plot near ITPs in Binyang County in Guangxi 
 
Notes: Photo taken during fieldwork in Binyang County in Guangxi on 31 March 2015. As shown 
in the photo, fences are built to protect the seeds from being eaten by mice hidden in the 
weeds as a result of planting eucalyptus trees nearby. However, according to the villager, “it is 
still useless”. 
 
In this sense, after such changes in land-use, a few villagers’ yields tend 
to decrease. This means that for some villagers’ their income from farming 
might further decline, albeit that earnings from farming are already a very 
low for a few villagers in China. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, even when 
a part of villagers’ livelihood resources is lost during the crop boom, their 
livelihoods are not necessarily damaged due to the resources that are still 
left to them. It is thus important to have a look at what and how much is left 
to villagers during the rise of the ITP sector. 
 
5.4 The change to villagers’ livelihoods 
There are multiple patterns of eucalyptus cultivation, including both large-
scale and small-scale tree plantations. Large-scale plantations normally in-
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volve massive land control change. As already discussed in Chapter 4, be-
cause farmland plots are usually fragmented, most of these large-scale 
plantations are built on forestland, mainly acquired by international com-
panies from state-owned farms, rural collectives and middlemen, and, to a 
lesser extent, directly from individual villagers. The forestland previously 
occupied by state-owned farms is state-owned, while the rest is collec-
tively-owned and usually remained undistributed before the crop boom. 
This indicates that during the land control change, most villagers’ access 
to farmland plots was not affected.6 Therefore, the villagers were not de-
prived of their corresponding livelihoods from these land plots.7 
 Meanwhile, small-scale plantations are usually built by villagers on the 
land plots they have access to. This usually involves a change in land-use 
rather than a change in land control. During this process, therefore, these 
villagers’ land access and associated livelihoods are not hurt, although their 
neighbours’ farming might be affected due to the environmental impacts 
of the tree crop. 
The development of the ITP sector in rural Guangxi thus took place 
without full, large-scale displacement of villagers. In other words, due to 
the specific institutional context in China (mainly the land system), alt-
hough some villagers lost access to part of their previous or future for-
estland, the access of most villagers to farmland remained intact. 
Moreover, as already mentioned in the previous part, a large number 
of villagers in Guangxi carry out off-farm work in urban areas and the 
wages these villagers earn have become a vital part of their household in-
comes. Thus, even though part of their land access was taken during the 
expansion of the sector, these villagers’ access to alternative livelihood 
sources (e.g. wage jobs) was undamaged and could still provide financial 
support to maintain and even extend their livelihoods. 
Based on this, the villagers had (albeit differentiated) autonomy and 
capacity to make livelihoods choices within the crop boom. As illustrated 
in Table 5.1, some villagers chose to engage with the ITP sector via inter-
nal grabbing of land (i.e. land grabbing within their own village and at the 
expense of their neighbours/kin) or changing their land-use, while others 
chose to “step out”. Irrespective of their choices, all these villages made 
changes of their own will and based on what they already had. Thus, rather 
than a complete loss of livelihoods, a few villagers, particularly those with 
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privileged access to resources, were able to sustain and even enhance their 
livelihoods. 
Table 5.1 Three main alternative livelihood changes by villagers in Guangxi 
Choices Outcomes 
Intimate 
land 
grabbing 
Acquiring more land to 
build ITPs 
Use both household la-
bour and employed la-
bour, conduct inten-
sive production 
practices 
Have their livelihoods 
sustained/extended 
based on their privi-
leged access to re-
courses; might gain or 
lose  
Land- use 
changes 
Maintaining land con-
trol and changing the 
land-use of the plots 
distributed under the 
HRS reform for the cul-
tivation of eucalyptus 
Exploit household la-
bour, apply intensive 
use of chemical inputs 
 
Maintain their liveli-
hoods and sometimes 
even have their liveli-
hood resilience en-
hanced  
Stepping 
out 
Actively excluding 
themselves from the 
ITP sector 
Do not plant eucalyp-
tus trees 
Usually have access to 
better alternatives with 
material /social capital 
 
5.4.1 Intimate land grabbing 
Some villagers gained control over the land from local or nearby village 
collectives and became owners of eucalyptus tree plantations. In this con-
text, grabbers were not from “the outside”, but were “local villagers” 
themselves. They were able to gain access to land which originally be-
longed to collectives and benefit from it at the expense of their neighbours 
and kin. Inspired by the idea of “intimate exclusion”, (Hall et al. 2011, 145-
146), such land grabbing is called intimate land grabbing in this study. 
In some cases, these villagers decided to grab land and engage in the 
ITP sector after calculating the benefits and costs. As explained by one 
villager in Wuming County who returned to the village and invested in the 
ITP sector: 
(I) used to be a barber in Shenzhen, Guangdong. Now (I) am getting old, 
so I came back. Now our county is developing very fast. (We) do not need 
to go very far (to work). There are factories nearby, which was not the case 
before. Here, (if I) got 100 Yuan, it is equal to 200 Yuan in Guangdong. 
And (I) have to pay for accommodation (in Guangdong). Although the in-
come there is a bit higher, it is not much higher (than that earned here in 
Guangxi). But (I) need to rent an apartment. Now I can go back home every 
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day. Now (I) plant trees, which is much more comfortable (Field notes, 13 
April 2015). 
Sometimes, such local investments are motivated by big companies. 
This is the case of one villager who controls over 110 mu of forestland: 
I used to do migrant work outside. Then the Finnish company (Stora Enso) 
came to our village and leased the forestland at the price of 8 Yuan per mu 
per year. I felt it was not worthwhile. I think it is better that I cultivate by 
myself. At that time, the timber was quite cheap at only 260-280 Yuan per 
tonne… (I) never thought the price would increase to the level it is at today 
(at around 600-800 Yuan per tonne). (Field notes, 18 March 2015). 
To gain control over land, these grabbers employ both economic and 
extra-economic practices, as summarized in Table 5.2. These practices in-
clude (i) enclosing previously commonly-used land to exclude others from 
using it based on their own resources (particularly their labour and social 
resources), (ii) leasing collectively-owned forestland earlier or at a price 
that others cannot afford, (iii) lending money to landholders in exchange 
for control over land-use and outputs, and getting involved in up-/down-
stream business to enhance their control over the land. 
Table 5.2 Distinct channels of individual villager-dominated land grabbing 
Type Channels Number of interviewed cases Scale (mu) 
Extra-economic Customary occupation 56 0.5-200 
Economic 
Leasing 20 7-500 
Loans 1 Hundreds 
Control of up-/down-
stream business 
15 - 
Source: Author’s fieldwork in Guangxi in 2015 and 2016. 
 
The first practice is more common, is normally piecemeal, takes place 
by stealth, and generally on a relatively smaller scale, as shown in Table 1. 
Under this scheme, these local land grabbers controlled undistributed and 
collectively-owned forestland using customary occupation. This group of 
grabbers are villagers whose households have abundant labour resources 
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to work on the degraded forestland, and access to information about prof-
itable land-use. As explained by a villager in a focus group discussion when 
I asked about the uneven distribution of forestland in their village: “if you 
have better labour conditions (for your household) and are physically 
stronger, you can occupy more land. (Because) (forest-) land has not yet 
been distributed” (Field notes, 11 March 2016). 
In spite of having suitable labour conditions in their households, most 
villagers can only grab very small pieces of land, usually less than 10 mu, 
while a small group of villagers gained access more land, grabbing as much 
as hundreds mu. The amount of common land is limited but these villagers 
gained more land because they started the practice of land grabbing earlier 
than others. Why did these villagers seize the opportunity and spend time 
and labour on claiming degraded land plots which, before the eucalyptus 
boom, were originally thought of as “valueless and unwanted by people” 
(Field notes, 13 March 2016) while other did not? The answer is closely 
allied with villagers’ ability to access information. This is the case of an ex-
leader of a village I visited in the March of 2016. He got information about 
the rise of the ITP sector form friends in the county government and be-
came the first to claim undistributed and collectively-owned forestland. In 
this way he gained control of around 200 mu of forestland. Later, other 
people began to see the benefit of claiming undistributed and collectively-
owned land and started claiming it as well, but on a much smaller scale 
(around tens of mu). 
So only those villagers who have social connections to get information 
and sufficient access to labour resources are able to seize the opportunity 
to gain control over restricted land via customary occupation. At the same 
time, when these villagers control the land, others are inevitably dispos-
sessed, and excluded from original and (possible) future use of the land. 
The three practices described above are based mainly on market power. 
To directly control the land, some villagers leased land from their commu-
nity using their financial capital. Their economic capital advantage came 
mostly from non-farm work. Of the 20 villagers I interviewed in Guangxi 
in 2015 and 2016 that leased land from the collectives, all of them were 
doing waged, non-farm work in urban areas, ranging from transportation, 
construction, and trade, as the main source of their households’ incomes. 
This implies that access to profitable non-farm work was vital for these 
grabbers to gain direct control over land in this way. 
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Seventeen of these households are completely independent landhold-
ers, with the scale of their plots ranging from 7 mu to 500 mu. Three vil-
lagers share part of the landholdings with a few of few friends or kin (1 to 
3 people), at the scales of 30 mu, 50 mu and 200 mu respectively. 
In addition to land leasing, there are also indirect ways for individual 
villagers to control land-use and products. One way is the use of loans, 
which is less common, but still exists. To give an example, a villager who 
already had 150 mu of ITPs lent money to another planter, enabling him 
to buy chemical inputs. In exchange, the villager giving the load could pur-
chase the trees at a specified price after four years (Field notes, 18 March 
2015). Another way to control land-use and products is to control the ITP 
value chain by engaging in one or more upstream or downstream busi-
nesses, including transporting trees and timber, preliminarily processing, 
and trade (i.e. being brokers).8 In this way, villagers can enhance their 
power and get better terms. 
These practices are not completely independent of each other. Some 
grabbers used a combination of these practices to get control over land. 
The villager who lent money to control the outputs produced by other 
villagers also leased land from his village to directly control 150 mu of 
ITPs. Six villagers I interviewed who leased land to build ITPs are also 
engaged in up- and downstream ITP sector businesses. 
These land grabs occurred at a much smaller scale than those carried 
out by Stora Enso (82.26 thousand ha) and APP (around 100 thousand ha 
of ITPs) (StoraEnso 2016a, Liu 2010b). Accordingly, the amount of capi-
tal involved in their investment is much less compared to the big compa-
nies. However, this does not mean that these grabbers have less control. 
The ease and firmness with which they can control land is embedded in 
regulation and legitimacy based on their identities as villagers, and on their 
geographic and social proximity. Legally, villagers have priority in con-
tracting collective land. Thus, their land claims are legitimized. Socially, 
these villagers, mostly elites, usually have better connections with cadres 
who are in charge of land distributions and transfers, which can make their 
access to land easier than it is for “outside” investors. 
Moreover, APP and Stora Enso faced resistance to their land acquisi-
tion practices and had to adjust their practices - (APP)9 stopped acquiring 
land in Guangxi in 2008 and (Stora Enso)10 reduced the amount of land it 
controlled from 90.2 ha in 2014 to 86.3 ha in 2016 when it started to cor-
rect and revise its land leasing contracts in 2009. At the same time, these 
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intimate land grabbers were able to maintain their control over land more 
firmly. On the one hand, due to their intimate relations with their fellow 
villagers compared with “outside” investors, they usually met much less 
overt resistance. On the other hand, they were better able to manage the 
different forms of resistance, which included pilfering, arson, sabotage, 
and encroachment as they were geographically close to the land plots they 
controlled. When such resistance erupted, they could quickly move in to 
stop it, as explained by a villager who controls 150 mu ITPs: 
If the (plantation) is not in the same village, it is very difficult to manage. 
When the trees are planted outside, no one can watch to see whether other 
people steal trees. Right? People will not steal when they know it belongs to 
an individual. And it will be troublesome if the trees are burnt during the 
Qingming Festival11.When trees are planted in the place where I can watch, 
if the trees are burnt, I can just find several people to put out the fire. (Field 
notes, 18 March 2015). 
In this way, compared to big foreign companies, intimate land grabbers 
do not have weaker, but sometimes stronger control. However, this does 
not mean that land control is static and that their investments always pay-
off. In reality, their investments are also full of risks. During the long 
growth cycle, villagers also have to bear the volatility of the market and 
the uncertainty of agronomic conditions (e.g. the weather). One intimate 
land grabber I interviewed in Hepu County in Guangxi told me that due 
to the typhoon a year earlier (in 2014), his trees were all “broken” and he 
faced big losses. Due to such losses, some grabbers reduce or even give 
up their land control. 
Compared to corporations, these individual villager-dominated land 
grabs sometimes have a specific impact on labour employment and the 
local environment due to their distinct production practices. Whereas cor-
poration-dominated production depends entirely on wage labour, these 
intimate grabbers can, at least partly, exploit family labour. According to 
my interviews, when the amount of land control is less than 30 mu, pro-
duction practices (including seeding, weeding, and fertilizing, but exclud-
ing logging) are usually carried out by family members. When the size of 
the ITP is over 30 mu, the intimate grabbers tend to hire seasonal labour 
to sow, plant, weed, fertilize, and log, just as the big companies do. An 
illustration of this is given by a villager I interviewed in 2015. He con-
tracted 500 mu of forestland from his own collective and I asked him 
whether he was able to manage such a large-scale plantation. “If (you) have 
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money,” he replied, “it does not matter how many hectares (you cultivate). 
Work can be done by hired people” (Field notes, 13 Apr 2015). 
As for employed labour, foreign companies prefer local wage workers, 
as explained by an employee of a foreign company: 
The wage of the local workers is higher. But the majority of the employed 
are local...(because), considering the costs of transport and discontinuity, the 
total cost of (employing) outsiders is higher. When it rains, the boarding 
costs will be 50-60 Yuan per day per capita. If the rain lasts long, the project 
will stop (Field notes, 19 March 2016). 
Some intimate land grabbers prefer migrant workers. Intimate grab-
bers, due to the smaller scale of their ITPs, are less concerned about con-
tinuity, but more about pure wage costs, as explained by a villager who 
owned 300 mu of ITPs: 
Normally (I employ workers) from Yunnan and Guizhou Province. These 
migrant workers work harder, and they are cheaper. There is one leader of 
these migrants from Yunnan. He talks with the bosses (the investors), and 
then goes back to bring a group of migrants. He will also earn some money 
from this. We call him the broker. It is more secure (for us) to employ 
through him. And (we) only need to pay him. (Field notes, 13 April 2015). 
Surprisingly, individual villager-dominated land investments at times 
create even fewer job opportunities for the local population than foreign 
company dominated ones. These villagers act in line with their own inter-
ests, which are based on their class relations (i.e. relations with the means 
of production). 
Moreover, intimate land grabbing is not necessarily more environmen-
tally-friendly, but is sometimes observed to have serious negative impacts 
on the local environment in Guangxi. This is mainly because of a few in-
timate land grabbers’ intensive production practices. During cultivation, 
some local individual investors stated that they use chemical inputs inten-
sively, as “chemical fertilizers work efficiently and are simple (to use)” 
(Field notes, 11 March 2016) and “without chemical fertilizers, (trees) do 
not grow well” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). With intensive use of chemical 
inputs, these investors are able to log in three or four years, when foreign 
companies usually take six years or even longer to harvest.12 Additionally, 
some intimate grabbers plant trees more densely compared to their foreign 
counterparts, as admitted by a local grabber (Field notes, 20 March 2015).  
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Figure 5.3 Eucalyptus trees planted by an “intimate land grabber” (top 
photo) and by Stora Enso (bottom photo) 
 
 
Source: The photos were taken on 20 March 2015 in Guangxi 
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Thus, sometimes, according to local affected villagers, one may easily 
differentiate trees planted by intimate land grabbers from those planted by 
foreign companies, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
This difference is linked with the distinct public attention given to each 
type of investor. Compared with big companies, especially foreign ones, 
individual investors are much less exposed to the public. They do not need 
to follow strict ecological standards or receive environmental assessments 
from international NGOs as their foreign counterparts do. Thus, they are 
able to cultivate the trees in a more profitable way as mentioned above, 
despite the fact that this might sometimes bring more significant environ-
mental destruction. 
Therefore, the impact of intimate land grabbers is not less, but at times 
more significant than that of foreign grabbers. Once intimate land grab-
bers have acquired the land, their fellow villagers, dispossessed of the col-
lectively-own land that they originally used or could potentially use, are 
rarely employed on the ITPs. Furthermore, due to a few individual inves-
tors’ intensive production practices, their neighbours have to deal with 
more serious adverse impacts on the local ecology, which in turn increas-
ingly affects their agro-production and their corresponding income from 
it. 
5.4.2 Changes in land-use 
Another choice for a large group of villagers is to change land-use in order 
to plant eucalyptus trees. In contrast to the previous group, these villagers 
did not lease or enclose extra land, but just worked on land plots already 
distributed to them during the HRS. Thus, these villagers maintained their 
petty commodity production, enhancing their resilience through their in-
volvement in the ITP sector. Of those villagers who changed land-use, 
some made the decision based on personal considerations. One villager in 
Wuming County explained that: “Planting eucalyptus trees needs less la-
bour inputs. (I) can go outside (to do migrant work) immediately after 
cultivating” (Field notes, 13 April 2016). 
For others, their decision to plant eucalyptus trees was the result of 
“following the crowd’’. This is because, on the one hand, under the land 
system in rural China, villagers’ land plots are adjacent to each other.13 
Because of the negative impact of eucalyptus trees on the other crops 
planted nearby, villagers sometimes have to plant the trees when the neigh-
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bouring plots are occupied by eucalyptus. On the other hand, villagers be-
lieve that following their fellow villagers can reduce risks and avoid the 
possible destruction and theft of their products by other villagers. The 
latter point is also a consideration for other land-use changes. During my 
interview with one villager in M village whose family has four members 
working in cities, he described such a calculation process clearly: 
(But), it is not you yourself who plant the whole patch. The other people 
(neighbouring villagers) all plant sugarcane. You want to plant other (crops) 
like fruit trees but it does not work. Your (land plot) is caught in the middle. 
You can plant other crops but you should consider that when your trees 
bear fruit, you have to guard (them). Once the trees are matured, (because) 
majority of villagers do not have fruit trees, they will pick and eat (the fruit 
from your trees). As for eucalyptus trees, other people will oppose you. For 
example, you have 2 mu of (land) in the middle of other plots… (So), if you 
plant eucalyptus trees, even if other villagers do not speak out (complain), 
they will still feel uncomfortable. The trees are planted on your land, but 
even if they are (planted) 2 metres from (the sugarcane planted nearby), the 
harvest of nearby land plots will still be affected”. (Field notes, 16 February 
2016). 
Similarly, another villager told me: “The land plots are too tiny. If the 
neighbouring land plots do not plant (the same crop), (I) will not have a 
harvest” (Field notes, 17 February 2016). But he also added: “now (I) have 
to plant the same crop as others. It is not possible to be different. (Because 
I) do not have technology. If (I) have never cultivated the crop before, (I) 
do not dare to plant it. Without knowledge, (I) cannot plant crops just 
according to my will” (Field notes, 17 February 2016). So as they say them-
selves, although personal gain is still the focus of villagers’ consideration, 
some of them, especially those that have alternative livelihood sources, 
include collective benefits into their calculation. 
During their cultivation of eucalyptus trees, these small-scale producers 
usually make extensive use of chemical inputs. Most villagers believe that 
the more chemical fertilizers they use, the better and quicker (three or four 
years instead of five years) they will be able to harvest. As pointed out by 
villagers in Guangxi, “Whether to harvest or not depends on water. But 
whether the harvest is big or small depends on the fertilizer” (Field notes, 
21 February 2016). In this sense, their production is not eco-friendly. 
Will these smallholders go bankrupt as a result of competition with 
their large-scale counterparts as was the case in Ukraine (Mamonova 
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2015)? In the case of Guangxi, the answer is no. Indeed, when competing 
with large-scale counterparts, small-scale independent planters in Guangxi 
are not in a disadvantageous position. This is mainly because of (i) the 
diversification of villagers’ livelihoods, (ii) villagers’ flexible strategy of 
production and circulation, and (iii) the social and institutional context in 
rural China. 
Firstly, most Chinese villagers have highly diverse livelihood sources, 
both from farm and off-farm sectors. Even if only considering the farming 
sector, most villagers in Guangxi are observed to plant more than one 
crop. In other words, among independent planters, due to the long growth 
cycle of trees very few only plant eucalyptus trees. Because villagers need 
a yearly income to cover their daily expenses, they usually plant eucalyptus 
trees and supplement this with other economic crops which they harvest 
yearly (e.g. sugarcane), even when the price of eucalyptus trees is much 
higher. As explained by a villager: 
I do not have a salary. Planting sugarcane can bring income every year. (Vil-
lagers) usually follow ‘one short and two long’ (it refers to the cultivation of 
one type of crop with a short growth cycle and two kinds of crops with a 
long growth cycle)… I planted 3 mu of eucalyptus trees. It has been two 
years. (The eucalyptus trees) are my pension when I grow old. Then I can 
enjoy my twilight years. (Field notes, 19 February 2016). 
This means villagers are sometimes more resilient than large-scale, spe-
cialized investors (particularly those for whom the ITP sector is their sole 
business) as their risks are distributed. When big companies face a big loss 
under a slump in the eucalyptus market, villagers can still survive and can 
benefit from other crops. 
Secondly, villagers have more flexible strategies in terms of production 
and circulation, which is partly due to the particular features of the ITP 
sector and partly due to the market condition. Specifically, planting euca-
lyptus trees does not necessarily require high technological and machinery 
inputs. Especially on hilly and rocky forestland plots, machines are almost 
useless during the production and logging process. In this sense, villagers 
who can (at least partly) exploit their household labour have a comparable 
advantage over capitalist investors who face extra costs hiring in labour. 
Also, in contrast to big companies who have strict plans in relation to 
production and logging, villagers usually adopt more flexible strategies. 
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Take villagers’ choice on the timing of logging as an example: when villag-
ers are in need of money, even though sometimes the trees are not ready 
to be logged, villagers may choose to sell their trees. As explained by a 
villager who sold trees when the trees were still quite small, “(My house-
hold) sold the trees to return the loans (from the bank to build a house). 
The interest rate is too high”, (Field notes, 18 February 2016). 
In contrast, when villagers are able to cover their expenses, they can 
wait for their trees to grow stronger and get a wider diameter (which can 
be sold at a better price), and wait for a higher market price for timber. 
One example is a villager I interviewed in Xiangzhou County who planted 
7 mu of eucalyptus trees and had still not logged them after 6 years of 
cultivation (Field notes, 16 February 2016). 
Villager: The price of the tree was originally (at the beginning of 2016) 600 
Yuan (per tonne). In July, (the price) dropped to around 400 Yuan. For each 
tonne, (the price) of the tree decreased 200 Yuan. The market is ruthless. 
Me: So is that the reason that you have not sold your trees, although they 
have grown for 6 years and are ready for logging? 
Villager: Yes! I am waiting for the price (to increase). 
So some villagers sell the trees when they have only been growing for 
three years, while some do not sell their trees even though they were 
planted more than six years ago. In this sense, the trees are treated as a 
saving, similar to a deposit in the bank: one spends time and money to 
invest in the trees (e.g. planting, weeding, and fertilizing), and one can 
withdraw the money after several years when the trees are ready to be 
logged. One can also get the money back before the set date when one 
encounters an emergency, but might lose some money. 
As for the sales of the outputs of the ITPs, villagers are not in an un-
favourable position. This is because the market in Guangxi for eucalyptus 
outputs is not held by a monopoly controlled by a few companies but 
involves diverse purchasers, ranging from middlemen, various sized tim-
ber processing mills, and paper-pulp companies. In other words, villagers 
can freely sell their products to whomever provides the highest price in a 
relatively competitive market. 
During my fieldwork in Guangxi in 2016, 37 villagers sold their euca-
lyptus trees. Among them, 10 chose to directly sell the outputs to compa-
nies through which they could get a better price, thus making the sale 
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“worthwhile” (Field notes, 16 February 2016). Meanwhile, the others (27 
villagers) chose to sell their products to middlemen. They believed it 
would cost them more energy and money to get a cutting licence from the 
state, to log the trees and to transport them to the companies, especially 
in cases in which the scale of the plantation was relatively small. 
Thirdly, due to the institutional and social structure in rural China, 
these small-scale producers are not in a marginalized position as is the case 
of villagers in other regions of the world. Villagers have been allocated 
land, albeit tiny and fragmented, and are offered a series of distinct subsi-
dies. And in some villages, if they cultivate eucalyptus trees they are pro-
vided with reforestation subsidies and free seedlings from the local gov-
ernment. Furthermore, compared with big corporations such as state-own 
farms and foreign companies, villagers are loosely monitored and con-
trolled. Although this is partly due to the difficulties of monitoring and 
managing nebulous individual behaviour, it is also because sometimes the 
Chinese state deliberately carries out less severe control in order to ensure 
social stability. Thus, villagers are sometimes able to plant eucalyptus trees 
on farmland despite policies issued by the provincial state that forbid this. 
5.4.3 “Stepping out” 
There is also a group of villagers who decided not to engage in the ex-
panding ITP sector. This decision was based on their specific interests 
rather than on passive acceptance. Adapted from Ian Scoones (2012, 515), 
“stepping out” in this study refers to the strategy of diversifying away from 
the ITP sector. After making calculations based on their specific situation, 
some of these villagers choose to plant other cash crops (e.g. sugarcane or 
fruit trees), as explained by a villager: 
In the countryside, the price of eucalyptus trees is not stable. (The trees) 
need 3, 4, and even 5 years to generate income, while sugarcane can generate 
income within one year. As for fruit trees, when the trees start to bear fruit 
after growing for three years, (the products) of one year can bring profit for 
three years. And the trees can bear fruit every year after that. (Field notes, 
17 February 2016). 
Some prefer off-farm work, as is shown by the case of one villager I 
interviewed in Xiangzhou County in Guangxi who is involved in the trans-
portation business and already has two cars: 
Farming is just to get enough food to eat. My household does not have 
much land, just a small patch. If we plant eucalyptus trees, the trees will 
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shade our neighbour’s crops. Neighbours who plant sugarcane will curse us, 
and would not agree with our cultivation of eucalyptus trees. And, farming 
makes much less money than work (refers to non-farm jobs). Working for 
one day you can earn enough to buy two bags of rice. (Field notes, 23 Feb-
ruary 2016). 
Some of the villagers who stepped out had planted eucalyptus trees 
previously. In a village I visited in Fusui County of Guangxi in 2015, one 
villager started to plant eucalyptus trees in 2012 on the 7 mu farmland 
allocated to his household during the HRS reform. But in the summer of 
2014, the trees he planted were blown down by a typhoon. He sold these 
immature trees as firewood at the price of 280-300 Yuan/tonne, which is 
less than half of the price of mature eucalyptus trees at that time.14 Due to 
the high risks of planting eucalyptus trees and the subsidies provided by a 
sugar company for the purchase of seedlings, fertilizes and the plastic pro-
tective covers, his family decided to stop planting eucalyptus trees and 
convert their 7 mu eucalyptus tree plantation into sugarcane production, 
as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4 A land plot tilled to change land-use from eucalyptus trees to 
sugarcane 
 
Source: The photo was taken on 7 March 2015 in Guangxi 
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By making their own complicated calculations, the villagers described 
above decided to step out from the ITP sector. In the first case, the villager 
compared the possible benefits of different cash crops and concluded that 
eucalyptus trees were less economically attractive.15 In the second case, the 
villager saw the negative impacts of eucalyptus trees on his neighbours’ 
livelihoods. He later mentioned that the choice was also partly the result 
of his calculation of his own personal gain from farming and non-farm 
work. Similarly, in the third case, the villager considered the risk of plant-
ing eucalyptus trees and the additional subsidies for sugarcane before de-
ciding what to do with this land, thus also making a decision based on 
personal interest. 
However, not all the villagers were able to step out. In most cases, those 
who stepped out had better livelihood alternatives. Those who chose to 
plant other cash crops needed to have sufficient material resources (e.g. 
land and financial capital). Those who preferred off-farm jobs had to have 
access to employment opportunities in off-farm sectors. 
Therefore, under the specific institutional settings, the villagers in 
Guangxi have, albeit unequal, access to livelihoods resources (including 
land, labour, social and/or financial resources). In the context of the ITP 
sector, and based on the resources they have, they are able to make distinct 
livelihoods choices instead of passively waiting to be fully dispossessed. 
As a result, villagers do not necessarily lose their livelihoods. On the con-
trary, those who have privileged access to resources are even able to im-
prove their well-being. 
However, as Zoomers (1999) reminds us, these livelihood strategies are 
never static, but will change with time. So, when the internal conditions 
(e.g. demographic) and external factors (e.g. price of the crop) shift, the 
villagers in question might make different choices regarding to the ITP 
sector, leading to distinct livelihood changes. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed villagers’ livelihood changes within the context 
of the expansion of the ITP sector in Guangxi. It argues that villagers are 
not always deprived of their livelihoods within a crop boom, but might be 
able to maintain and even expand their livelihoods under certain institu-
tional settings. 
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Frist, under the specific institutions in rural China, there are multiple 
schemes of eucalyptus cultivation involving both large-scale land acquisi-
tions by big investors and small-scale changes in land-use (and sometimes 
in land control) by smallholders. In rural China, farmland plots were allo-
cated to rural households during the HRS reform and are usually tiny and 
fragmented. Forestland generally remained collectively-owned and undis-
tributed before the crop boom and is relatively large-scale and contiguous. 
Thus, due to the transaction and production costs and risks, large-scale 
eucalyptus plantation owners (particularly big companies) prefer to acquire 
forestland or to deal with grower contracts rather than directly expel vil-
lagers from their fragmented farmland plots. This means that the Chinese 
rural land system enables investors to acquire massive amounts of cheap 
land without completely displacing villagers, thus to have cheap labour at the 
same time. So, due to investors’ interests, villagers’ access to recourses and 
livelihoods might not be destroyed. 
Second, again due to these Chinese rural institutions, many, but by no 
means all, villagers have access to several farmland plots or/and off-farm 
work opportunities. Because of these resources (e.g. land and/or financial 
resources), these villagers are not in an extremely vulnerable position, as 
was the case in some other regions where there was a crop boom. Instead, 
these villagers have autonomy and capacity to make their own livelihood 
choices (either to engage in or ‘step out’ of the sector): some become large-
scale tree plantation owners; some maintain their land control, with resili-
ence enhanced through involving the eucalyptus tree sector; and some 
others have access to better livelihoods. In this sense, the boom might be 
lucrative for a few villagers. This reminds us that instead of over-focusing 
on exploring what and how much has been taken away, it is equally im-
portant to have a look at what and how much is left in analyses of land grab-
bing and crop booms. 
In sum, villagers’ livelihood changes are closely linked to certain insti-
tutional settings, particularly the specific land system and labour condi-
tions. These settings are associated with what villagers have and what can 
be left to villagers with the rise of the ITP sector, and continuously 
(re)shape villagers’ livelihood choices and the corresponding outcomes. 
Without an alternative income source from internal migration and access 
to information, villagers are not able to gain access to extra land if they 
plan to invest in the ITP sector. Meanwhile, without access to land under 
the land distribution reform (HRS reform), a group of villagers is not able 
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to change their land-use and become independent growers if they want to 
become engaged in the crop boom. Also, without access to better alterna-
tive livelihoods, these villagers are not able to make an active choice to be 
excluded from the sector and might already have been significantly dis-
possessed by the rise of the ITP sector. 
In addition, there is a high level of differentiation among villagers. Vil-
lagers have distinct resource endowments, including land control, labour 
conditions, financial resources, and social relations. Based on these, some 
villagers are able to adapt and find their own niche within the rise of the 
ITP sector, similarly to what villagers in the Ukraine did (Mamonova 
2015). Moreover, in some cases, villagers had already been differentiated 
and spilt into distinct social classes due to their different relationship with 
the means of production. As illustrated in the case of highlanders in Indo-
nesia, “[i]nitial landownership was unequal and over time, efficient farmers 
were able to accumulate land and capital and pay workers to expand their 
farms and profits” (Li 2014, 7). With the crop boom, such social differen-
tiation was further deepened. While some villagers accumulate land con-
trol and become better-off, other villagers, especially the marginalized, be-
come more vulnerable. Situated in different positions along the value 
chain, villagers have different political reactions towards the rise of the 
ITP sector, something which will be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Notes 
1 As in the rise of the eucalyptus sector in Brazil (Kröger 2012) and in Ecuador 
(Gerber and Veuthey 2010). 
2 Although a few villagers might be dispossessed and become more vulnerable in 
the crop boom. 
3 Although some of the livelihood choices/behaviours might be unintentional and 
unconscious under certain structural components, as pointed out by De Haan and 
Zoomers(2005). 
4 Described as ‘paying enough to the state, saving enough for the collective and all 
that’s left is ours’(Ye 2015, 320). 
5 A similar role of migrant work and remittances is also observed in other countries, 
for example Zimbabwe (Ncube and Gómez 2011). 
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6 Although some villagers previously earned part of their income from forestland 
and thus lost a part of livelihood source as mentioned above. 
7 But it does not mean their livelihoods are not affected at all as the eucalyptus tree 
crop has high demand on water and nutrients (Kröger 2014, Calder 2003). Alt-
hough the actual effects might vary under different local conditions (McMaster and 
Bond 2008), during my fieldwork, the villagers in Guangxi complained about the 
sector’s negative impact on local hydrological and soil cycles. The cultivation of 
eucalyptus trees thus tends to affect the ecological environment of neighbouring 
land plots (e.g. hydrological, nutrition and sunshine conditions), which then affect 
a few villagers’ farming. 
8 Brokers are those who purchase trees from other planters, harvest them, and then 
trade the outputs. 
9 See Tongxin. 2016. The Real Exploration of the ‘Plantation-Pulp-Paper integration’ 林浆
纸 一 体 化 探 索  2015, accessed on 21 June 2016, Available from 
http://www.yicai.com/news/4730287.html. 
10 Data from an official reply from Stora Enso online, http://www.bei-
hai365.com/bbs/m/iphonetest/read.php?tid=3443840&onlylz=1, accessed on 
25 April 2016; and Sustainability Report. In Stora Enso’s Annual Report 2015: p 47. 
11 According to their culture, people will burn spiritual money when they visit an-
cestors’ graves on the hills in Qingming Festive. 
12 Data about the harvest time of these local individual investors is from interviews 
with a few investors during my fieldwork in 2015 and 2016. Data about foreign 
companies’ harvest time are mentioned in interviews both with employees from 
foreign companies and with workers in a state-owned farm (Field notes, 3, 19 
March 2015, and 29 March 2017). 
13 The big patch has been separated and distributed to different households within 
the village. 
14 According to my fieldwork in Guangxi in 2015, the price of eucalyptus trees can 
be as high as 400-800 Yuan/ ton. 
15 In line with the arguments of Hairong, Yiyuan, and Bun (2016, 381) in their 
analysis of a land use change from soy to maize in northeast China, we should 
notice that villagers’ crop choice - associated with the price difference between 
sugarcane and eucalyptus – is not solely economic and personal. As has been ana-
lysed in Chapter 3, the state also plays a vital role due to the Chinese state’s strategic 
control of the price of certain crops (including sugarcane), but not other crops (e. 
g. eucalyptus trees). 
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6 
6 Chapter 6: The politics of inclusion 
and exclusion in the emerging 
industrial tree plantation sector in 
China1 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Within the expansion of the ITP sector, those villagers in Guangxi who 
were affected have reacted to such changes in various and complicated 
ways: some of the villagers got incorporated into the ITP sector, while 
others are excluded; some embraced the change, while others had com-
plaints; and some of the complaints remained latent, while others devel-
oped into (overt or covert) forms of resistance. The key questions that 
arise are: how do affected villagers respond differently to the rise of the 
ITP sector, and what are the respective political-economic reasons behind 
this? 
Recent literature provides a rich analysis of the complicated trajectories 
of political reactions from below to land deals. In the literature, diverse 
forms of villagers’ resistance are discussed, ranging from individual covert 
forms of everyday resistance (Moreda 2015), individual overt “rightful re-
sistance” (O'Brien et al. 2006), and collective overt movements (Edelman 
1999, Martiniello 2015), to more mixed and dynamic forms (McAllister 
2015, Alonso-Fradejas 2015). In some cases, villagers sought different al-
liances during their resistance, with state actors or with elites (Gingembre 
2015), indigenous people (Brent 2015), and various NGOs (Rocheleau 
2015). In some cases, instead of resisting, villagers chose to adapt 
(Mamonova 2015) or even welcome the changes in land-use and land con-
trol (Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015, Franco, Carranza, and 
Fernandez 2011). However, within existing literature on political reactions 
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to land-use and land control changes, there are still three gaps that (build-
ing on Hall et al. 2015 and Borras and Franco 2013), must be fully ex-
plored. 
Firstly, recent literature is overly focused on villagers’ resistance to cor-
porations or the state, while intra- or inter-community conflicts along a 
“poor people versus poor people” axis have received less attention (Borras 
and Franco 2013, Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 2013, Hall et al. 2015), 
despite their prevalence.2 In the case of Guangxi, villagers sometimes fight 
with each over unequally distributed “goods” (benefits) and “bads” (neg-
ative impacts). In other words, when faced with the expansion of the ITP 
sector, villagers not only resist, but are also resisted against. 
Secondly, most studies on land politics are overly centred on villagers’ 
struggles around land access (e.g. against expulsion from land). Other trig-
gers for political reactions from below during land-based changes, how-
ever, have not received significant attention.3 In reality, triggers to villag-
ers’ resistance are highly diverse. Take the case of Guangxi as an example: 
a lot of the political reactions initiated by the villagers are not directly re-
lated to land control, but caused by low land rent or the negative impacts 
of the ITP sector on soil and water. 
Thirdly, contemporary literature tends to focus mostly on the struggles 
of villagers (excluded from the land deals and/or the emerging enter-
prises), while the struggles of those who have been included in the emerging 
enterprises are rarely studied in any systematic way.4 In Guangxi, villagers 
who are included in the ITP complex, especially in subordinate positions, 
have taken action to improve the terms of their incorporation, while some 
of the excluded villagers are indifferent to the rise of the ITP sector. 
This set of literature misses part of the contours and trajectories of 
political reactions from below. As highlighted by Borras and Franco (2013, 
1724) and Hall et al. (2015), villagers are not a homogeneous group. They 
have distinct resource endowments (e.g. land control, labour conditions, 
financial resources and social relations) and are embedded in certain polit-
ical-economic environments. Partly as a consequence of this, they are af-
fected differently, causing them to have distinct interests. 
In regard to villagers’ inclusion and exclusion, Hall et al. (2011, 15) 
identified four powers that shape the process of exclusion, mainly around 
land access, namely, “regulation, the market, force and legitimacy”. How-
ever, the conflicts are not always focused on land ownership and control. 
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On the one hand, land access is not automatically and necessarily always 
empowering for villagers. In the case of soybean expansion in Bolivia, vil-
lagers who maintain their land access might still be vulnerable and are 
squeezed out by the market because they lack access to financial capital 
and technology. McKay and Colque (2016) call this “productive exclu-
sion”. On the other hand, when villagers have profitable alternative 
sources of livelihood, land access or ITP inclusion is not their primary 
concern. In Guangxi, some villagers actively chose not to expand their 
land control and engage in the ITP sector, even when they had the re-
sources to do so. For a better understanding of villagers’ inclusion/ exclu-
sion, the analysis should not be limited to land access, but should also 
focus on their positions within the broader “dynamics of change in social 
relations” (Borras and Franco 2013, 1741). 
Borras and Franco (2013) cautioned that the simple “exclusion versus 
inclusion” dichotomy cannot capture diverse (win/lose) outcomes for vil-
lagers and their varying political reactions. On the one hand, villagers who 
are excluded do not necessarily lose out during the process. Rather, under 
certain conditions, “exclusion and separation can be valid strategies for 
the poor” (Du Toit 2004, 1004). On the other hand, villagers who are 
adversely incorporated might be left in a more vulnerable position (Du 
Toit 2004, McCarthy 2010). Villagers who are excluded do not necessarily 
have grievances about changes in land-use and land control. Villagers who 
got incorporated might resist the terms of their incorporation. This com-
plexity requires a broader exploration of the politics of inclusion/exclu-
sion. 
When villagers engage in political reactions, they follow diverse trajec-
tories involving different aims and actors. Some villager resistance can be 
seen as a “struggle[s] against expulsion”, while some is “struggle[s] for, and 
within incorporation” (Borras and Franco 2013, 1731). Some is against 
cooperate actors or state actors, while some is against other “poor people” 
(Borras and Franco 2013, 1730). Thus, villagers’ struggles should be un-
derstood in a relational and dynamic way, considering villagers’ distinct 
demands during changes in land-use and land control. 
Based on the above discussion, this chapter analyses the dynamics of 
villagers’ different political reactions. It focuses particularly on the varying 
and/or competing interests among villagers based on their various link-
ages with the sector (namely, passive or active inclusion, and active or pas-
sive exclusion), and related gains and losses during the changes. By doing 
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this, this chapter does not intend to argue that the agency and dynamics 
of conflicts over the expansion of ITPs in Guangxi are different from or 
similar to those that occurred in other countries, or to generalize the trig-
gers, mechanisms, and outcomes of resistance from below. This chapter 
hopes to offer some insights into the divergence of affected villagers 
within a crop boom, and calls for a rethinking of the nature of rural poli-
tics. 
This chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I discuss the 
framing of villagers’ inclusion and exclusion. In section three, I provide a 
more comprehensive typology of villagers’ inclusion and exclusion in the 
ITP sector. Based on this typology, I then analyse villagers’ distinct atti-
tudes towards the rise of the ITP sector and their corresponding political 
reactions. Finally, I highlight four points that are key to understanding the 
trajectory of political reactions from below. 
 
6.2 Rethinking the dichotomy of villagers’ inclusion and 
exclusion 
With the expansion of the ITP sector in Guangxi, some of the villagers 
became incorporated when they started to plant eucalyptus trees on their 
land. Some of the villagers were excluded, in line with the observations by 
Hall et al. (2011, 13) who pointed out that “the inclusion of some land 
uses, and some land users, necessarily means the exclusion of others”. 
In this chapter, in line with the definition of ‘exclusion’ by Hall et al. 
(2011, 7), exclusion from the ITP sector refers to the situation of some 
villagers not able to benefit from planting eucalyptus trees in rural 
Guangxi. In this sense, villagers who are excluded are those who do not 
plant eucalyptus trees, either because they do not have access to the land 
and capital required, or because they do not have any interest in planting 
eucalyptus trees due to their access to other profitable alternatives.5 Thus 
it is clear that villagers who are excluded from the ITP sector do not nec-
essarily lose. As one villager I interviewed in Xiangzhou County who is 
involved in a transportation business described: “[our household] does not 
plant eucalyptus trees. [Because] it is very hard work to farm [the trees], 
and it does not bring in money” (Field notes, 23 February 2016). In com-
parison, villagers who are included are those who can directly benefit from 
the ITP sector, including the owners of large-scale ITPs, independent 
planters, shareholders, planation workers, and landlords. In some cases, 
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although the villagers can get income from the ITP sector via land rent or 
employment, such small benefits cannot compensate for their losses.6 
The mismatch between engagement with a crop boom and the eco-
nomic outcome (i.e. to gain or to lose) can also be shown quantitatively. 
As shown in Table 6.1, among the 104 villagers I interviewed in Guangxi, 
80 villagers are included in the ITP sector, leaving the other 24 villagers 
excluded from the sector. Those who are included give a slightly higher 
evaluation than the excluded (3.04 versus 2.67) of the economic value of 
planting eucalyptus trees. However, the difference between these two 
groups is not significant.7 In other words, based on their own experience, 
the included and excluded villagers do not show much difference in their 
attitudes to the economic value of the ITP sector. Therefore, the eco-
nomic gains and losses between these two groups are not the same. 
Table 6.1 Villagers’ attitudes towards the economic value of the ITP sector 
 
N Means Sig 
Inclusion 80 3,04 0,77 
Exclusion 24 2,67 
Source: Interviews in March to April 2016 in Guangxi; 1= very low economic value, 5=very high 
economic value.8 
 
This complicated phenomenon reminds us to go beyond the simple 
dichotomy of “exclusion versus inclusion”. Instead, to understand villag-
ers’ actual position within the value chain, attention should be paid to (i) 
the terms of inclusion and (ii) access to alternative livelihood opportuni-
ties. 
For those who are included, the terms and conditions of the inclusion, 
especially villagers’ vertical and horizontal links within the value chain, can 
lead to completely divergent outcomes (Du Toit 2004). When linked ver-
tically, villagers’ autonomy and capacity are related to their access to di-
verse resources (e.g. land, labour, financial, and social resources) and the 
degree of dependency on upstream (e.g. agricultural input companies) and 
downstream (e.g. processing mills, retailers) actors. When villagers control 
abundant resources (including both material and social resources), or even 
engage with the upstream or downstream sector at the same time (e.g. 
selling seedlings, processing or trading timber), they have more bargaining 
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power, and presumably are able to benefit more than their counterparts, 
as is the case with “intimate exclusions” (Hall 2011, 844). When villagers 
control limited means of production, or are constrained by monopolized 
channels of access to agricultural inputs and sale of products, they are very 
likely to be adversely incorporated. This means they are squeezed by both 
the upstream and downstream market, and have limited or no control over 
the processes of production and output, as seen in the case of “productive 
exclusion” in Bolivia (McKay and Colque 2016). Underlying the above 
scenario, villagers are sometimes left more vulnerable than they were be-
fore their enrolment into the scheme (McCarthy 2010a). 
Horizontally, villagers’ capacity to survive or compete with large cor-
porations in the market is also directly linked to their differentiation. Such 
capacity is not only determined by villagers’ agency per se, but is also influ-
enced by state intervention. When the state particularly favours large-scale 
investors, smallholders might become vulnerable and easily go bankrupt, 
as was the case in the Ukraine (Mamonova 2015).9 When the state sup-
ports smallholders, some villagers might be able to prosper, as demon-
strated in the case of Vietnam (Sikor 2012). In China, Zhang (2012, 474) 
found that, “strong state support for agriculture and for market develop-
ment has created competing paths of agrarian transition based on inde-
pendent household commodity production”. 
Another key issue relevant to both excluded and included villagers is 
whether they have access to alternative livelihood sources. In some coun-
tries, villagers’ livelihoods are highly diverse, ranging from farm work to 
non-farm jobs. For those who have better alternatives, their exclusion 
from a crop boom does not lead to any loss. This is particularly true in 
China, where farmland is distributed according to the size of each house-
hold. Considering the huge rural population in China, villagers’ landhold-
ings are usually tiny and fragmented, and bring little (but relatively equal) 
agricultural income. In this sense, “the primary source of rural inequality 
is access to non-farm incomes” (Zhang 2012, 469). This is similar to what 
was indicated by Chen Xiwen, the Deputy Chief of Office of the Central 
Rural Work Leading Group (CPC): “If only farming 6 or 7 mu land for 
food production, the annual income is almost equal to the wage obtained 
in one month for doing migrant work in the urban area” (Guo and Tong 
2015). 
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6.3 Villagers’ positions within the expansion of the ITP 
sector 
For a better understanding of how the expansion of the ITP sector im-
pacts different villagers and their responses, this chapter provides a more 
complex typology of inclusion and exclusion, which covers “active inclu-
sion”, “passive inclusion”, “active exclusion”, and “passive exclusion” (see 
Figure 6.1). Within this typology, villagers’ control over the means of pro-
duction, the production process and outputs, and their access to alterna-
tive livelihood sources are also taken into consideration. In my typology, 
I consider villagers with limited/no control and limited/no access to al-
ternative sources of income as “passive” (Type B and Type C, respec-
tively). When villagers have sufficient control over the means of produc-
tion, the production process and outputs, and even gain control over 
upstream and/or downstream businesses in a few cases, their inclusion is 
what I consider here as “active” (Type A). For those who control enough 
means of production and/or have access to alternative sources of income, 
their exclusion is an active choice (Type D). 
Figure 6.1 Typology of villagers’ positions 
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6.3.1 Active inclusion 
Faced with the rapid expansion of the ITP sector, some villagers seized 
the opportunity and became incorporated. This group of villagers is lo-
cated in a relatively advantageous position within the value chain, because 
(1) they usually have control over sufficient means of production and (at 
least part of) the production process, and (2) some of them even get in-
volved in upstream and downstream business. 
In terms of the means of production, due to favourable geographic 
conditions, customary occupation, and individual land leasing, some 
households in rural Guangxi control more land resources. Firstly, due to 
various land resource endowments among villages in terms of quantity and 
quality, under the HRS reform land (mainly farmland) distribution is rela-
tively equal within the village,10 but unequal between villages. Thus, in 
some villages, there is more land available to be allocated to villagers. Sec-
ondly, except for the distribution based on the size of households, there 
are also informal distributions based on customary arrangements, mainly 
for the undistributed forestland. Thus, those households with abundant 
labour and money, sometimes even with particular social capital (e.g. being 
village cadres), were able to get access to more land. Thirdly, motivated by 
the rise of the ITP sector, some villagers leased large-scale forestland from 
their own or nearby villages with the financial and/or social capital they 
possessed. One villager in Wuming County, who contracted 30 mu of land 
from his own village collective, explained: “When the Gaofeng state-
owned farm came (to lease forestland in my village), some villagers and I 
also asked to contract (forestland) for the same terms (30 years) and same 
rent (6 Yuan per mu per year)” (Field notes, 18 March 2016). 
Among these land-abundant villagers, some started to plant eucalyptus 
trees independently. These villagers were able to control the whole process 
of production and the sale of outputs. They decide whether to employ 
labourers or use household labour for sowing, weeding, fertilizing, and 
logging; they choose how to produce eucalyptus trees, with intensive, little 
or no chemical inputs; and they make decisions on when and how to har-
vest, either to log and transport the products to the highest bidder or to 
sell the trees directly to middlemen. 
However, these independent planters are not homogeneous. The ma-
jority of them only changed part of their land plots, mostly the degraded 
forestland, into eucalyptus tree plantations. They are ITP smallholders, 
usually with a total area of less than 30 mu. Thus, although their plot is 
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relatively small, they are still able to make profit from the ITP sector, since, 
as one villager said, “it is better than leaving the land abandoned” (Field 
notes, 22 February 2016). Another villager interviewed pointed out that 
“harvesting 8- 10 mu (of eucalyptus trees) can bring a lot of income, as 
much as tens of thousands Yuan at one time” (Field notes, 13 March 
2016). For these small-scale independent planters, being included in the 
ITP sector actually diversifies their livelihoods and becomes a kind of ‘bo-
nus’. 
A few others are big holders of eucalyptus tree plantations, the “inti-
mate land grabbers” mentioned in Chapter 5. According to data obtained 
during my fieldwork in Guangxi, they have much larger ITPs, reaching as 
much as 500 mu, compared with the smallholders mentioned above. Cor-
respondingly, their investment in the ITP sector is much more intensive, 
which means more potential profits as well as higher risks (especially in 
the coastal region of Guangxi where there are frequent typhoons in the 
summer). 
In addition, as also mentioned in Chapter 5, to strengthen their active 
inclusion, some of these villagers choose to become involved in one or 
more upstream or downstream businesses in the ITP sector. These people 
are able to gain more profit by expanding their role in the value chain. 
In short, the inclusion of this group of villagers is a result of their own 
initiatives. By increasing their control over the means of production, the 
production process and outputs, they were able to gain economically un-
der the rise of the ITP sector in Guangxi. 
6.3.2 Passive inclusion 
Not all the villagers who are included in the ITP sector gain from it. There 
are some villagers who are incorporated under unfavourable terms, be-
cause (1) they control little or no means of production, and (2) they have 
little or no alternative opportunities. 
Compared with the active inclusion group, these villagers have fewer 
land resources, due to either existing geographic disadvantages or land 
control changes. Firstly, as mentioned above, in a few villages there is little 
farmland and little or no forestland available for distribution. Secondly, in 
some of the villages with abundant forestland, this land was already occu-
pied by or contracted to other investors (including some individual 
villagers) as already discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, leaving little or no 
forestland over for other rural dwellers. In such leasing cases, villagers 
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usually receive very little or even no land rent.11 Thirdly, some villagers 
were not originally short of land, but, because of financial difficulties, 
transferred (part of) the plots they controlled to investors, either through 
cooperation or leasing, mainly in the ITP sector.12 They usually have little 
bargaining power during such land control changes. 
Little control over the means of production does not necessarily lead 
to losses for villagers. Another key issue is that these villagers have no 
better alternatives, including off-farm work opportunities. In rural China, 
“households with off-farm income – either local wages or migrant remit-
tances – tend to be better off” (Murphy 2002, 72). A similar comment 
from a villager in Guangxi highlights this situation as follows: 
If a household does not have anyone to be a migrant worker and earn 
money, the income from farming only is almost nothing to cover the living 
expenses of the whole family. If a villager does not go to work outside and 
depends only on farming, (he /she) may not be able to support his/her child 
to go to school. Working outside can get you 200 Yuan per day. How much 
can one earn from farming? (Field notes, 16 February 2016). 
However, not everyone has the opportunity to do migrant work to earn 
extra money to support their family, especially considering the high cost 
of living in urban areas. Therefore, this group of villagers engages in the 
ITP sector in various ways, but always in subordinate positions. 
Some villagers supply the land they control for eucalyptus tree cultiva-
tion, while other investors (either individuals, state-owned enterprises, do-
mestic private companies, or international corporations) cover the ex-
penses needed for seedlings, chemical inputs, and labour. As a result, these 
villagers still get a negotiated share of the benefits,13 and they lose part of 
their control over the production process and complete control over the 
outputs. Thus, they can derive much less profit from the ITP sector, and 
sometimes even have to face rent arrears. 
Also, a few villagers lease their land (usually forestland) to investors, 
even if they have already planted eucalyptus trees by themselves, in order 
to cover the shortage in family income or to avoid further investment in 
necessary infrastructure (e.g. to rebuild the road to be able to transport 
timber) (fieldwork interviews, 20 March 2015). These villagers lose control 
over at least part of their means of production in exchange for some land 
rent, which is usually rather tiny compared with the benefits of ITPs 
(which, according to fieldwork interviews, can bring in at least 1000 Yuan 
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per mu per year). A couple who leased their forestland to Sotra Enso in 
Hepu County explained that, “how much forestland can be distributed for 
(us) two? We only get some 200 Yuan per year through leasing to the 
Finnish company. What is the use of 200 Yuan now? It can only buy sev-
eral jin14 of pork, we cannot even afford one jin of seafood” (Field notes, 
20 March 2015). In this sense, their inclusion in the ITP sector brings 
hardly bring any economic gain to their household. 
Some villagers have to change some of their plots into eucalyptus cul-
tivation because of the negative ecological impact of the ITPs planted 
nearby. According to one villager in Binyang County, “there is no other 
crop that can be grown beside the eucalyptus trees…So if you plant euca-
lyptus trees, I have to also follow the same change in land-use” (Field 
notes, 30 March 2015). For them, their tiny ITPs – usually less than 1 mu 
– are too small to enable them to employ labourers to log and transport 
the limited outputs to processing millers or companies. Additionally, the 
small scale of their plot makes it difficult for them to negotiate a good 
price with the middlemen who purchase the trees. Thus, their inclusion 
does not bring more profits than their original land-use. 
Some villagers, mainly the young and strong, are incorporated into the 
ITP sector through employment opportunities provided by the investors 
who lease their collectively-owned forestland, via introductions by their 
friends or relatives. Since the ITP sector is labour-saving, villagers’ em-
ployment is usually temporal and seasonal, ranging from 4 to 90 days per 
year (Interviews, 2016). Among these workers, some are able to do rela-
tively skilled jobs (e.g. logging), which can earn them higher wages of 
around 150-200 Yuan per day. Others can only do simple jobs (e.g. weed-
ing and fertilizing), with a much lower wage of around 50-100 Yuan per 
day. For these villagers, their incorporation only brings them a bit of un-
stable income, while also leading to a lot of losses. Their losses not only 
include their exclusion from access to previously commonly-owned forest 
produce (e.g. firewood) which contributed to their income, but also the 
reduction of their agricultural yields due to the ecological impacts of 
nearby eucalyptus tree plantations. In this case, the villagers are dispos-
sessed and (partly) converted into workers but do not migrate to urban 
areas. This is similar to what Watts and Little (1994, 81) describe as the 
‘disguised proletariats’. 
525292-L-bw-Xu
Processed on: 5-11-2018 PDF page: 194
172 CHAPTER 6 
In short, these villagers are included in the ITP sector in subordinated 
positions due to their limited/lack of control over the means of produc-
tion or access to alternative opportunities. As a result, they do not benefit 
from the ITP sector and some even become more vulnerable because of 
their incorporation. 
6.3.3 Passive exclusion 
Similarly to the passive inclusion group, this group of villagers also con-
trols little means of production and has limited access to alternatives. 
However, these villagers are left in a worse situation, since they are com-
pletely excluded from the ITP sector, either due to a lack of social capital 
or illness. 
In one of the villages I visited in Guangxi, the collectively-owned land 
had been leased out to other investors to build ITPs. Most of the villagers 
did not receive rent directly. The majority of them did not have the finan-
cial or social resources to acquire forestland anywhere else to plant euca-
lyptus trees, and their allocated tiny farm plots were necessary for food 
production. Thus, with the rise of the ITP sector, villagers had no land 
available to plant eucalyptus trees. As expressed by a production team 
leader in that village: “at that time, we did not know that the price of the 
tree was so high. If we had known, we would have distributed the for-
estland to each household to plant trees by ourselves” (Field notes, 2 
March 2016). 
Without temporary work in the eucalyptus tree plantations nearby or 
access to alternative off-farm jobs, these villagers are left in a vulnerable 
situation. As one villager described, “all the land (forestland) in the village 
has been contracted. Where can I find land to cultivate? Now I just stay at 
home. No work (referring to off-farm work) can be found” (Field notes, 
3 March 2016). This resonates with what Tania Li (Li 2011) described: 
“their land is needed, but their labour is not”. 
In addition to being excluded from the ITP sector, some villagers have 
lost their original income and been negatively impacted by the ITP sector 
due to the land control and land-use changes of their collectively-owned 
land. Firstly, such land control changes tend to exclude some villagers who 
used to get some income from these plots. As mentioned in part 5.3.1, 
villagers in one village in Hepu County used to cut firewood to support 
the family’s daily expenses. After Stora Enso leased their collectively-
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owned land, they were no longer able to earn this income (Field notes, 2 
March 2016). 
Secondly, the land-use change affects nearby farms because of the sig-
nificant ecological impacts of the ITP sector. One villager interviewed ex-
plained that: “since planting eucalyptus trees, the land has almost no water. 
No springs come out. Now no matter what crops are planted, they do not 
grow” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). Similarly, affected by the high water 
demand of eucalyptus trees, all of the 25 villagers interviewed either 
stopped cultivating paddy or reduced the cultivation of paddy from two 
rounds to one round per year on their tiny farm plots (usually less than 0,1 
mu per person). 
These villagers are thus completely excluded and not able to benefit 
from the ITP sector, as they are not connected to the value chain. More-
over, when they lack alternative livelihood sources, these villagers become 
even more vulnerable, as they are left exposed to the negative impacts 
caused by large-scale land control and land-use changes. 
6.3.4 Active exclusion 
Not all villagers excluded are as vulnerable as the above group. Some vil-
lagers do not plant eucalyptus trees as they have better choices as a result 
of their abundant resources (material, financial and social), as already men-
tioned in Chapter 5. 
Some of them control sufficient means of production, but choose not 
to plant eucalyptus trees. Some villagers prefer sugarcane, while others use 
their land for fruit trees. Their choices are based on careful cost and ben-
efit calculations. Some of the villagers might not have control over large 
landholdings, but have access to other profitable off-farm work, including 
upstream and downstream businesses connected to the ITP sector. For 
these villagers, although they only own tiny plots, they can still acquire 
enough land using their financial capital if they want to engage in the ITP 
sector. Thus, their exclusion from the ITP sector is due to their own 
choice and calculation. 
This group of villagers thus has the capability and autonomy to engage 
in the ITP sector. By making their own calculations, they choose to be 
actively excluded from the sector. For them, although they do not benefit 
directly from the ITP sector per se and might also be affected by the nega-
tive ecological impacts of the ITP sector, they are not considered vulner-
able and some might even profit from the rise of the ITP sector if they 
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engage in upstream/ downstream businesses (e.g. timber processing and 
timber transport). 
Based on the typology above, villagers’ attitudes towards the economic 
value of the ITP sector can be reconsidered. As shown in Table 6.2, vil-
lagers who are actively included in the ITP sector give it the highest eval-
uation, and those who are passively excluded give the lowest rating on the 
economic value of the ITP sector. Meanwhile, villagers who are incorpo-
rated in a subordinated way have a lower opinion than those who are ex-
cluded because of their own choice. The difference between their attitudes 
is significant. In other words, villagers’ different engagements with the ITP 
sector notably affect their attitudes to the gains or losses associated with 
the expansion of the ITP sector. Villagers who control the production 
process and outputs of the ITP sector (Type A) believe they can gain from 
the ITP sector. Contrarily, villagers who are adversely incorporated into 
the ITP sector (Type B) do not think so. Most of those who are passively 
excluded from the ITP sector (Type C) claim they lose from the expansion 
of the trees, and are much more pessimistic than those who are excluded 
actively (Type D). The result is in line with the qualitative analysis above. 
Table 6.2 Different types of villagers’ perceptions of the economic value 
 N Means Sig 
Type A: active inclusion 66 3,121 
0,045 
 Type B: passive inclusion 14 2,643 
 Type C: passive exclusion 13 2,385 
Type D: active exclusion 11 3,000 
Source: Interviews in March to April 2016 in Guangxi; 1 = very low economic value, 5 = very high 
economic value. 
 
Therefore, underlying the expansion of the ITP sector, the scenario in 
rural Guangxi is not as simple as “villagers being dispossessed or even 
displaced” by capitalists related to large-scale land control and land-use 
changes. With different resource endowments (both material and social) 
and embedded in the specific politico-economic environment, some vil-
lagers become incorporated while are excluded, either actively (voluntarily) 
or passively (forcibly). In a more complex way, because of their distinct 
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capability and autonomy in controlling the means of production, produc-
tion process and outputs, and their access to alternatives, those who are 
incorporated might become more vulnerable, and those who are excluded 
might not lose out. 
However, such a typology is not static: villagers who are actively in-
cluded, might lease out their land (due to income emergencies) and shift 
their situation into passive inclusion; villagers who are temporarily hired 
in the ITPs might lose their work and become excluded; and villagers who 
are actively excluded might decide to get involved in the ITP sector due 
to changes in the market. 
6.4 Perceptions of the affected villagers 
As analysed above, these four types of villagers are affected differently by 
the expansion of the ITP sector due to their distinct positions within or 
outside the value chain. Accordingly, they have different perceptions of 
the ITP sector, especially about its impacts on land control and the envi-
ronment. 
Figure 6.2 Villagers’ grievances towards land and environmental issues 
 
Source: Interviews in March to April 2016 in Guangxi. 1 = low grievance level, 5 = high grievance 
level 
 
1
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As shown in Figure 6.2, villagers’ perceptions of fairness or justness are 
concentrated on the environmental degradation caused by planting euca-
lyptus trees. The affected villagers complain that eucalyptus trees absorb 
too much nutrition and water, which affects crops (e.g. sugarcane) planted 
nearby. They also mention the negative ecological impacts on their liveli-
hoods: “now the paddy cannot be cultivated. Since the investors started 
to plant eucalyptus trees, here is very little water and it has become very 
dry. We can only plant some maize and peanuts. But (whether to harvest) 
still depends on the weather” (Field notes, 2 March 2016). Some of the 
villagers are also worried about health problems caused by the ITPs. They 
claim that “eucalyptus trees are poisonous. Now the water flowing down 
from mountains (where the eucalyptus trees are planted) is all black” (Field 
notes, 18 February 2016). Although many of the included villagers also 
mention such negative environmental impacts, those who are excluded 
(both actively and passively, type C and type D) express more grievances 
about the environmental issues caused by the ITPs. 
In terms of land issues, villagers’ perceptions of unfairness or unjust-
ness were not significant (less than 3) during my fieldwork interviews. In 
the villages where collectively-owned forestland was allocated to each 
household, most of villagers claimed that land was distributed to every 
household and therefore illegal land occupations have not occurred. Some 
of these villagers complain about the shade caused by eucalyptus trees 
planted on the nearby farmland plots. They see this as a kind of land oc-
cupation that will affect their food production. In villages where forestland 
was distributed based on the principle of “first occupation” or customary 
occupation, some villagers complained that some elites were able to oc-
cupy more land due to better access to information. As explained by a 
villager during a focus group discussion: 
In the past, this used to be an undistributed wasteland hill...That one (refer-
ring to the ex-leader of the village) must have known it (referring to infor-
mation about the economic value of eucalyptus trees) from the county gov-
ernment. The (collectively-owned) forestland would have been distributed 
that year, but he occupied a lot of land himself. Other people around saw it. 
Then they also started to occupy the land (Field notes, 11 March 2016). 
In the villages where collectively-owned forestland has been leased to 
outside investors, the villagers’ concerns are more about land rent. In a 
news report in Economy & Nation Weekly, an employee from the Guangxi 
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Forestry Department mentioned that the price of forestland in the prov-
ince has increased more than 10 times since the land leasing started, so 
“there are huge conflicts” (Zhang 2010a). Conversely, those who lease the 
land to plant eucalyptus trees usually complain about land encroachment 
onto their ITPs by local villagers. The villagers who are actively included 
(Type A), especially the owners of large-scale ITPs, have relatively more 
grievances about illegal land occupations due to encroachment by nearby 
villagers. These planters complain about becoming the target of resistance 
from other villagers. 
In short, villagers who are passively excluded (Type C) generally ex-
press more grievances towards the ITP sector, especially related to 
environmental concerns. Conversely, villagers who are incorporated into 
the ITP sector have significantly fewer grievances about its negative eco-
logical impacts. However, among the four types, the differences in villag-
ers’ attitudes towards land grabs caused by the ITP sector are not signifi-
cant, partly due to their distinct understanding of land occupation. 
 
6.5 Differentiated political reactions by the villagers 
Although almost every villager has some complaints about the ITP sector, 
not all of them have transformed their complaints into resistance. Some 
villagers support the expansion of ITPs, while some resist in either overt 
or covert ways. As summarized in Table 6. 3, villagers who benefit from 
the ITP sector (Type A) generally embrace and even try to push forward 
the development of ITPs. Villagers who are adversely incorporated into 
the ITP sector (Type B), do not show obvious opposition towards the 
sector itself, but engage in political struggles for the improvement of their 
inclusion (e.g. increasing the land rent). As the most vulnerable group, vil-
lagers who are passively excluded (Type C) tend to engage in resistance to 
the sector. Type D villagers are mostly indifferent to the rise of ITPs, ex-
cept in a few cases when they covertly resist because their livelihoods are 
affected by negative ecological impacts. 
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Table 6.3 Villagers’ different political reactions to the rise of the ITP sec-
tor 
Types of 
villagers 
Gain or loss 
within ITP sec-
tor 
Political be-
haviour 
For land 
rights 
For environ-
mental jus-
tice 
For eco-
nomic 
gain 
A Benefits Support   X 
B 
Little benefit; 
some even with 
losses 
Modification X  X 
C Losses Resistance, modification X X X 
D No losses; even benefits Indifference  X  
Source: Summarized from the author’s in-depth interviews and observations in Guangxi 
 
Specifically, although most Type A villagers agree that the ITP sector 
has negative ecological impacts, they still keep planting eucalyptus trees, 
because “we farmers are practical (make a living)” (Field notes, 22 Febru-
ary 2016). Put more extremely, one villager in Xiangzhou County ex-
plained: “we farmers will run to where the greatest profits are. As long as 
it will not poison people immediately, we will plant what can bring the 
most money” (Field notes, 17 February 2016). In this sense, these villagers’ 
support for ITPs is due to their individual pursuit of profits. 
Instead of taking action against the ITP sector, this group of villagers 
(Type A) takes measures to secure and expand their control over it. To 
give an example, one villager who leased 200 mu of forestland in another 
village on which to plant eucalyptus trees, paid around 2000 Yuan per 
month to a local villager to protect his ITPs from being stolen or destroyed 
(Field notes, 12 March 2016). In another case, a villager who already 
owned 150 mu of trees, lent money to another planter to enable him to 
buy chemical inputs, in exchange for a contract to purchase his trees at a 
certain price in four years (Field notes, 18 March 2015). 
In contrast to Type A villagers, villagers who are passively included 
(Type B) do not benefit much from the ITP sector. Their priority is to 
improve their terms of incorporation rather than resist the ITPs’ en-
croachment into their villages. As described by a villager in Hepu County, 
“we are poor. There is no other choice. [Leasing the land] can get some 
money, so we all want to lease the land out” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). 
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Thus, these villagers’ actions are mainly against unpaid rent and under-
paid labour in the ITPs, ranging from overt litigation to covert pilfering 
and sabotage. Some of the actions are against investors, as is highlighted 
by the conflicts between villagers and Stora Enso discussed by Ping and 
Nielsen (2010a). Similarly, according to the report in Economy & Nation 
Weekly, in a village in Pubei County, villagers contracted their land to APP 
on terms of cooperation. They received no payment after two rounds of 
logging, so they denied APP’s request to log again. One villager in Pubei 
County explained, “Seedlings are from APP, but the land is mine. Why do 
they think they can log the trees when the price (of the land share) is not 
acceptable?” (Zhang 2010a). Some of these actions were also against other 
villagers, understood as the “poor-versus-poor” type of conflicts men-
tioned by Borras and Franco (2013). Such disputes are not only concen-
trated on the uneven access to land between rich and poor families, as was 
the case in one type of conflict in Vietnam (McElwee 2009, McElwee 
2012), but are also related to the distribution of the benefits derived from 
plots with ambiguous land rights attached to them. One example is given 
by a villager in Hepu County (Field notes, 3 March 2016): 
Villager: Here family X used to have a gang fight with family Y over a 
boundary of forestland which has already been leased out to Stora Enso.15 
Author: For land rent? 
Villager: Yes. 
Author: But isn’t the rent very little? 
Villager: Even though it´s little, they still want it 
Villagers who are passively excluded (Type C) suffer the most from the 
expansion of the ITP sector. Accordingly, their opposition is more signif-
icant. It can be encapsulated in the case of a village in Hepu County where 
a large number of villagers are passively excluded (as was mentioned dur-
ing the analysis of passive exclusion above). According to a villager inter-
viewed: 
In our village, none of the 10,000 mu eucalyptus trees have been har-
vested… Recently, the trees were all burnt down. They were burnt while 
there was only one year remaining before the trees were ready to be logged. 
Also, individuals tend to steal their trees. They (the thieves) are hardly ever 
caught. They steal the trees to sell… I do not know about the situation in 
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other villages, but in our village, the bosses (referring to the ITP investors) 
have never harvested their trees (Field notes, 1 March 2016). 
These Type C villagers resist the ITP sector through litigation, pilfering, 
arson, sabotage and land encroachment, which are all forms of overt 
“rightful resistance” (O'Brien et al. 2006), and covert “everyday forms of 
peasant resistance” (Scott 2008). They engage in the struggles for two main 
reasons: First, their resistance can be understood as revenge for their live-
lihoods being undermined. Second, some of their actions are aimed at in-
corporation. To give some examples, encroaching onto the land acquired 
by large landowners enables the villagers to get access to some land to 
plant eucalyptus trees; stealing a tree is a way for villagers to share part 
(although very little) of the benefits from the ITP sector; and blocking the 
road is a strategy for villagers to get some compensation. 
In contrast to the above group, Type D villagers have alternatives. They 
seldom conduct any overt actions against ITPs. As claimed by one villager 
in Guangxi, “the trees belong to Stora Enso. How does it have anything 
to do with us?” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). However, there is some cov-
ert resistance for environmental justice, mainly done through the internet. 
In few cases, however, these villagers take more radical actions (e.g. subtle 
sabotage) when their livelihoods are impacted, as explained by a villager in 
Guangxi: 
When planting eucalyptus trees too close, another villager will burn down 
the trees because the roots of the eucalyptus tree will stretch towards where 
the sugarcane grows. The nutrients will then be extracted by eucalyptus 
trees, and the trees will shade the sunshine. The trees of those households 
who plant eucalyptus trees in the middle of farmland and migrate out will 
be destroyed (Field notes, 17 February 2016). 
In short, the four types of villagers tend to have different reactions to 
the expansion of the ITP sector. However, the cases outlined above do 
not intend to build automatic linkages between individual situations and a 
certain type of political reaction. In reality, villagers’ actions are the result 
of far more complex processes, influenced by the politico-economic con-
text and individuals’ own experience, interpretation, and calculation. Thus, 
not all of the villagers will take visible action – especially when the actions 
are high risk. 
The scenarios described above are certainly not static, but change dy-
namically along with villagers’ engagement and political opportunities.16 
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As mentioned above, villagers might change their position within or out-
side the ITP sector value chain. Accordingly, their attitudes and possible 
reactions towards the expansion of the sector will also alter. In this con-
text, Borras and Franco (2013, 1733) remind us that: 
Changing political opportunity structure can partly influence poor people’s 
decision to engage in overt political contention to struggle around their ex-
pulsion, either against their expulsion or to demand some kind of compen-
sation or better terms of compensation. 
This highlights how affected villagers will adjust their response strate-
gies to the expansion of the ITP sector along with social and institutional 
changes (e.g. policy changes and changing social relations). Villagers’ dif-
ferent political responses can partly (re)shape the socio-economic struc-
ture in rural communities (including the actions of the investors and the 
state), which in turn might influence villagers’ engagement and political 
opportunities. Thus, this process becomes even more complicated. 
 
6.6 Further discussion on villagers’ political actions 
Four key points emerge for the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of political reactions from below. 
6.6.1 The flexibility of villagers’ actions 
We see diverse and flexible strategies by those who resist or struggle 
against the expansion of ITPs. Villagers’ weapons range from litigation to 
pilfering, arson, sabotage, and land encroachment. Villagers typically avoid 
direct confrontation with powerful groups, making their resistance more 
tolerable to authorities. Additionally, as “leaderless and nebulous move-
ments like Karen-style village resistance” (Malseed 2008, 504), most of the 
villagers’ resistance in Guangxi is spontaneous, adaptable, and difficult to 
attack or co-opt. According to an employee of a state-owned farm, these 
features are explicit: 
Villagers who live near our forestland come and chop the trees (the state 
farm planted). They sometimes even put down some herbicide. Once the 
trees die, the villagers occupy the land by growing some vegetables or sow-
ing some hemp seeds. Villagers encroach the land little by little every 
year…Villagers have time. Their land is just a few mu, and located where 
they can easily monitor it. So no one else is able to occupy their land (Field 
notes, 10 March 2015). 
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Moreover, with the development of technology, villagers have an addi-
tional tool which facilitates their resistance, namely the internet. Most vil-
lagers currently have internet access. Villagers are able to post their com-
plaints on the internet, for example through “Weibo” (the Chinese version 
of Twitter), or on a web forum. The anonymous feature of the internet 
reduces the political cost of their resistance, and the prevalence of the in-
ternet makes it easier to raise public concern and extend the reach of their 
political action very quickly. When a piece of news about illegal forestland 
expropriation is posted on Weibo (especially if there are photographs at-
tached to prove it), it may be shared millions of times within a couple of 
minutes and soon gets the public’s attention, as well as that of the author-
ities. 
As shown in the discussion above, villagers are thus not purely 
defenceless victims. They have their own weapons, which can be useful 
under certain institutional arrangements. 
6.6.2 Beyond the common assumption of “villagers against foreign 
companies” 
Villagers’ political reactions are much more diverse than the common as-
sumptions of the “villagers against foreign companies” scenario in current 
debates on global land politics. Firstly, villagers´ actions are not limited to 
“resistance”, but also include “support, compliance, modifications and 
evasions” (Kerkvliet 2009, 233). This is because villagers have different 
levels of control over the means of production, the production process 
and outputs, and varied access to alternative livelihoods. Secondly, foreign 
companies are not the only actors that the villagers resist against. As 
Borras and Franco (2012) argue, foreign capital is not the sole power that 
leads to large-scale land control changes. In the case of the ITP sector in 
Guangxi, domestic private companies, state-owned companies, individual 
entrepreneurs, the state, and local elites all play a role in the expansion, 
either as direct land recipients or as indirect facilitators. Thus, they all 
might become the targets of resistance when villagers’ interests or even 
subsistence are seriously affected. Additionally, villagers’ struggles are not 
only around land control and targeted at “grabbers”, but are also related 
to the distribution of benefits among villagers. Thus, villagers sometimes 
also resist their fellow villagers, highlighting that villagers’ conflicts have 
more complicated contours. It could be “poor people versus corporate 
actors, poor people versus the state, and poor people versus poor people” 
(Borras and Franco 2013, Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 2013, Hall et al. 
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2015). In sum, an over-simplified framework cannot capture the compli-
cated trajectories of villagers’ political reactions on the ground. 
6.6.3 Beyond land access 
In most of the literature about political reactions to large-scale land-use 
and land control changes, the focal points of conflict are usually land. 
However, as highlighted by Paige (1978), sources of income will lead to 
different conflict focuses. According to Paige (1978, 18): 
A noncultivating class drawing its income from land tends to be economi-
cally weak and must therefore rely on political restrictions on land owner-
ship. These restrictions tend to focus conflicts on the control and distribu-
tion of landed property. A noncultivating class drawing its income from 
commercial or industrial capital is usually economically strong and requires 
fewer political restrictions on land ownership, and conflict therefore tends 
to be focused on the distribution of income from property, not the owner-
ship of property itself. 
My study shows that land is important but not the only determinant in 
villagers’ politics. If villagers only draw their income from land, the con-
flicts are focused on the control of the land. However, in rural China, a 
large number of villagers get their income from non-agricultural sectors 
rather than land per se (Ye, Wang, and Long 2009). For them, “farming 
income is just pocket money” (Field notes, 22 February 2016). Thus, with 
the expansion of ITPs, some conflicts are focused on the distribution of 
profits derived from the sector and protecting villagers’ livelihoods from 
being affected by the sector, rather than on land access itself. 
To take the discussion a step further, a large part of villagers’ concerns 
are centred on how to make ends meet or get more income. When land is 
the villagers’ primary source of income, they are more likely to take actions 
when they lose – or face the threat of losing – control over it. When their 
land provides very little income, villagers pay less attention to maintaining 
control over it. During my fieldwork in Guangxi, several villages wel-
comed a land consolidation programme (called “Shuang gao” or “Xiaokuai 
bian dakuai”).17 Some villagers were even eager to transfer their land con-
trol for rent, as was pointed out repeatedly by one villager from a village 
in Xiangzhou County where the programme has not yet been introduced: 
“After my land is expropriated (refers to joining the programme and leas-
ing the land out), I will start to have money” (Field notes, 21 February 
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2016). Additionally, villagers whose incomes are mainly derived from al-
ternative off-farm work are less likely to resist land control. If this group 
of villagers resists, it is usually covertly and because of negative impacts 
on their livelihoods. 
Thus, to understand the complicated trajectory of political reactions 
within large-scale land-use and land control changes, we must take into 
account the actual interests of different villagers as a unit of inquiry, rather 
than simply focusing on land access. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the dynamics of diverse political reactions 
from below, based on villagers’ different linkages with changes in land-use 
and land control. It notes that varying interests and resource endowments 
(e.g. land, labour and social resources) differentiate villagers. Meanwhile, 
it considers the specific politico-economic environment that these land-
based changes are embedded in, including relevant institutional settings, 
market access, and state intervention. 
This chapter challenges the dichotomy of “exclusion versus inclusion”, 
as this oversimplifies reality. In other words, exclusion from a booming 
sector might not be a passive choice made by the villagers in a certain 
politico-economic context. Thus, it does not necessarily cause villagers to 
lose out, and in some cases it may even benefit them. In contrast, inclusion 
might not be due to villagers’ own initiatives. Under certain terms, incor-
poration even places villagers in a more vulnerable position. The empirical 
data demonstrates that the terms of inclusion and villagers’ access to alter-
native livelihood opportunities are closely related to the wins and losses of 
affected villagers. Based on these two factors, this Chapter offers a more 
complex typology which includes passive inclusion, active inclusion, pas-
sive exclusion, and active exclusion. Following this nuanced typology, this 
Chapter analyses the affected villagers’ distinct positions within the ITP 
sector and their different political responses. 
This chapter explores the divergence of villagers’ political reactions, ar-
guing that they are far more complicated than simply the “excluded villag-
ers resisting against expulsion/dispossession” scenario portrayed by re-
cent land grabbing literature. The three main scenarios are: (1) Villagers 
do not only resist exclusion, but also struggle for better terms of 
incorporation and to reduce the negative impacts on their livelihoods; (2) 
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Villagers not only resist land investors, but also villagers; and (3) Conflicts 
are not only about land, but are also about the distribution of social, 
economic, and environmetal benefits and costs. To understand such dy-
namics, this study reveals the need for a systematic examination of 
villagers’ actual interests in the context of land-use and land control 
changes based on their different positions within the value chain. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Part of this chapter has already been published in Xu (2018b) 
2 There have been some studies that point out the division among rural dwellers 
during land use and control changes (Gerber 2011a, McElwee 2009, McElwee 
2012). 
3 Although there have already been a few studies that have pointed out environ-
mental conflicts over ITP sector (Gerber 2011a, Gerber and Veuthey 2010). 
4 There used to be many studies conducted about plantation workers’ struggles for 
the improvement of their terms of inclusion. However, the current focus in aca-
demia has shifted to the struggles of the excluded. 
5 Villagers who are only involved in the upstream/downstream business and do 
not engage directly in the ITP sector are also part of the excluded group. 
6 For example, the loss of control of the land they originally used and the crop yield 
losses caused by the negative impacts of the ITP sector. 
7 Only when p<0. 05 is the difference significant. 
8 The question was: Do you agree that villagers´ income has increased with the rise 
of the ITP sector? The possible answers were 1: strongly disagree; 2: disagree; 3: 
neither agree nor disagree; 4: agree; 5: strongly disagree. 
9 In Ukraine, the largest share of direct and indirect agricultural subsidies is given 
to large agribusinesses, while private family farmers and rural households operate 
with hardly any state support. Besides that, private family farmers have to compete 
with large agribusiness for access to land and associated resources (e.g. grain stor-
age facilities). This makes then financially disadvantaged, as they are unable to pay 
the market price for the use of those resources. 
10 Except for a small part of the hilly land already allocated through the HRS re-
form, most of the forestland remained in the hands of collectives. 
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11 During my fieldwork in 2016, villagers in only one of seven villages mentioned 
that they receive 100 Yuan per year as rent for their collective land. Villagers in 
other villages either said that they never hear about the land rent or mentioned that 
land rent remains in the collective for public activities. 
12 There are also some villagers in Guangxi who transferred their land control as 
an active livelihood choice (e.g. those who migrated to urban areas), but they do 
not belong to this group. 
13 According to the data from my interviews, the percentage ranges from 30% to 
50%. 
14 Unit for the measurement of weight: 1jin = 0,5kg. 
15 Here I replaced villagers’ family names with X and Y. 
16 In this chapter, in accordance with (Borras and Franco 2013, 1475), the political 
opportunity structure is understood as “structures of political opportunities and 
threats that are critical contexts for collective actions”. 
17 More details about the project are in part 2.4. 
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7 7 Chapter 7: conclusion  
 
 
 
This study set out to investigate the central research question: Why and how 
did the industrial tree plantation sector expand in Southern China, and what implica-
tions does it have for the livelihoods of villagers? With a critical agrarian political 
economy and political ecology analytical framework, this study explores 
the dynamics of the ITP sector’s expansion in Southern China, contextu-
ally, interactively, and dynamically. This study demonstrates that the rise 
of the ITP sector emerged under particular economic, political, and social 
conditions worldwide and in China, while the contours and trajectories of 
the ITP sector are (re)shaping and are (re)shaped by the land, labour and 
livelihood conditions in Southern China in a dynamic and relational way. 
 Furthermore, in response to the recent political discussion around ac-
cumulation and dispossession of land (see the assumption in Chapter 1), 
this study argues that villagers are not necessarily dispossessed of their 
land, neither are they always converted into landless labourers that mostly 
facilitate the development of the urban industrial sector. Instead, with the 
rise of the ITP sector in Southern China, a few villagers are able to actively 
get incorporated into and benefit from the booming sector. Moreover, a 
few villagers even have the capacity to accumulate more land with the fi-
nancial capital (wage incomes) they gain from urban industrial sectors. 
Thus, there is a reverse flow of capital and labour from urban to rural 
areas. 
Why has the ITP sector emerged and expanded so massively and 
quickly in Southern China over the past two decades? The rise of the ITP 
sector in Southern China is caused by both externally imposed and inter-
nally-driven factors, including Chinese domestic demands for its outputs, 
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agronomic conditions in Southern China, the institutional settings around 
land and labour, and the financial capital, especially the foreign capital, 
involved. These factors have created intertwined value, material, institu-
tional, and financial bases for the expansion of the ITP sector. 
How did the ITP sector emerge and expand? With the rise of the ITP 
sector, extensive changes have emerged in land-use and land control and 
labour condition. The changes in land-use and land control are dominated 
by distinct actors using diverse mechanisms. Following the changes 
around rural land, labour conditions in the rural areas also changed. In 
contrast to most studies on migration in rural areas which describe a mas-
sive labour flow from rural to urban areas, the development of the ITP 
sector has witnessed a reverse labour and capital inflow from urban areas. 
During this process, the state has played a critical and complicated role, 
both promoting and impeding the development of the sector. 
What are the implications of the ITP sector on rural villagers in South-
ern China in terms of the political economy of their livelihoods? With the 
changes in land and labour, villagers’ livelihoods are inevitably affected. 
However, villagers are not necessarily excluded by and do not necessarily 
resist the sector because of their expulsion and/or their environmental 
concerns, as has happened in many other places over the world where the 
ITP sector has expanded. Rather, villagers are affected differently in rela-
tion to the dynamics of their inclusion and exclusion in the sector, cover-
ing both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ forms of inclusion and exclusion. The poli-
tics of inclusion and exclusion, in turn, result in far more diverse political 
reactions from these villagers. 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the main arguments in this 
study on the dynamics of land, labour and livelihoods, and the mechanism 
of accumulation during the inclusion/exclusion process. The chapter then 
discusses some of the implications of this for research into land politics. 
 
7.1 Changes in land-use and land control 
As illustrated throughout this dissertation, the rise of the ITP sector in 
Southern China was followed by massive changes in land-use and land 
control. These changes are not uniform, but have many faces due to the 
dynamics within the development of the sector. Firstly, as already analysed 
in Chapter 2, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5, the ITPs are of various sizes and 
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are exploited by various planters/investors, ranging from transnational pa-
per-pulp companies, Chinese state-owned forest farms, domestic private 
companies, individual entrepreneurs, and independent planters. This thus 
means that the expansion of the ITP sector involves diverse mechanisms 
of land acquisition and multiple directions of land-use change. Secondly, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6, the development of 
the ITP sector is not linear. Due to dynamics among the key actors (the 
state, investors and villagers), some ITPs might change hands and/or shift 
to some other land uses. 
There are four main directions in the trajectory of land-use change 
around the ITP sector, as summarized in Figure 7.1. With the rise of the 
ITP sector, some land plots previously dedicated to food production (e.g. 
sugarcane and cassava) were converted into ITPs (Type A). These land 
plots included farmland and a small part of less hilly and rocky forestland. 
Such land-use change was mainly dominated by villagers, usually as an 
adaptive livelihood strategy as analysed in Chapter 5. In a few cases, it also 
involved foreign and domestic companies. Such land-use change might 
provoke conflicts between planters and the neighbouring landowners due 
to the negative environmental impacts of the tree crop, especially when 
the land-use change emerged on land adjacent to plots which are still used 
for food cultivation, as presented in Chapter 6. 
Figure 7.1 Typology of land-use change with the rise of the ITP sector 
 
Type A 
Food to ITPs 
 
Type B 
Other non-food to ITPs 
 
Type C 
ITPs to food  
 
Type D 
ITPs to other non-food 
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A large number of ITPs were converted from forestland that used to 
plant other non-food crops (Type B). Most of these forestland plots re-
mained degraded, with pine trees or acacia trees planted dispersedly.1 This 
does not mean that these land plots are actually waste. As revealed in 
Chapter 4, a few villagers did get some income from the forest products 
(e.g. firewood). Thus, such land-use change might violate the livelihoods 
of some villagers and then cause conflicts. 
However, such land-use change is not static. Due to various economic, 
social, and poltical reasons, some ITPs convereted back into the 
cultivation of food (Type C), or other non-food crops (Type D). As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, on encountering resistance from below, the local 
state started to halt the rapid expansion of the ITP sector in 2014. With 
the intervension of the state, some state farms changed part of their 
eucalyputs tree plantations into pine tree plantations. Similarly, due to the 
removal of eucalputs trees planted on farmland orgainzed by some county 
governements, a few villagers changed their land-use of these farmland 
plots back to food production (e.g sugarcane), as described in Case 8 in 
Chpater 1. In addition, land-use change also emereged due to a few 
villagers’ livelihood choices when considering the risks casued by market 
volatility and uncertain agronomic conditions (e.g. the weather), as men-
tioned in Chapter 5. This reminds us to make a more careful exploration 
of the past, present, and future trends in land-use. 
The above shows a far more complicated trajectory of land-use around 
the ITP sector than in other regions worldwide. The rise of the ITP sector 
is not accompanied by large-scale deforestation, as demonstrated by cases 
in Ecuador (Gerber and Veuthey 2010). In China, most of the natural for-
ests in Guangxi were destroyed in 1935. Thus, the forestland used to build 
ITPs was either degraded or already used for the cultivation of inedi-
ble/edible crops. Furthermore, some eucalyptus trees were planted on the 
tiny and fragmented farmland plots which were previously devoted to 
food production. This indicates that, compared with those ITPs trans-
formed from natural forests, ITP’s encroachment into Southern China 
had a distinct impact on villagers and the environment. 
As most of the farmland plots were fragmented when contracted to 
households during the HRS, in Guangxi the land control changes linked 
to the ITP sector did not commonly take place on farmland, but on state-
owned or collectively-owned forestland as shown in Table 7.1. As analysed 
in Chapter 4, state-owned forestland was contracted to foreign companies 
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facilitated by local governments. In a few cases, the land was accessed by 
the investors in the form of cooperation. Similarly, the collectively-owned 
forestland was also (sub-)leased to investors, including foreign companies, 
domestic private companies, state-owned farms, and individuals. Some of 
this land leasing involved middlemen, who leased land from rural collec-
tives/individual villagers and then re-contracted it to investors. Mean-
while, some of the forestland plots originally controlled by villagers, either 
via the HRS reform or customary occupation, were transferred to inves-
tors through lease or cooperation deals. 
Table 7.1 Typology of the change in land control around the ITP sector in 
Guangxi 
Type Property rights From Via To Mechanism 
A1 State-
owned 
State 
farms 
State-owned 
company 
Foreign/domes-
tic investors 
Leasing 
A2 State-owned 
State 
farms 
State-owned 
company 
Foreign/domes-
tic investors 
Cooperation 
(share-holding) 
B1 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Villagers - Foreign/domes-
tic investors 
Leasing 
B2 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Villagers - Foreign/domes-tic investors 
Out-grower 
contract 
B3 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Villagers - Foreign/domes-tic investors 
Cooperation 
(share-holding) 
B4 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Villagers Middlemen (lo-cal/outside) 
Foreign/domes-
tic investors Leasing 
C1 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Village 
collectives - 
Foreign/domes-
tic investors Leasing 
C2 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Village 
collectives 
Middlemen (lo-
cal/outside) 
Foreign/domes-
tic investors 
Leasing 
C3 
Collec-
tively-
owned 
Village 
collectives - Villagers 
Customary oc-
cupation 
 
However, the change in land control is not a one-way process. As a 
response to conflicts, some investors were observed to return part of their 
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land back to rural collectives or villagers, as illustrated by the case of Stora 
Enso in Chapter 4. Likewise, faced with crop failure due to frequent ty-
phoons, arson, and tree thefts, a few investors subcontracted their land to 
other investors (see Chapter 4 for the case of APP). 
With the change in land control, land-based wealth and power was also 
(re)distributed. It led to distinct impacts on investors, state-owned farms, 
and villagers. Investors gained access to land via different channels, more 
or less facilitated by the state. Meanwhile, they had to deal with different 
forms of resistance to their land acquisitions. As to the state-owned farms, 
on the one hand they lost a large part of their land when foreign paper-
pulp companies (mainly Stora Enso) came to acquire land for the con-
struction of ITPs with the strong support of the provincial government. 
On the other hand, to compensate such land loss, they contracted large-
scale forestland from rural collectives, facilitated by the local state. Villag-
ers, were affected differently. Some villagers, especially the “rural poor”, 
were dispossessed of the collectively-owned forestland that they had pre-
viously been able to use. In contrast, a few villagers, those intimate land 
grabbers analysed in Chapter 5, were able to gain control over more land. 
In this sense, the change in land control led to further differentiation 
among villagers. 
 
7.2 Changes in labour conditions 
In the course of the rise of the ITP sector, the labour conditions in South-
ern China also changed. Villagers were observed to migrate (i) from rural 
to urban areas, (ii) from urban to rural areas and (iii) from rural to some 
other rural areas, as shown in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Labour flow during the rise of the ITP sector 
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First, some villagers migrated to urban areas or nearby towns to seek 
waged jobs, while keeping eucalyptus trees planted at home. Such an ar-
rangement is closely related to the labour-saving characteristics of euca-
lyptus. During my interviews in the spring 2016, 69% of those households 
with family members doing migrant work chose to plant eucalyptus trees 
at home.2 Furthermore, 78% of the households that planted eucalyptus 
trees had at least one family member who migrated to an urban area.3 
However, this does not mean that villagers’ migration is directly caused 
by the rise of the ITP sector. For some villagers, the wages from migrant 
work were their main source of income. In such circumstances, planting 
eucalyptus tree were treated as an additional livelihood choice if they had 
land resources. As explained by a villager, “When (we) plant eucalyptus 
trees, we migrate to do wage jobs. When (we) do not plant eucalypts trees, 
we also migrate” (Field notes, 3 March 2016). 
Second, as illustrated in Chapter 5, a few villagers, mainly intimate land 
grabbers, gave up waged jobs in urban areas, went back to rural areas and 
used the income earned from the industrial sector to invest in the ITP 
sector. Whereas a number of scholars have argued that large numbers of 
villagers migrate from rural to urban areas as cheap wage labour in the 
industrial sector to facilitate capital accumulation in contemporary China 
(Arrighi 2007), the above shows an opposite direction of labour and cap-
ital flow: from urban to rural. 
Third, there are also some villagers who moved from being subsistence 
farmers to being plantation workers, and who came not only from local 
villages, but also from villages further away, even other provinces. This 
indicates an alternative trajectory of rural labour migration which has thus 
far been little explored: from rural to rural. These villagers left their 
hometown and came to work for the ITPs (e.g. tree planting, weeding, or 
logging). These migrant workers are preferred by some investors, espe-
cially local grabbers, as analysed in Chapter 5.4  
Considering that the ITP sector is a labour-saving sector, this crop 
boom thus actually created very few job opportunities for the local popu-
lation. In this sense, those villagers who lost control over the land they 
had previously used (including the collectively-own forestland) found it 
difficult to get incorporated in the sector. They are therefore most likely 
to be completely excluded. 
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7.3 Changes in livelihoods 
In the current literature on land politics, villagers, who are the original 
users of land, are commonly portrayed as victims within land grabbing: 
they lose control over the land they previously used. They are dispos-
sessed, or even displaced, in a context where “their land is needed, but 
their labor is not” (Li 2011, 286). In response, villagers sometimes choose 
to resist these land deals in either overt or covert ways (Borras and Franco 
2013), or to adapt (Mamonova 2015). 
However, this study demonstrates that the role of villagers is not lim-
ited to this. Villagers are not homogeneous. They have distinct resource 
endowments, including land control, labour conditions, financial re-
sources, and social relationships. Based on these factors, as shown in 
Chapter 5, when faced with the rise of the ITP sector, villagers’ livelihood 
changes were diverse. A few villagers acquired land and became owners of 
ITPs themselves. Some villagers maintained their land control, with resil-
ience enhanced through land-use changes. In addition, some villagers 
“stepped out” of the sector due to their access to better livelihoods else-
where. Thus, during the expansion of the ITP sector, some villagers were 
dispossessed or adversely affected, while a few may have benefited and 
may even have dispossessed others. 
7.4  Villagers’ wins and losses: the typology of inclusion and 
exclusion and accumulation mechanisms 
With distinct livelihood changes, villagers’ positions within the value web 
of the ITP sector also vary. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the 
common dichotomy of “exclusion versus inclusion” cannot capture the 
complexity of the dynamics in Southern China. In other words, those vil-
lagers who get included do not necessarily win, while those who are ex-
cluded do not necessarily lose. This reminds us to look further. In order 
to understand the actual wins and losses of affected villagers, this study 
therefore offers a more complex typology: passive inclusion, active inclu-
sion, passive exclusion, and active exclusion, as shown in Figure 6.1. This 
nuanced typology considers the terms of inclusion and villagers’ access to 
alternative livelihood opportunities. 
Based on the above typology, villagers experience diverse trajectories 
of changes in land-labour relations and livelihoods. As already mentioned 
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in Chapter 1, these dynamics relate to the classic formulations of PA, 
ABD, and AWD. 
When villagers are positively included in the ITP sector, they still main-
tain, and in a few cases even gain, control over land. At the same time, 
they work for the ITP sector, although not necessarily as cheap wage 
workers. In this scenario the land is not needed, but the labour is. In these 
circumstances, the villagers are not dispossessed, and sometimes even dis-
possess others (e.g. intimate land grabbing). Thus, for this group of villag-
ers, the growth of the ITP sector is generally without dispossession. 
In contrast to the previous group, villagers who are passively included 
control little (or even no) means of production and have little (or even no) 
access to alternative livelihoods. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, among 
these villagers, except for a few who have a little land as a result of their 
natural resource endowments, most villagers lose control over land 
(mainly collectively-owned forestland) via either economic or extra-eco-
nomic channels. Meanwhile, they do work in the ITP sector. Some are 
forced (passively) to plant eucalyptus trees on very tiny land plots (usually 
less than 1 mu) and are very likely to end up selling trees at a very low rate 
due to a lack of bargaining power. Others do get some job opportunities 
from investors, but this is always temporary and seasonal. Thus, the vil-
lagers are not completely expelled from the land, and are simultaneously 
converted into cheap labour. Both land and labour are needed. In other 
words, similar to Chuang’s (2015) findings in rural China during the rise 
of capitalism, what capitalists want are both cheap land and cheap workers. 
The process contains elements of both Harvey’s ABD and Arrighi’s 
AWD. Under the worst occasions, villagers experience dual accumulation 
with the rise of the ITP sector. 
The villagers that are passively excluded are those with little/no control 
over the means of production and have no access to alternative liveli-
hoods. Similar to the above group, most of these villagers might have lost 
control of their land. What is worse, they do not get employed. This is a 
situation in which “the land is needed, but the labour is not”, which is 
closer to accumulation by dispossession/primitive accumulation. 
There are also some villagers who choose not engage in the ITP sector, 
as they have sufficient means of production and/or access to alternative 
livelihood sources. Thus neither their land nor labour is needed. They are 
not dispossessed by the expansion of the ITP sector.5 This implies that for 
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these villagers, the encroachment of this sector into rural areas might not 
become a process of accumulation. 
The above discussion is not intended to claim that all cases are neatly 
and fully captured by this typology. There are always exceptions. But the 
discussion helps to deepen our understanding of the dynamics within and 
between villagers’ various engagements in the ITP sector and reflects a 
general tendency of differentiation among villagers within the rise of the 
sector. 
Because of their distinct positions and diverse degrees of dispossession 
(or no dispossession), villagers have various perspectives on the rise of the 
ITP sector and tend to have various political responses towards the ex-
pansion of the sector. In turn, these political responses affect state policies 
and politics, and further shape the trajectory of the development of the 
ITP sector (see Chapter 3). 
 
7.5 Insights into global land politics as seen from China 
In its analysis of the case of China, this study presents a complicated tra-
jectory of the ITP sector. However, I hope that the implications of this 
study are not limited to China and the study of ITPs. As a conclusion to 
this dissertation, I would like to highlight three key points, with the hope 
of contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of global land 
politics. 
First, foreign land investments can emerge anywhere around the world, 
even in those countries that are normally perceived as being the home of 
land investors. In the literature on global land politics, China is cast as 
either a major land grabber in distant places such as Africa, or as a key 
context for crop booms elsewhere because it provides a massive market 
demand for crops such as soya from Southern America. This study shows 
that there are also foreign land investments inside China that involve trans-
national capital and investors. It reminds us that capital accumulation is prin-
cipally interested in geographic places and settings where it can generate profit, which 
is not new but is critical for rethinking the nature of global land politics. 
Second, in additional to large-scale and (transnational) corporate-dom-
inated land investments, relatively small-scale land deals/transactions that 
are initiated by local villagers also exist. Correspondingly, local villagers are 
not always “victims” and “resisters”, but sometimes investors or even 
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grabbers. While most studies focus on large-scale foreign corporate-dom-
inated land deals, relatively small-scale land acquisitions initiated by local 
villagers receive much less attention. This reflects the fact that the scale of 
land acquisitions, the identities of investors, and a simplified view of the 
role of villagers tend to take precedence in analyses of land politics. How-
ever, over-focusing on these elements can be problematic and even mis-
leading. This study demonstrates that: small-scale land transactions are not 
necessarily less significant than large-scale ones; local actor-dominated 
land control changes might sometimes have a more serious adverse impact 
on local communities. Furthermore, within land deals, villagers might also 
accumulate at the expense of their fellow villagers, rather than being 
simply victims or resisters. These are critical reminders to go beyond the 
dichotomies of “small vs. large”, “outsider vs. local actors” and “victims 
vs. grabbers”, and instead focus on the dynamics of social relationships around 
land and production processes. 
Third, faced with extensive changes in land-use and land control, vil-
lagers’ political reactions are highly diverse, stemming from their distinct 
resource endowments and access to alternative livelihood sources. Current 
studies focus on “the excluded villagers fighting against investors (mainly 
foreign investors)”, while this study shows a more complicated scenario. 
On the one hand, villagers do not only resist exclusion, but also struggle 
for better terms of incorporation and to protect their livelihoods from 
being affected. On the other hand, villagers resist not only land investors, 
but also other villagers. Moreover, conflicts which emerge from land 
grabbing are not only centred on land issues. In some cases, conflicts are 
assoiciated with the distribution of social, economic, and environmetal 
benefits and costs becasue villagers’ concerns are always centred on sub-
sistence and economic gain, rather than land access per se. When land is 
villagers’ primary source of income, they are more likely to take action if 
they lose control over the land. When their land provides very little in-
come, villagers pay less attention to maintaining their control over it. Thus, 
villagers whose incomes are mainly from off-farm work are less likely to 
resist land grabbing. Furthermore, when villagers are able to benefit from 
the extensive changes in land-use and land control, they tend to embrace 
these changes. Hence, to understand the complicated trajectory of political 
reactions, instead of being “land-centric”, the differentiated interests of affected 
villagers and their wins and losses should be the key unit of inquiry. 
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7.6 Epilogue 
Grounded in a critical agrarian political economy and political ecology an-
alytical framework, this study explores the dynamics of the ITP sector’s 
expansion in Southern China. The rise of ITP sector over the past few 
decades involving both foreign and domestic actors has led to extensive 
changes in land-use and land control, as well as in the labour conditions 
and livelihoods of the villagers in question. Affected villagers have shown 
diverse political reactions to the encroachment of the sector. 
However, as I have mentioned throughout this dissertation, the devel-
opment of the ITP sector and the corresponding changes in land, labour, 
and livelihoods are not static, but full of dynamics. Changes in Chinese 
state policy and the global context will inevitably lead to further changes 
in rural land and labour conditions, which will in turn affect the trajectory 
of ITPs and other boom crops (e.g. sugarcane) in rural China. 
 By unpacking these dynamics, this study does not intend to champion 
the expansion of the ITP sector or applaud the positive changes of a few 
villagers (those who benefit, e.g. who are positively included and positively 
excluded). Instead, it hopes to reveal the diverse and dynamic nature of 
land politics and call attention to the marginalized and their struggles dur-
ing the crop boom. 
This study is focused on a specific sector (the ITP sector) in a specific 
area of China (mainly Guangxi), but the implications of it are expected to 
go beyond the sector and research region. On the one hand, this study 
illustrates an alternative trend in agrarian transformation in China: instead 
of rural labourers migrating to work in industrial sectors in urban areas, 
there is a reverse flow of labour and capital from industrial sectors in urban 
areas to agriculture sectors in rural areas. On the other hand, this study 
also relates to global land dynamics and rural politics in other countries. It 
offers a more refined trajectory of global land politics and highlights the 
differentiation among villagers during a crop boom and the corresponding 
changes in land-use and land control. 
Furthermore, in addition to the dynamics of land, labour and liveli-
hoods discussed above, intra-household, inter-generational and gender dy-
namics have a role to play in the villagers’ livelihood changes, land politics, 
and then agrarian transformation (Park and White 2017, De Haan and 
Zoomers 2005). So this is a critical area for future study. 
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Notes
1 These trees are planted by production teams rather than individual villagers. 
2 Among the 106 interviewed villagers, 84 households already had family members 
that migrated. Of these households, 58 plant eucalyptus trees. 
3 Of the 106 villagers I interviewed, 76 villagers told me that they have planted 
eucalyptus trees. Of these planters, 59 households have at least one family member 
doing migrant work in an urban area. 
4 As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are also a few investors, especially large-scale 
ITP owners, who prefer local wage workers. According to an interview with an 
employee of a foreign company, large-scale investors are more concerned with 
continuity because their ITPs are larger (Field notes, 19 March 2016). 
5 But they might be dispossessed or become cheap wage workers during some 
other process in another sector, and in urban areas. 
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 8 Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Questions for academic actors 
 
1. The general situation of the development of eucalyptus trees in 
Guangxi: 
• What kind of trees are planted here? And how many areas are al-
located to each type? 
• When did the eucalyptus trees become popular in Guangxi? And 
why? 
• What are the main products of eucalyptus trees? 
2. Their relevant research: 
• What is your main research direction? 
• What do you think about the eucalyptus tree crop in terms of its 
economic and ecological values? 
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Appendix 2 
Questions for state actors 
 
1. General situation of the forests in Guangxi: 
• What are the area and the types (for economic use or for ecology 
use) of the forestland now? What kind of trees are planted here? 
And how many areas are allocated to each type? 
• The economic effect (are there any changes in the economic 
growth in Guangxi, especially in rural areas); ecology effect, and 
social effect (employment)? 
• The problem and challenges you have met. 
• Plans for the future (how many hectares for economic forests). 
2. The land-use changes for ITPs in Guangxi: 
• The land property rights (collective or private, what is the percent-
age of the state-owned forest farms? What are the percentages of 
domestic and foreign forest farms, respectively?). 
• The history of the land (before the plantations, what did they do 
with these lands? The time of change, the process aim). 
3. The situation of the forest investment in Guangxi: 
• Why does Guangxi prioritize the forestry economy for develop-
ment? 
• What kind of land can be used for forestland investment (collec-
tive or private)? 
• Is there any preferential policy for state-owned companies for for-
estland investment? Any challenges? 
• Why is it a goal to attract foreign investment in Guangxi? How is 
this done? And are there any impediments? 
4.  Relevant forest investment policies: 
• The influence of the preferential policies (development of western 
regions, coastal area, minority and China-Asian Free Trade Area) 
on the forestry economy. 
• The influence of the reforestation policy on the forest. 
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Appendix 3 
Questions for corporate actors (state-owned farms, APP and Store Enso) 
 
1. The general situation of your company: 
• What are the company’s products? 
• Where are your company’s sites (production sites, processing sites 
and circulation sites)? 
• Where do your products go: domestic or international consump-
tion? 
• Why did your company choose to invest in Guangxi? When? 
2. The investment and output value: 
• How much did the company invest in Guangxi? And how much 
of this amount goes into the ITP sector in Guangxi? 
• How much is the output value of your company here in Guangxi? 
And how much of it comes from the ITP sector in Guangxi? 
3. The company’s ITPs: 
• How many hectares of eucalyptus trees are planted by the com-
pany? 
• When did your company start to plant eucalyptus trees and why? 
• How did your company get the land for eucalyptus tree plantations 
(from government, state farms or villagers)? 
• Are the eucalyptus trees you planted all for your own products? If 
not, where/which company do you sell trees to? 
• Do your companies also buy eucalyptus trees from other plant-
ers/companies? If so, who/which companies do you buy trees 
from? 
• What are the problems and challenges you have encountered? 
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Appendix 4 
Questions for villagers 
1. The land condition and land-use change in Guangxi: 
• How much (the hectares and the plots)? 
• What kind of land (forest/farm land, irrigated land or rock and 
hilly land, leased from collective/individual or contracted through 
HRS)? 
• For what land-use (paddy, vegetables, sugarcane, eucalyptus trees 
or other economic crops)? 
• The changes and reasons? 
• The dynamic between land-use of eucalyptus and other economic 
crops? What kind of crop was planted before eucalyptus trees? 
 
2. Land property rights: 
• How much land leased by whom to whom (different types - from 
private land tenure to community-owned land leasing, with /with-
out land brokers and what is the role of the government in it)? 
 
3. Labour and livelihood changes: 
• Internal migration and impacts for the livelihood of indigent peo-
ple. 
• What is the main source of income of the rural households in 
Guangxi? 
• Whether there is any (nuanced) social differentiation within vil-
lages and the main reason behind it? 
• The labour distribution in eucalyptus tree planting? (how many la-
bourers, how much time, employed wage labour or household la-
bour)? 
 
4. Eucalyptus tree expansion: 
• The new technology used for planting eucalyptus (the seed, the 
fertilize and the herbicide used ). 
• The production mode of eucalyptus (independent planter/ con-
tract farming/wage labour, percentages for each). 
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• The commodity chain of eucalyptus (for domestic consumption 
or export, locally processed or transported to other places to pro-
cess, involved with domestic private/state/transnational capital). 
• Is there any resistance against the eucalyptus tree expansion, for 
what reason (land, environment or employment)? 
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Appendix 5 
questionnaire (English version) 
 
Time   
Location  city  county  township 
Code   
 
A personal status: 
A1 your gender is: ( )  1) male  2) female 
A2 your age is _________________ 
A3 your education background is ： ( ) 
0) none 1) primary school 2) middle school 3) university/college and above 
 
B Household condition 
B1 Your annual household income is _________Yuan, of which: 
 Yuan 
B2 from rice cultivation  
B3 from sugarcane cultivation  
B4 from eucalyptus cultivation  
B5 from other economic crops _________   
B6 from animal husbandry  
B7 wage in town  
B8 wage in the urban area  
B9 from trade  
B10 from eucalyptus upstream and downstream sector  
B11 others____________  
 
B12 The number of your household members, and each one’s status: 
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The rela-
tion with 
respond-
ent  
Age Sex 
1m 
2f 
Marriage 
situation 
1 single 
2 married 
3 widowed 
Education 
0 none 
1 primary 
2 middle 
school 
3 univer-
sity/col-
lege and 
above 
Other off-
farm work 
in the vil-
lage 
1 selling ag-
ricultural 
inputs 
2 transport 
3 wood 
processing 
4 trade 
5 doctor/ 
teacher 
      
      
      
      
      
Internal migration Villager 
cadre? 
0 No 
1 Yes 
Whether 
0 No 
1 Yes 
2 used to, 
but not 
now 
If so, 
since 
when 
Where 
1 town 
2 city in 
Guangxi 
3 other 
province 
What job? 
1 construction 
2 factory 
3 waged job in 
commercial 
and service sec-
tor 
4 teacher 
5 trade (boss) 
6 other_____ 
How 
long a 
year 
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C Land condition: your household currently owns _______ (Mu) land 
with _____plots. 
 Plots  Hectare (Mu) 
C1 agricultural land owned (paddy 
land) 
  
C2 agricultural land owned (dry land)   
C3 forestland owned   
 
 Plots 
Hec-
tare 
(Mu) 
Year 
From/to 
1 village collective 
2 state farms 
3 foreign companies 
4 domestic private com-
pany 
5 individual villagers 
6 domestic investors/ 
middlemen 
For 
1 rice 
2 eucalyptus 
3 sugarcane 
4 fruit trees 
5 cassava 
6 maize 
7 vegetables 
8 other_____ 
C4 agricultural 
land leased in      
C5 forestland 
leased in      
C6 agricultural 
land rented out      
C7 forestland 
rented out      
 
D The current land-use for your agricultural land and forestland: 
 Rice  
Eu-
ca-
lyp-
tus  
Sug-
ar-
cane  
Fruit 
trees 
Cas-
sava Maize 
Vege-
tables  
Other 
economic 
crops 
Agricul-
tural land 
(Mu) 
        
Forestland 
(Mu)         
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Usage 
1 subsist-
ence 
2 commer-
cialize 
        
 
E How much time and do you spend on the crops listed in the table 
in your household, and how many labourers are involved: 
 Rice 
Euca-
lyptus 
(first 
year of 
1 rota-
tion) 
Eucalyp-
tus 
(after the 
growth 
stage) 
Sug-
ar-
cane 
Fruit 
trees 
Cas-
sava Maize 
Veg-
eta-
bles 
Other 
eco-
nomic 
crops 
Time 
(days)          
Number 
of labour-
ers 
         
 
F Status of eucalyptus cultivation 
F1 Do you plant eucalyptus trees? ( ) 1) Yes  2) No 
F2 If not, why? ( ) 
1) Environment pollution  2) no land 3) no money 4) the require-
ment of the government 5) other________ 
F3 Your household plants eucalyptus trees for ( ) 
1) the high economic profits  2) the requirement of government 3) 
the impacts of neighbour 4) the impacts of foreign investors 5) the impacts of 
state farms  6) the labour shortage 
7) Other________ 
 
F4 Your household planted the eucalyptus trees starting in the year 
________ 
 
F5 You plant eucalyptus trees: 
 Hectare 
(Mu) 
Annual income 
(Yuan) 
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a) Through contact with compa-
nies 
  
b) As wage worker   
c) As shareholder   
d) As independent planter   
 
F6 The land you plant eucalyptus trees is from: 
 Hectare (Mu) Originally usage 
1 paddy 
2 eucalyptus 
3 sugarcane 
4 fruit trees 
5 cassava 
6 maize 
7 vegetables 
8 unused/waste land 
a) your own agricultural land   
b) your own forestland   
c) leasing from collective   
d) leasing from other villagers   
e) leasing from state farm   
f) leasing from middlemen   
g) other__________   
 
F7 The cost on the eucalyptus trees (excluding labour): 
 Cost per unit 
(Yuan) 
Unit (a tree /Mu/Year/ 
rotation) 
Total 
(Yuan) 
a) seeds    
b) fertilizers    
c) herbicides     
d)oth-
ers_______ 
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F8 Do you employ wage labourers to plant eucalyptus trees? ( ) 
1) Yes  2) No 
F9 If yes, these labourers are: 
 Time 
(days) 
Number 
of labour-
ers 
Labourers from 
1 local village 
2 other regions 
of China 
3 other coun-
tries  
Cost 
(Yuan) 
a) planting      
b)weeding and fer-
tilizing 
    
c) logging     
F10 You sell the eucalyptus trees to: 
 
Logged 
0 no 
1 yes 
Together with 
the land 
0 no 
1 yes 
m3 Price 
a) APP/Stora Enso     
b) state farms     
c) domestic private 
companies 
    
d)individual inves-
tors/middlemen 
    
e) others_______     
F11 Are you hired in the eucalyptus sector（ ）1) Yes  2) No 
F12 If yes, the employment situation is ： 
Link 
 
Time 
(day/year) 
Situa-
tion 
1 sta-
ble 
Machine 
1 owned 
2 rented 
Objects 
1 foreign 
company 
Annual 
income 
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2 tem-
po-
rary  
3 no,em-
ployed by 
others 
2 state 
farm 
3 domestic 
private 
company 
4 individ-
ual inves-
tor 
a) planting       
b) weed-
ing and 
fertilizing 
     
c) logging      
 
F13 Do you take part in other links of the eucalyptus sector ( ) (mul-
tiple choices ） 
1) seeding cultivation  2) transportation  
3) wood processing  4) middleman 
 
G What do you think about the impact of eucalyptus trees planted 
in your region（indicate your opinion ） 
 
Strongly  
agree Agree  
Neither 
agree  
nor dis-
agree 
Disa-
gree  
Strongly  
disagree 
G1 Regional income 
has increased 
     
G2 More internal mi-
gration 
     
G3 The illegal land 
occupation has in-
creased 
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G4 More water pollu-
tion 
     
G5 More soil degra-
dation 
     
Thank you very much for your time! 
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Appendix 6 
questionnaire (Chinese version) 
 
关于农村转型的问卷研究 
女士/先生：您好！ 
我是荷兰伊拉斯姆斯大学社会科学学院“农村人口环境”课题组
派出的访问员，希望对您做一次社会调查，旨在了解您家庭的生
计状况。本项调查是一次匿名的社会调查，调查结果主要用于学
术研究，不会给您带来任何政治、经济上的不良影响。我们将按
照《中华人民共和国统计法》对您的回答保密。您的回答对本项
研究非常重要，衷心感谢您的配合！ 
调研时间  
调研地点 市 县 乡 
问卷编码  
 
 
A 个人和家庭基本情况 
A1 您的性别 （ ） 1）男 2）女 
A2 您的年龄__________ 
A3 您的教育水平（） 
0）无  1）小学 2）初中  
3）高中/中专 4）大学及以上 
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B 家庭状况 
B1 您家的年收入有 _________元，包括： 
 元 
B2 种粮食  
B3 种甘蔗  
B4 种桉树  
B5 其他经济作物种植_________   
B6 动物养殖  
B7 在镇上打工  
B8 在城里打工  
B9 做生意  
B10 桉树上游和下游行业  
B11 其他____________  
 
 B11 您家里一共 人， 具体的情况是： 
与 您
的 关
系 
年龄 性别 
1 男 
2 女 
婚姻状况 
1 未婚 
2 已婚 
3 寡居 
教育水平 
0 无 
1 小学  
2 初中 
3 高中/中
专 
4 大学及
以上 
在村里的其他
非农工作 
1 卖农资 
2 运输 
3 木材加工 
4 贸易 
5 医生/老师 
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打工经历 是否村干部？ 
0 否 
1 是 
是 否
外 出
进 城
工
作？ 
0 否 
1 是 
2 以
前 有
过 
如 有
， 从
何 时
起？ 
在哪里 
1 镇上 
2 广西 
3 其 他
省 
4 其 他
国家 
何 种 工
作? 
1 建筑 
2 工厂 
3 在工商
和服务行
业打工 
4 老师 
5 做生意 
6 其 他
______ 
一年在外
时间 
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
C 土地情况 
C1: 目前您家有土地_______ 块，合计_____亩 
 地块数 面积 (亩) 
C2 水田   
C3 旱地   
C4 林地   
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 块
数 
亩数 年
份 
来自/租给： 
1 村集体；2
国有林场；3 
外企；4 国内
私企；5 个人
(同村)；6 个
人（外来）/
老板 
种植 
1 粮食；2 桉
树；3甘蔗；4
果 树 ； 5 木
薯；6玉米；7
蔬菜；8 其他
_____ 
C5 租入耕地      
C6 租入林地      
C7 租出耕地      
C8 租出林地      
 
D 目前土地用途 
 粮食 桉
树 
甘
蔗 
果
树 
木
薯 
玉
米 
蔬
菜 
其他经济作物
____ 
耕地 
(亩) 
    
   
 
林地 
(亩) 
    
   
 
用途 
1自己
吃 
2买卖 
    
   
 
 
E 您家一年内多少天多少人进行耕种以下作物： 
 粮
食 
桉树 
(第一
年) 
桉树 
(一年
后) 
甘
蔗 
果
树 
木
薯 
玉
米 
蔬
菜 
其他经济作
物____ 
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时
间 
         
人
数 
         
F：桉树种植情况 
F1： 您家里有种桉树吗？（ ）1)有  2) 没有 
F2：您不种桉树的原因是？（ ） 
1)破坏环境   2）没有林地 3)没有资金 4)政府要求5)其
他________ 
F3：您种植桉树的原因是？（ ） 
1)经济效益好   2）政府要求 3)周围邻居影响 
4)外企影响  5）国有林场影响 6）劳动力短缺  
7）其他________ 
F4：您家桉树从_________年开始种植。 
F5：您家桉树种植模式是：   
 面积 年收入 
a 与企业签约种植   
b 作为工人为企业种   
c 合作种植   
d 自己独立种   
 
F6 您家种植桉树的土地:( ) 
 面积 (亩) 原来用途 
1粮食；2桉树；3甘蔗；4果
树；5木薯；6玉米；7蔬菜；8
荒地；9）其他_____ 
a) 自己的农地   
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b) 自己的林地   
c) 租集体的土地   
d) 租其他个人的土
地 
  
e) 租国有林场的土
地 
  
f) 租中间人的土地   
g) 其他__________   
 
F7 桉树成本 （劳动力除外）: 
 
单位成本 
(元) 
单位 (株/亩/年/ 轮伐期) 
总计 
(元) 
a)种苗    
b) 化肥    
c) 除草剂    
d) 其他_______    
 
F8 您家有雇工种植桉树吗？（ ）1)有  2) 没有 
F9 如果有，劳动力雇佣情况是： 
 
时间 
(天) 
人数 
来自 
1 本村；2 中国
其他地区；3 其
他国家 
成本 
(元) 
a) 耕种     
b) 除草和施肥     
c) 砍伐     
 
F10 您家桉树卖给： 
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是否包含砍
伐 
0 否；1 是 
是否包含土
地租赁 
0 否；1 是 
m3 价格 
a) 外企     
b) 国有林场     
c) 国内私企     
d) 个体老板/中
间人 
   
 
e) 其他_______     
 
F11 您是否被雇佣于桉树种植（ ）1)有  2) 没有 
F12 如果有，劳动力雇佣情况是： 
环节 
 
时间
（天
/ 年
） 
性质 
1 固
定；2 
临时 
有无勾机 
1 自己有；2
租赁；3 无，
帮人打工 
对象 
1 外企； 2
国有林场；
3 国 内 私
企；4 个体
老板 
年 收
入 
a) 播种      
b)除草，
施肥 
     
c)砍伐      
 
F13 参与桉树其他环节（ ）（可多选） 
1）种苗培养  2）运输  
3）木材加工  4）中间人 
 
G：您下列关于桉树种植的影响：（在下列符合的条目中打钩） 
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 符
合 
基本符
合 
差 不
多 
基 本 不
符合 
完 全 不
符合 
G1 收入增加了      
G2 更愿意出外
打工了 
     
G3 占地多了      
G4 土地更加干
旱了 
     
G5 土地肥力下
降 
     
以上为全部调查内容，感谢您的配合! 
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